LAND AND .WATER. 
March 13. 1915. 
Useful or necessary Fo the bombardment of the 
vorks. All that is being undertaken from far 
down the channel. 
There is one aspect of this tremendous piece 
of work which must not be neglected. The Turkish 
forces by land are considerable, and though full 
communication between those upon the Gallipoli 
peninsula and tliose upon the mainland to the 
Augustowo forest. The force which was defeated 
at Przasn} sz at the other end of the line has fallen 
back right to the German frontier, and all that 
remains of the effort is a diminished bombard- 
ment of Osowiecs in the centre — presumably, in 
order to prevent the Russians from using the rail- 
way that passes through this town for their 
advance. It was said at the beginning of the 
north is interrupted by the continued shelling to movement that its whole meaning was to be tested 
iWhich a portion of the Allied Fleet subjects the by the success or failure of the Germans to pass 
peninsula of Bulair, j^et thei'e is already a con- the line of the Narew and Niemen. It would seem 
eiderable concentration of men, with many field at the moment of wi'iting that had failed, 
pieces, occupying the peninsula itself. Ultimately 
these forces will have to be reduced. It can hardly, 
with the weapons at its disposal, imperil the pas- 
sage of the Dardanelles by tue Fleet when once the 
permanent works upon that Strait have been 
reduced. But it can render all land operations 
oifficult when the turn of these shall come, unless 
a force equal in amount and munitions can be 
landed somewhere in the north to meet it or to cut 
it off from the other Turkish forces on the main- 
land. The concentration upon the Asiatic side 
cannot be dealt with in the same way. But the 
possession of the Dardanelles will forbid its junc- 
tion with the men in the Gallipoli peninsula. 
II. 
THE MEMEN-NAREW FRONT. 
The efforts of the enemy to pierce the fortified 
line upon the Xiemen and the Xarew, and so to 
III. 
THE CARPATHIAN FRONT. 
It was repeatedly insisted upon in these notes, 
in dealing with the Austro-German action across 
the Carpathians in the Bukowina, that the main 
purport of that pressure was political, and that 
the occupation of Czernowitz meant, above all, the 
separation of a potential Roumanian army, should 
Roumania decide to interA^ene, from the main 
Russian armies in Galicia round Przemysl and 
Lemberg. But this opinion I must now modify, 
for the success of the attack upon the Bukowina 
and the occupation of Czernowitz was followed up 
in such a fashion that to the first political object 
of the move could be added a purely strategic one. 
It has been pointed out more than once in 
these columns that no effort upon the south- 
^ ^^ eastern, or left, flank of the Russian army in 
reach the Warsaw railway beyond, seem to have Galicia could hope for success unless the Austro- 
come defijiitely to an end. The issue was in doubt Germans were in possession of the decisive points 
until after the publication of last week's number, ^° .^'^® railway system of Southern Galicia, by 
but the communiques on both sides since then show ^^'l^ich they could get supplies across the mountains 
clearly enough what has happened. The force ^^^ concentrate men. 
which had crossed the Niemen below Grodno has Now, for the few days, as was clear from the 
i-epassed the river and is retreating through the note appended to last week's article and put in as a 
postscript at the last moment, the Austro- Germans 
nearly succeeded in getting hold of the two decisive 
points in this railway system, and therefore 
during those days distinctly menaced the Russian 
flank. In order to see what happened, the follow- 
ing sketch of the railway system may be of value. 
In this sketch the more important lines are 
marked with cross bars, the three railways which 
alone approach the complicated Galician system 
from Russia are marked with double lines cut into 
segments, the less important railways — those of 
Galicia and Bukowina — with marked single lines, 
and the Russian frontier with a hatching. 
To hold Czernowitz at C was indeed to cut 
off the Roumanian system from the Russians, and 
also from Galicia to the north, but until Kolomea 
at K was held, no railway transport across the 
mountains was available to the Austro- Germans 
for any considerable effort against the southern 
flank of the Russian armies in Galicia, which had 
their central base at Lemberg at L, and which are 
investing Przemysl at P. Even with Kolomea in 
their hands, the Austro- Germans would be ham- 
pered until they obtained the point S, Stanislaus, 
where four railways meet, and until they were 
across the line S P, which lies under the foothills 
of the Carpathians and permits of transport for 
the munitions that could have come across the 
mountains by the railway passes 1, 2, 8, and 4. 
The summits of all these passes are in Austrian 
hands, the only Summit remaining in Russian 
hands being the road pass at Dukla, D. 
Now, the Austrians, as we knew, after a tele- 
