March 6, 1915, 
LAND AND JV! A T E R. 
A NOTE OF WARNING. 
BRITISH AERIAL SUPREMACY MUST NOT BE COMPROMISED 
BY AIR RAIDS. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
KOTE. — TIlU article hu been submitted to the Press Bnrean, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
reaponaibility loi the correctness ol the statements. 
TWO principles seem to have guided our military 
authorities in dealing witli the production of air- 
craft during the period immediately preceding 
the outbreak of hostilities. These two principles 
s.rei 
{») 'Ertrrr really promJshigly coiatnicted aircraft mnst be given a 
tnaL 
(b) Evei-y promising constractor must be given work. 
As students of military aeronautics are well aware, {he 
udoption of those two priuciplea by our authorities and their 
adherence to them were not brought about without much 
pressure from aeronautical designers, constructors, and a 
oertain section of the technical Press. Anyhow, when the 
war broke out, these two principles being already in opera- 
tion, the counti-y found itself in possession of several designs 
•f aeroplanes, especially suited for military purpoces, and of 
a number of firms who had already acquired considerable 
•xperience in aeronautical construction. When, therefore, 
in his last article, the writer expressed the view that no 
praise should be grudged to those who, right at the beginning 
of hostilities, enabled Great Britain to secure that kind of 
aerial supremacy for which the various countries were striv- 
ing, he bad in mind not only our splendid airmen and those 
on the General Staff who were responsible, in all its details, 
for an intricate and then untried organisation, but also those 
designers and constructors who, in the early days of aeronau- 
tics, have had on many occasions to face with an empty purse 
official apathy and general indifference. The writers also 
who, in the public Press, supported and encouraged them 
deserve as well their meed of recognition. 
THE NEED FOR CRITICISM AND 
SUGGESTIONS. 
The writer is led to mention the above facts because 
there has of late been a tendency, in certain quarters, to 
point to the exploits of our Flying Corps as evidence that 
eriticiam of, and suggestions to. His Majesty's Air Depart- 
ments are out of place and can serv'e no purpose. It can be 
asserted, however, and proved, by means of indisputable 
documentary and other evidence, that our Air Service owes 
the efficiency it already possessed when the war broke out to 
the very sharp criticism to which it had been subjected in 
the past. As regards outside suggestions, the writer con- 
■Ulers that now, more than ever, these should be welcomed : 
(1) Bec&uae in studying tlie ncvr military uses to wliich, every 
day, it U found that th« aeroplane can be put, cor authorities 
do not possess the accumulated experience wliich exists in 
the case of other methods of warfare. They are, therefore, 
no better prepared to deai with them than any other student 
of military aeronautics. 
(2) Because an important unforeseen potentiality for offensive pnr- 
p<»c8 has now become evident in the aeroplane, and this 
potentiality, on account of ita possibility of shortening the 
war, must be Uervelopod and employed with as little delay as 
may b«. 
To none, therefore, should suggestions be more welcome 
tkma to those responsible for the development of our Air 
Pervioe and for its adaptation to the important task lying 
before it. 
rHE TWO KINDS OF AERIAL SUPREMACY 
The writer has already, on a former occasion, tried to 
stake clear the point that, speaking in a general manner, the 
present war has shown that an aerial fleet may bo employed 
ui two ways i 
(1) It may form p».rt of our land and sea forces j 
•nd 
(2) It may be used as an Individual force which may act either 
independently of or in co-oporatiou with our land and sea 
forces. 
In the following lines it will be explained, why, so far 
M the present war is concerned, (he same aerial fleet cnnnot 
ferforin the two preceding funrtions with the best posHhle 
retidtt. When it is considered as a part of our land or sea 
forces, an air fleet or an air squadron is especially concerned 
with the reconnaissance or kindred work necessary to the 
•ommander of the force to which the air fleet or squadron U 
attached. The main valae of such a fleet being the carrying 
out of careful, and at times difficult, observations, it follows 
that, apart from the reliability and qualities of the aircraft 
constituting the squadron, the principal factor influencing 
the efficiency of aerial reconnaissance is the capability of the 
observer to make and report his observations accurately and 
carefully. *" Botli pilot and obser\'er must be able to read 
and understand a map just as quicJdy and easily as they can 
a book, and at any moment of a cross-country flight they 
fchould both know exactly where they are. Beyond this the 
observer — or, in a single-seater, the pilot — must be able to 
pick up troops on the ground, determine what they are, 
estimate their numbers, and mark their precise potiition on 
the map. He may have to do this in a rough wind and in the 
midst of fleeting and distracting clouds, and either during 
his return journey in the air, or after landing from a long 
and perhaps alarming and uncomfortable flight, he roust 
write a clear, intelligible report of what he has seen. All this 
is difficult, and, in consequence, the results of aerial recon« 
naissance will sometimes be inaccurate and misleading. 
" This liability to error will be intensified by subter- 
fuges undertaken by the enemy with the express purpose of 
deceiving the aerial observer. Small forces may be strung out 
on roads to represent large columns, while the mass of the 
troops are kept hidden in woods and villages; dummy trenches 
may be constructed, while real ones are hidden; guns may be 
made to look like bivouac shelters, bushes, or country carts, 
while country carts may be made to look like guns. Bivouacs 
can and have been completely hidden from above, and troops 
billeted in villages will be hard to locate. The game of 
deceiving the airman offers endless opportunities for in- 
genuity, the onlj- drawback being that all theso tricks give 
the troops that carry them out a great deal of trouble and 
extra work without the satisfaction of ever knowing whether 
they have been successful . . . The best guarantee that 
aerial reconnaissance will overcome the difficulties presented 
by imperfect observation and hostile subterfuge lies in the 
careful training and wide experience of its observers, and in 
the presence of sufficient numbers of aeroplanes to enable 
doubtful information to be checked and corrected without 
delay." 
Now, since in his last article, f for reasons therein given, 
the writer has been led to define that " Supremacy of the 
Air" which we have already acquired as meaning "the 
capability of airmen to give, in good time, the necessary 
information which will enable their commanders always to 
possess the initiative," it follows that, if for some reason, such 
as the carrying out of a raid or an attack, we deprive even 
momentarily our land or sea forces of a number of aerial 
observers of " careful training and wide experience," we 
compromise, at least for a time, the retention of our aerial 
Eupreraacy as above defined. 
Further, it does not follow that aerial observers of 
" careful training and wide experience," whose number is 
limited and whose services are indispensable to the com- 
manders of our land and sea forces, would make the best 
aerial bombardiers.} 
The writer has, besides, explained on various occasions 
why aerial attacks should be made in force. Consequently, 
if an aerial attack be undertaken with an air fleet meant for 
the m.aintaining and developing of that supremacy of the 
air which is at present ours, not only would the personnel of 
that fleet not be best suited to employ the aeroplane as an 
offensive weapon, but also by such a policy we would run the 
risk of compromising the most valuable assistance which the 
airmen attached to our Army and Navy can render to our 
land and sea forceSi 
If, therefore, the country decides to endeavour to 
• From a lecture cm " The Aeroplane in War," eiven at the Univer- 
B?fy of London, by Major \V. S. Brancker, Royal Artillery (K.F.tO, 
Eeservc), General Staff. 
t " To End the War," Laxd and W.wee, February 27, 1915. 
t See " The Aeroflane on the Ofiensive," LaXD akd Wateb, 
January 23, 1915. 
i3« 
