February 27, 1915. 
LAND AND W A T E R. 
east of Verdun, the occupation of one of the spurs 
in the Vosges overlooking the Plain, are all so 
many small local advances which, taken individu- 
ally, mean little. But taken togetlier tliey mean 
that over all the line upon which they have 
occurred the German positions :ire now beiiig held 
with a strict minimum of men. This does not mean 
they will continue to be so held. The moment the 
enemy feels more secure in Poland he will come 
back in greater strength upon the West, and; as T 
have said, there are indications that, in one point 
of the Alsatian front, some of his new bodies have 
already come into the field. The evidence for this 
is no more than a brief sentence in the French com- 
munique of Monday to the effect that considerable 
masses of the enemy had recently appeared in front 
of the valley mouths, which lie east of Colmar, 
and that they had come on in jieculiai-ly deep an(l 
sol i d form. They must lia ve come from somewhere, 
and tlieir presence, coupled with their arrange- 
ment, suggests new levies. 
But much the most important point on all 
this front until the large new bodies appear upon 
either side is the weight of the heavy artillery. 
AVe are assured, both in French and English 
evidence, that the heavy artillery on the French 
side now dominates its opponent, but only personal 
elements could deterinine how far this is the case, 
and the question of degree here is very important. 
Should a really decisive superiority api)ear, it 
would mean a great deal. It would mean some 
embarrassment for ammunition on the enemy's 
side and some breaking strain in its manufacture. 
It will, perhaps, mean that the blockade in certain 
metals is beginning to tell, and it will decide more 
than any other factor except some great supe- 
riority in numbers the issue of the next advance 
OH either side. Without his then great superiority 
in heavy pieces, the enemy coiild iiot have, done 
what he did during the advance on Paris. With- 
out it he could not have stood as he did on the 
Aisne. Lacking it, he will hardly succeed in the 
advance with new numbers against our positions 
or resist a corresponding advance from our side. 
A POINT UPON THE DARDANELLES. 
The attack upon the Dardanelles is only 
indirectly a land operation. It is chiefly a naval 
operation with a naval object, and conducted, in 
the main by naval forces. There is one point about 
it which merits attention in connec^tioji with the 
land strategy of the affair. The Galipoli penin- 
sula, as it is called, which forms the European 
side of the Dardanelles Straits, and which takes 
its name from the town of Galipoli, north of these 
Straits at G (see plan 6) is divided from the main- 
land by Narrows, which may be called the Isthmus 
of BulairatBB. 
Now, it is evident that if this Isthmus is 
captured and held in sufficient force by a power 
commanding the sea. the reduction of the isolated 
forts marked by cros-ses u[x>n the diagram, lying 
to the south along the EuropcaTi shore of the Dar- 
danelles, is only a question of time, and with a 
nmdern siege train and high explosives, a question 
of what should be a short time. It is of interest, 
therefore, to note the conditions of the Isthmus of 
Bula ir. They are here indicated in a rough sketch. 
(Plan 7). 
Ti)e Isthmus is, generally speaking, occupied 
by one big lump of hill, with three summits, 433ft., 
7* 
489ft., and 436ft. respectively, . the 2,000ft. con- 
tour reaching close to the sea upon either side and 
the highest summit being a little to the south- 
east of the central point. This highest summit is 
crowned with a permanent work — of the value of 
vhich I know notliing— and there are, of course, 
entrenched lines reaching across the narrowest 
part and folloAving the ridge from A to B. But; 
this line can be turned by anyone in command of 
the sea. A range of 6,000 yards drops sheer from 
the top to the water on the sea side of the Isthmus, 
right over the hills into the Dardanelles Straits,, 
Gulf qfX.eros 
.'K-'\ 
■ r-, ■'— -. 'Boulair 
•; T;;VJ(;, -., .200 
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<V, .' ; .,' "---I ^-iryi 
♦;•>- — ' -•■ - -« t/Nt 
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'^'^^dantlU'-^"'"'' 
iOaa 1099 %M0 4eM 5009 MOO 
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yards 'Rtwgi 
VII. 
and there is deep water close up to the north- 
western shore of the Isthmus. 
The whole operation of occupying this little 
belt of land or of sweeping it from the sea to pre- 
vent its being crossed by the enemy closely, 
resembles that which the Japanese undertook when 
they made untenable by their men-of-war the 
isthmus which unites the Peninsula of Port Arthur 
to the mainland. 
