March 6, 1913. 
LAND AND ,W. A T E R. 
contradiction with certain views that have been 
put forward with admitted authority, it seems to 
me at the moment the best tlieory. 
Anyone holding the Bukovina, and particu- 
larly Czernowic2, holds, as I have shown in past 
numbers of this paper, the communications 
whereby Roumania and the Russian army in 
[Galicia might join hands. It holds the knot in 
which the railways loin. But unless more than the 
Bukovina is held, tnere is not a suflBcient avenue 
of supply for the working of large armies round 
upon the flank of the Russians in Galicia, and 
the consequent freeing of the northern Carpathian 
passes from the invader, let alone for the relief 
of Przemysl. You are dealing here with the 
thickest portion of the Carpathian chain, and rail- 
ways are, especially in a winter campaign, of the 
first importance to your supply. Now, the only rail- 
way of this region crosses the Carpathian chain 
on the line between Marmoras and Kolomea. 
iThere are railways leading up the valleys of the 
range, with its dense woods and poor roads, but 
there is no crossing the ridge until this Kolomea 
railway is reached. From Kolomea to Przemysl 
itself is a matter of 160 miles, and to the Duk'la, 
as the crow flies, a matter of nearer 200 miles. A 
firm hold well north of the Bukovina by the enemy, 
which should include the whole of this line across 
the mountains, will enable supply to reach a large 
£ttgii*bMiU*. 
Marmaros 
r 
army which could work against the flank of the 
Russian armies to the west in Galicia, and thus 
turn the grip of the Russians upon the western 
Carpathians. But until, or if, the Aus'tro- Germans 
push beyond the central Carpathians and occupy 
much more than the Bukovina alone, the avenues 
of supply seem insufficient for any such attack. 
Since writing the above, news has come that 
the Austrian forces are as far north as beyond 
Stinisland, and even if checked there it is clear 
that the railways into the plain are now in their 
bands, which will, if the position is maintained, 
change all these conclusions. 
THE CALL FOR AMMUNITION. 
If you were to ask off-hand a man of good 
observation, well educated, and perhaps one 
acquainted with war and yet not a soldier : " What 
is the prime factor at this moment in the problem 
of the trenches ? " he might be at a loss to ansv,er 
you, or, rather, manv such men would give many 
different answers. !But a soldier on the spot, at 
any rate a soldier anywhere near the higher com- 
mand, would almost certainly reply : " Ammuni- 
tion, and especially hea\7 gun am.munition." 
This is the point we have to consider most 
carefully from now onv.-ard3, and it is one of those 
Eoints in which public opinion and a fair grasp 
y civilians of the conditions abroad is of great 
yalue. Just as it was of value to point out that 
cotton is to-day gunpowder, and that the cotton 
that went into "Germany did not only make shirts, 
but also killed British soldiers, so it is of im- 
portance to insist now upon this business of 
ammunition. For public opinion well awake to the 
one as to the other will support all the public 
action necessary. Whereas public opinion con- 
fused or ignorant upon these essentials 'sometimes 
leaves the authorities without driving power 
behind them. 
The reason that ammunition, and in par- 
ticular hea^y gun ammunition, is so important is 
this : In the other factors of the trench problem 
(to give it a short but convenient name) European 
armies, such as the Allies and the German, are 
fairly enough matched. But in the provision of 
ammunition, and particularly of hea^y gun ammu- 
nition, we can, if we choose, dominate more and 
more. 
The fire discipline of the Allies is superior 
to that of the enemy, and this is particularly trua 
of the British contfngent. But the field of fire has 
become so very much shorter than was expected 
that this advantage is more or less eliminated. I 
do not mean that the excellence and steadiness of 
the shooting is not tested quite as much over a 
narrow field as a wide one, but I do mean that 
troops which have now been exercised for months 
in the art of stopping a man before he covers two 
hundred yards have got to be much of a muchness. 
In the construction of trenches, from the 
detail of their comfort to the tracing of their 
position, the enemy was altogether superior to the 
Allies some mont&s ago. The Allies are now at 
le-ast his equal. In the sanitation necessary to this 
kind of siege warfare the Allies are probably the 
superiors of the enemy. We have reason to think 
that his losses from sickness are far superior to 
ours. In machine gun work we were his inferiors 
in the beginning and are said to be now his equals. 
In field gun work the Allies had, and maintained, 
I am told, superiority both in rapidity of fire and 
in accuracy. This is said to be particularly true 
of the French, who certainly had the best weapon, 
and, what is more probable, the best tradition. 
But take the thing all round, and there does not 
seem, according to the evidence of those who have 
suffered actual experience in the field during the 
last few months, to be now any chance of con- 
spicuous difference save in this matter of heavy 
gun fire, and what that means can perhaps be most 
graphically presented to the eye by an ideal 
section of the line. 
It is, of course, no more than the siniplified 
suggestion of ground which takes an infinite 
variety of shapes in this four hundred miles of 
line. But, such as it is, I hope it will serve to 
show very roughly how the trench fighting is 
conducted. 
The first element in that fighting is, of course, 
the line of the trenches themselves. Let us sup- 
pose that in this section they run as we see them 
in the accompanying sketch. In reality, of course, 
the ultimate lines of the two opposing forces are 
much more regular, especially where there has 
been heavy attacking and counter-attacking, and 
a real plan would be confused with a number of 
empty trenches abandoned; but for the purpose 
of my illustration these tv,'o roughly parallel lines 
wiirserve to stand for the opposing lines in a 
particular section' of the field. These advance 
trenches are very narrow ditches, deep in compari- 
son with their mouths, provided every few yards 
