LAND AND W A T E R. 
February 27, 1915.. 
quantities of animals the support of which is 
no longer possible. Not the least important 
has been tlie action of Russia in the matter 
of horses. Normally, Russia sends into 
Germany 150,000 horses a year. Now she is 
sending none. Further, Russia sends in vast sup- 
plies of eggs and butter and the rest dairy produce 
in general, which have also been cut oft". 
And there is one more article of import which 
Germany needs and which will very gravely affect 
the future of this war, and that is labour. .What 
numbers can be spared from civilian occupation 
for the formation of the new armies in Germany 
is the most poignant and the most doubtful of the 
niatters we touch in this country. But whatever 
tlie margin may be, it is heavily affected by the 
absence of Italian and Slav labour, and tlie place 
of these yearly iunnigrants cannot nearly be taken 
by the use of prisoners of war. 
We may sum up and say that in every element 
of wastage or of the strain ivifosed hy time \\\>on 
the resources of the enemy, the argument points 
towards a war of shorter rather than longer dura- 
tion // the containment of the enemy continues 
unbroken and // the blockade which it is now in 
our power to impose is at last seriously imposed. 
As to the precise limits for the duration thus 
influenced, it is of course absolutely impossible ta 
make even a rougli guess, but the following ele- 
ment in our judgment should be carefully noted. 
The pinch for food and the pinch for ammunition 
has already begun upon their side. The accumula- 
tion of amnumition beyond what we are actually: 
expending has just begun on the West. Allow,- 
now, three full months and the weight of valu-r 
able projectiles upon the two sides will have; 
turned in favour of the Western Allies and; 
against the Germanic powers — // they are still- 
contained, and the same calculation, a little more; 
prolonged, gives the early summer as the corre-' 
sponding date for the chief effect of the blockade; 
of food. Not the end of May, but the end of June? 
or beginning of July gives the point of maximum 
strain in this regard, and that strain will Ive ver/j, 
heavily increased indeed if the Hungarian plain, 
or any considerable part of it, should fall into 
Russian hands before the harvest. , 
Everything, therefore, seems on this line of 
argument, to converge upon the early summer as, 
the decisiA'e moment. ; 
But it is only one line of argument. There 
remain two more, as I have said : the supply of , 
men and the topographical argument. With these 
I propose to deal next week. 
TO END THE WAR. 
HOW VICTORY MAY BE OBTAINED AT A COST OF £10,C00,0C0. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
WHATEVER may be the resources of the 
enemy in rnen, food, supplies, arma- 
ment, and ammunition, and whatever 
may be their bravery^ determination, 
and tenacity, the. Allies could end the present war 
Avell within six months. This result could, more- 
over, be achieved at an expenditure, in lives and 
money, verj^ much less than any amount which the 
most optimistic military expert, in his most opti- 
mistic moments, would venture to fix. It is true 
that, in order to bring about such a result, it would 
be necessary to revise our ideas concerning the 
methods of warfare which our generals and strate- 
gists have inherited from their predecessors. If 
it be accurate to say that tlie object of a war is 
to end that war 07i terms acceptable to the victors, 
then, if it could be proved that, by a slight re- 
adjustment of our ideas in the light of modern 
conditions, we could bring the present war to an 
early close, it would be reasonable to assume that, 
when such proof is established, we shall be expe- 
ditious and thorough in giving effect to our 
modified views. 
In the present article the writer proposes to 
bring forward evidence, based on actual facts and 
experience, which will prove that an aerial offen- 
sive, on a comprehensive and sustained scale, can 
lead to a quick and glorious conclusion a war 
which, otherwise, may be both protracted and 
costly. 
The Avriter desires to elaborate his views, at 
some length, on this all-important proposition, 
and claims earnest attention both on the score of 
his technical training and experience in aero- 
nautics, and on the fact, also, that, possibly, he 
has given more thought and consideration to the 
capabilities of military aeronautics than, by the: 
very force of circumstances, it .has been possible. 
for any member of our Governme"nt, or of those of 
our Allies, todevotc to the new weapon of war. It ; 
is, therefore, in his technical capacity that the 
writer brings forward his views in tiic hope that 
they may be conducive to the sparing of many lives, 
great sorrow, and mucii sacrifice. He would like 
the reader to realise that it is neither lack of 
modesty nor self -congratulation, but, rather, an 
earnestness that his views should receive careful 
consideration, and a deep sense of moral responsi- 
bility that he should do his utmost to save 
thousands of lives, that have prompted him to 
write the preceding few words, although tiiey may 
seem self -laudatory. 
THE MEANING OF AERIAL SUPREMACY. 
Before an explanation is given of what i% 
meant by the phrase " a comprehensive and sus- 
tained aerial of/ensire," it would be well that the 
reader should have a clear understanding of tho 
real value of aeronautics i n the present war. 
At the beginning of hostilities there was verr 
little available experience, obtained iu actual ' 
warfare, to enable oiir military authorities to have 
a clear conception of the capabilities of the fiftlt 
arm. Perhaps the principal reason that, at first, 
induced our Government to devote a certain 
amount of attention to the new weapon was the 
fact that other Governments were encouraging its 
development. Then the other Governments, see- 
ing our efforts to create an air fleet, increased 
their own efforts, with the result that, a year or 
so previous to the begimiing of tlie present wav, 
the world witnessed a competition anjong the 
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