writer is in a position to indicate \\ow this could 
be actx)niplislu:;d, in England, within six months. 
THE MEANING OF A "COMPREHENSIVE 
AND SL STAINED AERIAL OFFENSIVE.' 
The reader has, ]-)robably, by now some idea 
of Mhat the writer means by the ]ihrase " a com- 
l-n-elieiisice and sustained aerial offensive^ It 
is a kind of oft'ensive that is not to be confused 
with a raid. Unlike the latter, a comprehensive 
and sustained aerial offensive would render the 
maintenance of a hostile field army impossible, 
and would bring- to an end the system of trench 
warfare which is long and costly in lives and 
money. With a powerful offensive air fleet, our 
airnien could attack, njght and day, the roads 
and raihvavs behind the hostile lines, and could 
l^revcut the enemy from receiving supplies, 
ammunition, or reinforcement. 
The possession of an adequate offensive 
aerial fleet would enable us to strike, with might 
and with assured results, at the enemy's arsenals. 
In the sketch map is shown the western portion 
of the town of lessen, which is well within the 
range of our airmen, and where are situated the 
gigantic Krupp's works. These workshops lie in 
the west of the town and cover an area somewhat 
greater than that of the City of London. Imagine 
what the destruction of such an arsenal would 
rtieau to the enemy, and imagine wliat vvould be 
the ]diglit of the German armies if they were 
suddenly deprived of guns and of amnmnition. 
And such an air fleet, built and equipj)ed on the 
scale indicated in the preceding lines, a)id capable 
of dealing such a decisive blovv' as the destruction 
of Essen, would cost less than £10,000,000 ! 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE, 
NOTE. — This Article has been submitted to the Press Rure.-:ii, whitli docs not olijccl to the pi:b!k&ti»it as censored, antl takes ii« 
rcsponsibiiity for the correctness al the stateuents. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
ON llie 19lb KH Anglo-French force of battlesliips, 
batlle cruisers, and auxiliaries of various kinds 
opened fire fX 8 a.m. ou the Dardanelles forts at 
Cape Holies and Kum Kale at long range- 
probably six or seven miles. Early in the war a 
mild bombardment had proved that the forts could be out- 
ranged — probably they mount nothirig heavier than 8.2's in 
the way of modern guns, plus a number of bigger guns of 
©bsolet« pattern. 
Up (o 2.45 only big guns were employed for the attack ; 
but then Vice- Admiral Garden, who was in command, ordered 
ships carrying guns of 6 inch or thereabouts to close in to 
near range. Two forts on the European tide were silenced, 
and one ou the Asiatic side. The bombardiiient ceased at 
dusk, when one fort was still firing. None of the warships 
engaged was hit. 
In general, this may be regarded as the most important 
naval operation to date. Even as an illustration of the 
ubiquity of Sea Power it has its lessons, for the British ships 
engaged were drawn from all quarters of the globe (the In- 
flexible, for iiittauce, fought at the FaJklauds, and the 
Triumph assisted in the bombardment of Kiao Chau). The 
principal ships engaged, and their broadsides were : — 
BRITISH. FRENCH. 
Jniiexihle G12in. Bouvtt.. 2 12in., 1 10.8, 4 5.5 
>1^7,i«/«H6/i... 412in., 5 9.2 Cauloii. A12\n., 5 5.5 
ConnraUis ... 4 12in., 6 6in. Siifren. A 12in., 5 6.4 
yengeance ... 4 12in.. 6 Gin. 
Forty big guns firing steadily naturally were capable of 
doing an enormous amount of damage. Whether they did so 
or no is another matter. Bombarded fortifications have often, 
after a short interval, a knack of resurrecting themselves iu 
a way which ships cannot. This is due to the fact that unless 
a gun be actually hit, tlie effect of shell fire is merely to 
destroy the gun's crew or possibly bury the gun In debris. To 
dig away the debris and find fresh gunners is comparatively 
ea! y. Hence it has become a canon that a bombardment must 
be followed up by a lauding party to destroy all guns that are 
etill serv-iceabl©. There are also canons as to military co- 
©l)eration. 
The passage of the Dardanelles has always been regarded 
as an extremely difficult operation. The Italians are said to 
have contemplated and decided against it in their recent war 
with Turkey, though here, of course, international politics 
may have had weight in their councils. 
The forts, qua forts, being Turkish', are probably much 
less formidable than they are supposed to be, and they are all 
eusceplible to long range bombardments, Danger lies rather 
in the mine fields laid in the narrows. These will have to be 
cleared under fire from field artillery and rifle fire (even sup- 
posing all forts to be silenced), unless a fctrong allied army 
operates along the Gallipoll Peninsula. 
Supposing, therefore, tliat (as asEumed) an attempt to 
force the Dardanelles, and so reach and capture Constan- 
tinople is toward (the assumption may be wrong) it will be — 
as both Duckworth and Hornby described it in the past—" a 
difficult and dangerous task." 
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE TEE DAHDAAELLES. 
On the other hand, the advantages of successful operations 
would be enormous. Turkey would be eliminated from the 
war by the fall of Constantinople, but that would be among 
the least of the benefits. 
Corn and oil, which we need from the Black Sea lip.rbours 
cannot reach us while Turkey rules at Constantinople. Hence 
the immediate result would be an excliaugo of useful com- 
modities between the Allies. 
DURATION OF THE WAR. 
As Mr. Belloc has been announced to discuss tliis week 
the Duration of the War from the military standpoint, it will 
perhaps be of interest to say a few words about the sanie 
question from the purely naval standpoint. llorc, since, 
humanly speaking, the situation is all against any Trafalgar, 
we are necessarily reduced to considering the less dramatic 
issues which must ultimately bring hostilities to a conclu.sion. 
These are all contained iu the phrase, " Silent Pressure 
of Sea Power," though subject, of course, to how militarj 
operations may eventuate. 
13« 
