Tliese militarj' opeiati om are, of com-so, enlirely outsiJe 
my province;'! have uo means of cjtiinatiog tlie probahiiities 
of a Russian advance or what muy happen in the West in tlia 
spring. I can pimply record the nautical irnprcf.sion, entirely 
as a lunitical imprcusioii, which from the miiitary point cf 
view may Ij" jwt as inaccurate as from the naval point of 
view are military ideas ar. to the part plaj-e*.! by the Navy. 
Vevy roughly and quite crudely the r'niat idea of the 
land warfare may be put down a-s somelhing very like " .siale- 
mate," or, at any rate, " j>erpetual check," v.'hich comes to 
about the fame thing. I do not aa^ert (hat this idea is 
correct: it is far too liable to be upset by side factors such as 
resourcss, food, ammunition, and v.'hat not. 
Hal, save in So far as the supply of men is concerned, it 
seems to me that the whole of the ether questions are entirely 
uav'al; en(i!'ely matters having to do with the 'silent 
pressure of Sea Power," and as entirely uocounected with 
the gain or loss of " some groiind " in the laud warfare. 
Of course, a sudden jtrepondcranco of strength on one 
side or tlie other might alter the whole aspect oi the land 
campaign : I am necessarily confined entirely to considering 
things on the hypothesi.s of the maintenance of the itutus fjtio 
on land and wJuit will happen then. 
To data the Navy ha.s hit Germany very h.ird by the 
annihilation of her overseas trad«, p.nd also a cuUin<' off of 
food supplies which is probably more .apparent than real. 
Personally 1 do not believe that v.'e have appreciably uffected 
Germany's food supply or that v.e shall ever do so, no matter 
what measures we may take. We can cut off certain luxiuie'i 
dear to the German stomach, we may render the national 
tendency to overeat difficult of accomplisbraent, we may make 
them uncomfortable and disgruntled, but I am convinced that 
the entire force cf the Britinh Navy will never starve a singio 
German. The utmost we cau do is to drive tliom to support 
life on about the same provender that miliionn in this country 
have subsisted on for the last one or two hundred years. 
So far from shortening the duration of the war, T a?n 
inclined to think that an embargo on German food.Auff 
from overseas will lengthen the struggle, and serve to keep 
t'.p to the scratch the " hate " which is Germany's main 
motive power. 
C'onsequently it n;ay be that possibly our best policy 
v/ould be to let the Germans get all the food tliey want, even 
if necessary spending money in seeing that their food is 
abundant I 
Coupled with this, Iiowever, everything in the natnro of 
raw material of any sort or kind would have to be declared 
contraband — In a phrase, we should starvr the iiulusfri'-s, not 
Ihe inJivi<lii(ils. With both exports and imports cut off, the 
bulk cf the civil population would be out of employment— i.e., 
v/ithout the means to purchase food. The German Govern- 
ment v/ould 1j€ compelled to resort to free doles, and the 
moral effect of such on a population would very soon make 
itself felt. What happened to ancient Rome would just as 
assuredly befall Germany, and even a threat to stop food 
supplies (let alone carrying it out) would probably end the 
war to a certainty six months from now were a policy of this 
sort pursued in the interim. 
The adoption of piratical methods by German submarines 
is generally believed bore to be due to economic pressure and 
shortag'^ of food supplies. I greatly doubt whether this has 
much to do with the matter except in the " talk departments." 
Rather, I take it, German public opinion wants to see the 
Navy on v/hich it has spent so much money " do something," 
and submarine attack on commerce represents the cheapest 
and most showy way of seeming to " do something." 
Altogether (looking at the matter, of course, entirely 
from the point of view of what our Navy can accomplish), f 
.should say that — failing some perhaps rather improbable 
tirastie change in the situation on land — a naval war based on 
attempts to curtail German food supply may well go on in- 
definitely, even if Germany did not possess scores of eminent 
chemists perfectly capable of inventing chemical substitutes 
for every known form of food. 
If, on the other hand, we more or less glut them with 
food, but, by tlie stoppage of oversea trade, import or export, 
of every sort and kind, create a vast population unable to 
purchase food, and forced to subsist on Government charity, 
I am inclined to think that the British Navy cau end the war 
inside six months. 
The "dramatic effect" of Waterloo (possibly, for that 
matter, the previous dramatic effect of Trafalgar) has ever since 
blinded us to the fact of the enormous power wliich the Navy 
wields in the matter of apparently intUrect res/'lt^\ The public 
can envisage to the full a regiment fighting in the trenches: 
.what it cannot envisage is that a battleship, floating seemingly 
idle, miles and miles from anywhere, may be altering for good 
and a!! the history of the world. 
