LAND AND ,W. A T E R. 
February 27, 1915. 
encc to guide them, the military authorities of 
the various (<..'mtries had not sufficient data to 
prepare themselves for any other kind of aerial 
supreinacy. 
It should not be assumed that such a 
" Supremacy of tlie Air," because of some nega- 
tive characteristics, is not of the greatest value. 
iThe truth lies in tlie opposite direction. We 
should, therefore, grudge no praise to all those 
who have helped our country' to obtain that 
supremacy right at the tieginning of hostilities. 
It is a supremacy of .such considerable value that 
we should run no risk of compromising it, and, 
w]iate\er developments ve may wish military 
aeronautics to assume, it must not be to the 
tietriment of the particular supremacy we have 
already accpiired. 
TWO KfNDS OF AERIAL SUPREMACY. 
The fact remains, however, that we are now. 
as regards military aeronautics, in possession of 
(lata which were not available when the v.ar 
broke out. Some preconceived ideas concerning 
the ^alue of aviation have received terrible blows 
and have met with a quick destruction. Unfore- 
seen uses of the aeroplane have come into pro- 
minence. Our airmen have shown a gi^ater 
valour and adaptability than even the most 
enthusiastic supporter of the new arm could 
have exjiected. It is. therefore, well that we 
should pause and take stock. 
When this is done. Ave shall find that a most 
important quality of the aeroplane has been 
brought to light. This quality is its value for 
offensive ojjerations. We have already, so fsr 
as the numlier of ma-chines is concerned, 
utilised it in a timid manner in carrying out 
a number of raids. Is that timidity due 
to the fact that we have not really grasped 
the full value of the aeroplane for offen- 
sive purposes ? Or is it be^?au.se we are so engaged 
in maintaining the supremacy we have already 
obtained that we cannot vigorously push on the 
devektpment of a real offensive air-fleet ? 
The writer has, in these columns, constantly- 
explained the iniportancc of an aerial offensive 
Since the publication of his articles the 
Admiralty have reported two air raids by aerial 
squadrons of thirty-four and forty aeroplanes 
strong respectively.' Compare the result of these 
raids with those undertaken with a still smaller 
numlx^r of machines— the C'uxhaven raid on 
Christmas Day, 1914, for instance— and you will 
realise clearly the importance of the number of 
aeroplanes composing an attacking aerial fleet. 
For offensive v^-ork, of permanent value, it is not 
an air fleet of a few dozen machines that is 
required, but one of about a thousand, or more, 
strong. 
With such an air fleet we could enter upon 
the conquest of a .second kind of " Supremacy of 
the Air,'" a kind in which the offensive value of 
the fifth arm would make it.self felt, in a |>er- 
manent maiuier, miles beyond the range of our 
guns. In fact, such an air fleet would be a force 
that could not l>e stopped by trenches, rivers, or 
fortified jilaccs ; it vvouUl be a. force in whose way 
no obstacles could be put, and which would carry 
the war straight into the heart of the enemy's 
country. 
This second kind of supremacy could be 
obtained by the Allies well within six months, and 
tlie possession of it would mean an utter impos- 
sibility for the enemy to continue the struggle. 
Such a state of affairs cannot be reached with an 
offensive fle^t of a few dozen, or even a few 
hundreds strong. 
HIE BUILDING AND MANNING OF AN 
AIR FLEET 2,000 STRONG. 
In connection with the employment of aero- 
planes at the front, it is important to remember 
that the fifth arm is still somewhat frail in con- 
struction. Major W. S. Brancker, Royal Artil- 
lery (Royal Flying Corps Reserve) General Staff, 
in a lecture delivered at the I'niversity of London 
a few weeks before the beginning o^ hostilities, 
said : " A good average pilot may fly, da}' after 
day, round an aerodrome and make many land- 
ings without ever straining his aeroplane, or 
even breaking a wire; but in war the pilot must 
fly in any weather to obtain information and 
land on almost any ground to deliver it. The 
result will be numerous small breakages and 
strains, all of which take time and skill to 
repair, and which demand the provision of a 
large quantity of spare parts, and their delivery 
wherever they are required in the theatre of 
war. The difficulty of supply of spare parts will 
J>e increased in proportion to the number of 
different types of aei'oplane emploj-ed. The same 
applies to engines, which, in addition, require 
thorough periodic overhaul after a compara- 
tively short time at work. 
" Again, in war there will be no sheda 
available for housing machines on the ground. 
The aeroplane of the moment cannot stand for 
long in the open witliout serious deterioration in 
its flying qualities. . . . All this points to, 
the fact that only a small proportion of the 
aeroplanes in the field will be fit to take the air 
at any given moment." These, and other reasons, 
show that if 1,000 aeroplanes are to be always 
ready for offensive purposes, we nuist possess at 
least twice that number of machines and keep on 
making good the losses. 
Now the question which presents itself is 
whether it would be possible for this country to 
build, in the space of a few months, 2,000 aero- 
planes, train the men necessary to pilot them, 
form the necessary contingent of mechanics 
which would be required to accompany them at 
the front, and organise an adequate transport 
service. The writer has gone carefully into these 
questions and he is convinced that, though the 
effort would have to be a considerable one, the 
formation of a powerful offensive aerial fleet, 
thoroughly equipped and manned, could be pro- 
duced in this country in the time stated. It can, 
Ijesidcs, be asserted that such a fleet could be 
brought into existence without interfering v.'ith 
or hindering, in the slightest degree, the devek»i"»- 
ment of the present air fleet which is so nece.ssary 
to our armies for reconnaissance and kindred 
work. 
Seven months ago no one could have fore- 
told that the British Army could be made million.s 
strong. We have made the effort and succeeded 
in protlucing a new Army by far stronger than 
any which we have had in the past. In the same 
manner, if the country decides to consider the 
creation of an offensive air fle«t 2,000 strong, tha 
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