LAND A N D ."^ A T E R. 
February 27, 1915. 
THE DURATION OF THE WAR. 
I. 
THE first question evcrvojie iisks himself 
about the \var is, What will be its 
))robablc duration ? It is a nmtter which 
has not been discussed in these columns 
because, as will be again insisted uj)on in a 
mojuent, it is not susceptible of calculation or 
description. But as the matter is now^ more than 
ever a subject of pulilic discussion, and as more 
or Jess trustworthy rcj^orts of this and that 
authoritative opinion are being circulated, it may 
be wise to consider the elements of our judgment 
in this matter. 
Tlie I'cason that interest and conjecture upon 
the duration of the war have become so much more 
acute of late is that the end of the winter is in 
sigJit aud that this moment coincides with the end 
of the jieriotl required for training the enemy's 
new levies and for equipping our own. The days 
tlirough which we are passing are therefore a 
Jittle more suitable for this very indeterminate 
discussion than w-ere those of the past, and we 
may without imprudence sum up the only elements 
upon which any judgment can be based. 
First let it be said that any attem})t to esti- 
mate with jn-ecision the probable duration of any 
campaign whatsoever is a folly. It is a folly into 
which the enemy very conspicuously fell Avhen he 
Blade such cai-eful arrangements for a six months' 
campaign and failed to foresee the possibility of 
a campaign lasting for a year — or at any rate 
made no full preparations for the same. 
There is no reason Avhy we should imitate 
this folly by pretending to a^ny limit of our own, 
especially after so many months of warfare have 
taught us how full of unexpected accidents a 
modern campaign can be. 
But though even the vaguest pro])heey would 
be gratuitous folly, it is in this, as in almost all 
other military affairs, possible to put two alterna- 
tives and to say in the one case, " the war will 
Jiot be of less than such and such a duration," in 
the other ca.se, " it will not be of less than some 
other limit." 
Before tabulating and considering the ele- 
ments of such a judgment, one probable and one 
improbable disturbing factor in the calculation 
}nnst be eliminated. The probable factor is the 
entry of one or more of the nations now neutral 
into the campaign : the improbable factor is 
separate action, open or concealed, upon the part 
of any one of the Allies to the detriment of the 
rest. 
If either of these disturbing factors bo 
admitted all forms of calculation upon this 
matter fall to the ground. We can only judge 
vyith tlie material we have to ha)id of what will 
follow if, for instance, Roumania and Italy threw 
their weight into our scale before next May, or if 
Bulgaria joined the enemy without a correspond- 
ing recoupment upon our side; or what would 
Jiappen if some one of the Allies, fi-om exhaustion 
or from any other reason, pursued the common 
object with less vigour than the rest, it is perfectly 
impossible to determine. 
Eliminating these disturbing factors, then, 
thei-e remain two great alternatives upon the 
(general character of w^hich we can decide at once. 
8» 
Either the enemy, who is now in the strict sense 
of that term )>esiegcd, will raise the siege or the 
siege will continue. 
First, note that he can only raise the siege by, 
breaking through upon the West. 
A local and suflicient decision in the East 
might, indeed, enable him to bring great forces 
back west and might therefore indirectly secure 
his ultimate object; but that object will only be 
finally secured if his success m the West is 
complete — that is, if he break the line containing 
liim and find himself able to defeat in a final 
manner tl;e French army and its allied British 
contingent. 
In the ease of that alternative all discussion 
of the duration of the war falls to tlie ground. 
The menace to our civilisation would be then so 
ai)parent and so pressing that every resource left 
to the Western Allies would be brought into play. 
And there can be no question, especially upon the 
part of this country, of admitting the final 
result. 
It is probably true to say that in case of such 
a disaster a state of war would technically remain 
even after the very distant period in which the 
defeated parties should have suffered complete 
exhaustion, for, to use a phrase justly which has 
been often used rather wildly in this campaign, 
such a situation would literally and exactly mean 
life or death to Great Britain. It would mean 
the security of her food suppl}', and without 
food men die. 
It is only in the .second alternative that any 
element for judging the possible duration of the 
war can lie considered. That second alternative 
is the maintenance of the ]>resent siege, and the 
calculation upon which we are engaged somewhat 
remotely resembles the sort of calculation which 
every besieging army general has always made of 
the power of resistance of the besieged. - 
Let us see of what the settlements principally 
consist. 
1. There is first tiie element of wastage, and 
that has a trij)le form — the wastage in number.-j 
of men, the wastage of ammunition, and the 
restriction of supplies due to a more or less 
perfect blockade. 
2. There is secondly the element of new- 
numbers — that is, of recruitments u])on either 
side. Can the besieged arjuy count on more men 
— if so, how many? Can the besieger count on 
further numbers — if so, in what amount? 
3. The third clement is the element of to])o- 
graphy. What effect upon my siege will it have 
to occupy this, that, and tlie other point of 
vantage, and what effect will it have if tlie enemy 
on his side manages to push out and occupy this,' 
that, or the other j)oint — after breaking my lines? 
We will consider those three main elements 
of the calculations in detail, 
1. First, as to the wastage of men. 
There is no need to reiterate in this analysis 
the calculations which have so often found place 
in these columns. My readers know uj>on what 
figures they are based and that, alread}- some little 
time ago, one could estimate the total permanent 
losses of Germany alone, excluding cases of sick' 
