Fe'oruary 27, 1915. 
LAND AN D ,W A T E E. 
from the north-east. Tor the nearer to Warsaw 
that line is reached, in reason, the ercater tlie 
effect the cutting of it will have upon tlie fortunes 
of the city. That Neo Georgievsk itself can be 
speedily reduced must be at least so doubtful to 
the enem}' that he must attack the Narcw line 
well above the junction of that river with 
the Bug. The attack will, of course, if it 
develops, concern the whole stretch of the river. 
I am speaking only of the point where lie will pre- 
sumably use his greatest force and attempt to 
break through. He has against him in this attempt 
the paucity of the roads, tlie condition of the soil 
(another serious thaw having just set in), and the 
absence of any railway save tlie two lines, one on 
Osowiec, the other througii Mlavva, more than 
100 miles apart. 
The railway from Mlawa will bring up 
strategy of delay wliich does that, an^l not the 
strategy of sudden action. 
The extra men can only have come from the 
new levies. In what numbers these new levies, and 
in what formation, have appeared we cannot 
exactly tell, but we may surely safely estimate 
those present upon the whole of this front from 
the Eumanian border to tiie Baltic at this moment 
as not less than six and probably not more than 
ten corps. That is not less than a quarter of a 
million nor more than alx)ut 400,000 men. The 
point is of considerable importance to our judg- 
ment of the whole war at this juncture, because 
there is nothing upon which we must try to obtain 
a juster opinion than upon the enemy's margin of 
men. We know that he has been filling gaps with 
newly-trained men, very largely, ^^e know that 
these new formations have appeared upon the 
ammunition for an attack on J'nco Georgievsk, but East; it seems possible that some of them have also 
not for the middle Narew. and if Osowiec gives appeared in Alsace. How many hare altogether 
liim a better road and a l^etter railway for a single been put in the field up to now from the Gem^an 
approach, it is yet the hardest point in the whole Empire alone we cannot yet tell, but if we say, 
line for any particular single approach, for it counting all the filling of gaps that has gone on in 
stands in a mass of marsh and forest. In spite of the last few months, and counting these new great 
his difP.culties, however, it seems clea,r enough that masses in the East, something over three-quarters 
the enemy intends a heavy attack upon the Narew. of a million, but less than a million, we probably 
and that if he does not deliver it it will only be due ■ - - - - ■ .... 
to his own miscalculation of the difficulties and 
the strength of the position gathered against him. 
It is true that permanent fortifications have 
gone down to howitzer fire in this war, but it ha.s 
shall not be far wrong. It is a point which rather 
concerns the analysis upon the duration of the 
war which will follow this; for the moment let 
us be content to conclude that the new formations 
have certainly appeared and that so far they lm\"e 
only done so where there have been good roads for principally appeared in the Eastern field and par 
the big catcrjjillar wheels to travel on and railways 
to bring up the heavy ammunition of the monsters. 
Now let us turn to the second question — 
whether, as has been stated in some quarters 
worthy of respect, the enemy brought up his new 
formations as I suggested last week. 
The additional evidence appearing since then 
seems to me to make it clearer than ever that he 
did bring up such new formations. 
It is true that the Grand Duke speaks of cer- 
tain forces being brought up by the enemy from 
the front immediately before Wai-saw upon the 
Bzura and the Kawka. But these cannot be in any 
considerable number. The forces upon the two 
rivers in front of Warsiiw have already been 
tieularly in this action or series of actions against 
the Niemen and the Narew. 
The third point of our enquiry is the extent 
of the success so far scored by the enemy again.st 
the 10th Russian xVrmy. 
Let us first sum up v.'hat is exactly known, 
being admitted directly or indii-cctly by the 
defeated as well as affirmed by tlie victorious .side. 
Two divisions have suffered so severely as to 
count no longer in the field. But the guns of less 
than one division have been lost. The retirement 
in the case of each Russian body, witlt the excep- 
tion of the two divisions that were is<ilated, lias 
been protected upon every route and in every pas- 
Scige or defile by a rear guard. These rear guards 
heavily tried. It would Ix? impossible to diminish have necessarily suft'ered he^ivily; they have also 
them.siifely in any considerable degree. necessarily abandoned many of their wounded to 
The enemy had in East Prussia up to about the enemy. On the other hand, there has been but 
the first week in February very small forces indeed a small proportion of the whole force engage^} iri 
— as the .scale of this war goes. He held positions such actions. If we put down at alx)ut 12 per cent, 
the natural strength of which is inferior to none in the general losses of the retirement and add the 
Europe. He held them against nothing more than 
the 10th ilussian Army, consisting of no more 
than four army corps ; yet he was compelled to give 
way .sfjmefthat. It is not cre<lible he had much 
more than 80,000 or 100.CK)0 men in the field. 
After the first week in February he appears 
with anything between 300,000 and 400,000 men. 
Where did the extra new farces come from ? Not 
destruction or little Icas than the destruction of 
the two belated divisions, we nuist revise our 
earlier estimates and allow for something over 
40,000 out of action — killed, wounded, and 
prisoners, upon the Russian side. 
That is a very h€<avY toll to have paid. It is 
more than a quarter of the whole 10th Russian 
Army. On the other hand, we must remember that 
from the C'arpathian front, for that needs everj' the whole army was but a sitmll proportion of the 
man the enemy can spare and more. Not from the 
west front, which is very heavily tried, and into 
which, as a fact, he has had to put new forces quite 
recently. 
Not from any considerable trained reserve, 
because we know from every indication of the cam- 
total Russian line. Four army corps out of, 
perhaps, seventy-five. 
The loss in material was surprisingly small 
so far as guns go. In transport it .seems to ivAV^. 
been heavy, which is what one v/ould ex}>ect under 
the conditions of such a retreat undertaken with 
paign and from every expression of German strate- all the had luck of a recent thaw and followed by; 
giuil opinion that lie does not work with such a a heiivy fall of snow. 
reserve (unlike the French), or rather, to be accu- What the corresf»ondJng losses of the attack- 
rate, he does not work with a large one. It is the ing side may have been wc can only guess. The 
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