LAND AND ffiATER. 
March C, 1015, 
Vow Vhts6 principles being grasped lei us 
add to them S ?oUo Jng conditions of the cam- 
paign in its present phase : 
M The air x%ork of the Allies has now estab- 
lished a defoiUe superiority over that of the enemy. 
It is oneTthe most notable features of the jar 
and perhaps one of the least expected, and i 3 
^lu^^ssT largely due to the excellence of the 
Shu h work in tLs field. Therefore the Allies 
do fiml the positions of the enemy's hca^7 Sf/ 
»°orc rapidly and more often than the enemy hnda 
liie position of ours. 
(h) The blockade puts the enemy at a disad- 
vantage which increases with time. All shells need 
SpSr bands to engage in the rifling of the piece 
Tnd ?i give them The twist upon which depends 
tl^l accuracy of their fire. Now, copper, though 
the cremy is not yet actually short ol it is giving 
Je J^em^y concern. His fear ff^ the ?uturo 
makes him consider every shot, and the blockade 
viU now have another effect more slow m its 
development. Every great shell is propelled with 
an expenditure of cotton of so many pounds, ur 
iron with which to make the shell, and of nitrates 
with which to make the explosive within the shell 
ihe enemy has no lack. But in copper he has long 
been hampered, and he will now be hampered in 
cotton. The hesLxy French artiUery. which m 
this region quite dominates that of tHe 
merav, was used lavishly. It was not only used 
to batter the trenches and to cover the assault, 
but also to create a ditch or zone of impassable 
ground hehind the enemy's trenches, so that he 
could not bring up reinforcements or fresh ammu- 
nition. But to act in that way the commander 
must feel no sort of anxiety for his reserves of 
ammunition. He must be as prodigal with it as 
though his supply were infinite. 
It is here that this all-imporfance of a great 
supply of heavy ammunition comes in. The side 
which is quite free to use as vast a supply as it 
chooses must ultimately have its will over the side 
.which is hampered, and counts every shot. 
But here the reader may say: " I can well 
ttndcrstand that the enemy will be increasingly 
hampered in his production of heavy, ammunition. 
huE whv should this qtieslion trouble fo arise, and 
In particular to the British.^who have the markets 
of the world open to them J - 
The answer lies in the fad that the produc. 
lion of a shell is so very much slower a business 
than the employment of it in action. 
I was present the other day. by the courtesy 
of one of tLe contractors for ^^"^«\^^tipn m the 
Yo?t h at the manufacture of a number ot fiv e-inch 
fnr thfl production of very different macnmery;. 
Some hSeds of men we/e turning and pressing 
The cases of five-inch shells. I/^^^^p^^.^^^J 
tool slowlv paring down the surface of the thicK 
rSta and i^cinsfdercd as I watched that tedious 
proeess how. when the eyHndri-conical body w^^^^^^^ 
Lt completed, its copper band .attached and 
Dressed in aud smoothed down, its interior filled 
She explosive, its fuse attached, and he who e 
lone business come to its conclusion I lUight see 
that slSl run into the breech of a fiye-mc^ gun 
discharged, and hear its explosion miles a^vaj, all 
in as many seconds as it had taken hours to make. 
The big shed in which I watched this process was 
working to produce, I believe, 3.000 such shells, 
and I was told in how many days they would be 
delivered. 
There is needed for the proper supply of the 
heavy guns, and, therefore, the chief factor m a 
decision upon the West, all the heavy gun ammu- 
nition that the whole resources of the nation can 
turn out at the utmost speed and with the most 
vigorous resolution and skill. There can never be 
too much for the appetite of the great pieces. 
There can only too easily be an insufliciency or a 
hitch, and on the continual increase of that supply, 
and on the swelling and further swelling of its 
stream depends the immediate future of this 
country more than on anv other single factor. One 
could almost wish that half of the energy devoted 
to the very satisfactory results of voluntary re- 
cruitment could be turned on to emphasising aiui 
re-emphasising this all-importance of the suppljfj 
which the heavy guns are hungry for, and for 
which they will clamour when the hour for th«i 
advance has sounded. For there lies the key. 
THE DURATION OF THE WAR. 
WE hare seen that three material 
factors must be considered in any 
judgment, or rather guess, upon the 
possible duration of the war, and 
Ihat these were: (1) the factor of -wastage— in 
supply as in men ; (2) the factor of numbers — 
that is, of recruitment upon either side and of 
equipped recruitment; and, thirdl,y, the geo- 
graphical factor— that is, the effect upon the 
duration of the war of the seasons, of varying 
elevations of land, natural obstacles, the soils 
in trench warfare, etc. 
To these must be added, in conclusion, 
.■^vhat sometimes proves the most important 
thing of aJl toward^ the end of a wa?— ihe moral 
iSicioT. 
II. 
"With the first of this series we dealt briefly 
last week. Let us turn this w^eek to the second. 
Before entering the subject again, however, 
it is necessary to repeat this warning : That no 
guesswork upon this matter has any finality. 
All one can do is to state the elements upon 
Avhich a judgment turns ; to attemjit prophecy 
in the matter is gratuitous follj^ The whole 
thing may bo compared to what a man miwht 
judge of "the chancea of a good eleven pitted 
against another eleven of equally proved merit. 
lie could only say in the early middle of the 
game: " The wicket being what it is. the score 
standing as it does, the past form of either team 
being such and such, I take it that the end will 
be BO and so, and will be reached in Buch ami 