Let me add that the reason for this i.-; that no one li-M ever 
managed to ri' plain ichy in a manner to be " understanded 
of the people." No one ever will. It is a fact beyond explain- 
ing. Only a fairly good chess player can properly realise an 
inkling. The great Napoleon himself could never grasp it, 
and he fell because he could not. At St. Helena, uo doubt, 
too late, he realised. 
All the indications of the pre".ent war are that neither 
tlie K.aiser nor von Tirpitz can see further through a brick 
wail than could Napoleon, or they would never have .'signe'l 
their own death warrants by their fatuous declaration of % 
submarine Ijlockade, and .so delivered them.selve.s into our 
hands lor the sake of murdering a few non-combatants. 
Retwcon this kind of thing and the practice of Chinese pirates, 
who paint horrid faces on the bows of their junks, the 
difference is well-nigh negligible where the Briti.-th Navy ii 
concerned. 
To this extent the duration of the war will be shortened. 
The German! are out to " frighten the enemy." The British 
Navy is out to '" l:Ui the enemy." 
THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE." 
The policy of leaving the crews of submarine victim.i to 
drown v.'ithout warning has been followed by some Germaii 
submarines but not by others. Presumably all Germ.aii 
cffioers are not yet " blooded " to the methcds of Captain 
Kidd and hla fellow-pirates. 
The probftble motive of the j)olicy I have discuswed el'ia- 
where in this article; here I am endeavouring to find au 
historical analogy which may have some bearing on tha 
question. 
This is somewhat difTiculfc to find. Ancient history teem* 
with instances of captured merchant ships, whose crews wer» 
cither slaughtered or made into slaves. But even in thoHe 
long .igo days there v/as a certain logical idea of phinJer: I 
cannot recall any historical instance of slaughter of non- 
coinbaiants for the mere result of slaughter. Primitive man 
in the Stone Age may have acted on some such lines; but it i« 
doubtful. Por slaughter without some idea of tangible gain 
we must probably go back to the primitive aps. 
The suggestion of an apo intelligence as the motive forco 
is not, however, so much due to the wanton slaughter and 
destruction of all and sundry, as to the inability to perceive 
the futility. 
Once merchant ships take to cruising in groups, it rnusi 
follow, as I suggested last week, that the main danger will h<i 
run by the submarine aggressor — so that even such ape-lik^ 
joy as may be obtained from wanton destruction will not bo 
forthcoming. Equally ape-like is the inability to realise that; 
drastic retaliatory measures are to Ije e.^ipected, measures 
whicii (if sufficient submarine success be secured) may run t>> 
the entire German nation (including the Kaiser) being pro- 
claimed outlav/s and common murderers. 
One's amazement h, hcv/ever, not at the slaughtering 
wantonness of ihe German plan, but at its sheer stupidity. 
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENCE. 
I). D. W. (South Shields).— The Admiralty is always 
ready to consider any scheme that is reasonable; uo " influ- 
ence " is required. 
B. n. H. (London, W.C.).— All data published aboub 
recent big guns have been extremely vague. The extreme 
possible range is therefore entirely conjectural. It is further 
complicated by the fact that the service muzzle velocity is not 
the maximum possible: also the mounting does not admit oi 
the maximum of elevation. 
T. H. (Winchester).— (1) Would be censored. (2) When 
German armed liners were to be expected the Aq<tiiania was 
useful; later on her work was to be done equally well by a 
less costly ve.S;iel. (3) The war will probably be over before 
the ex-Greek S'lkoiiis is completed. It takes about a year to 
build and equip a submarine. (4) Allowing the obituary 
notices to appear was an ofHcial oversight. Such notices are 
now forbidden, I believe. 
B. B. (St. Neots).— (1) See reply to " B. H. H." above. 
(2) Your theory that messages are sent to Germany by means 
of the " Agony" column is very probably correct. " Bat it 
could also be done via " W^ant place?," " Situations vacant, "- 
and v/hat not. There seems uo way by which it could b« 
stopped. (3) There is nothing novel about the submarine 
mine-layer. (4) .Something similar to the scheme you suggest; 
is already employed. The Admiralty leaves nothing to chanba 
in matters of thi^ sort, but they wisely say uothiu"; as lo wlxasi 
they are doing. 
14* 
