L A X D AND 5V^ A T E E. 
March 13. 1915. 
far as I can gather, lio is a " boaven-born genius " or an 
" out-and-out traitor," according to the politics of whoever 
sizes him up. Personally, I have only a literary acquaintance 
with him; so far as that goes I can put him in neither cate- 
gory. All I can definitely say is that — so far as my experience 
goes — he was out to do his job according to his lights. Every 
politician has to do a certain amount of eye-wash. Beyond 
that he is honest, or he would not be where he is. There is no 
monopoly of honesty on either side. 
A. F. T. (London, W.C.).— Your idea is all right, but 
you can safely lay sixty to one that the British Navj' tumbled 
to it six months ago. 
F. G. (London, N.). — Fifty people at least have sent in 
the same idea before. See replies to several. It is something 
like a million to one whether any non-technical idea sent in 
is worth the p.iper that it is written on. At the same time, 
it is worth a lot against Germany. Your idea is not, but the 
spirit which prompts you to send the idea along is quite as 
potent as if you were a wan (or two men) in the trenches. I 
take off my hat to any lady who tries to do her bit, no matter 
how ridiculous that bit may be. As a matter of fact, your 
particular idea is not in the least ridiculous, but experiments 
long ago proved it to be impracticable. 
A. E. (Cardiff). — Your idea is quite sound. The only 
thing against it is that it has been in operation ever since the 
war began. Not quite as you put it, perhaps, but the same 
integral idea. The British Navy is no fool, and there is little 
that it has not thought of long since. 
B. C. (London, N.). — See the last three replies. 
M. F. (Quinta, St. John, Madeira). — (1) Yes. You are 
right. I have acknowledged the silly pen-slip about the 
Tore?:. (2) i?« the Queen Elizabeth, see answer to 
" E. C. W.," above. 
" Alphabet " (Cardiff).— Duly noted. There have been 
German spies galore; but a certain amount of perspective 
should be observed. Think of the number of our people who 
have harmlessly been to Wiesbaden, Baden-Baden, &c. It is 
easy to overdo the spy business and to help the enemy accord- 
ingly- 
N. B. M. (London, S.W.). — I am glad to learn that you 
are not a German-American. Three weeks ago I suggested 
that attempting to starve the civil population was probably 
a mistake. Apparently you and I are arguing to the same 
effect from different standpoints. Where I think you get 
adrift is as follows: You do not seem to realise that Mr. 
Churchill is a Democratic Minister compelled to minir.ter 
to a democracy — and you know what Mr. Bumble (vide 
"Oliver Twist") said about "the public." Consequently 
Mr. C'hurchill has to consider his audience as well as his 
job. I will allow that he has let off " hot air " on more than 
one occasion. I will furtlier admit that there are few abusiva 
adjectives which I did not apply to him in the piping timca 
of peace, but— we are at present at war, and it is due to him 
that we are where we are. I'almam qvi meruit feratl 
W. H. M. G. (Eastry).— Yes. Some of tlie ideas about 
nets and torpedoes are aEsorled and peculiar ! As for th» 
Zeppelin basket, that really does exist. It was originally 
designed to carry a machine gun, but novir I believe is used 
for bomb-dropping, being let do'.vn when the machine ii 
more or less stationary. Not impossibly it is stayed to prevent 
being "dragged" when in motion. Otherwise, of cours^y— 
exactly as you suggest — it would be dragged to goodaesa 
knows where. 
W. H. G. T. (Toronto, Canada).— Many thanks for fcha 
cutting you enclose of the American "expert's" views. I 
have no means of ascertaining the naval qualifications of 
Mr. Benjamin, " naval expert," but I certainly agree with 
you that his opinion that Admiral Beatty should be shot 
for not having plunged into a clever German trap suggests 
that Mr. Benjamin's sympathies do not lie with the British 
Navy. Put your trust in Admiral Beatty, and let tha 
Germans say what thoy like. 
" Veriest Tvro " (Dunmore). — At Heligoland, bo far 
as we know, tlio Germans have concreted everything. Wa 
could probably ease off torpedoes v/ithout number and leava 
the bases of the fortifications untouched. When our really 
big guns come along it is not impossible that we may gradu- 
ally disintegrate the island, but ,1 am afraid that it is 
exceedingly improbable. Destroying a fort is something lika 
trying to kill a tortoise which you cannot capsize. 
" AiB Bug" (Dundee). — I think that the ATmy anA 
Navy Gazette hit the right nail on the head. All these "air 
mechanics" know a great deal about the technique, but 
where war strategy is concerned they are apt to be babies in 
arms. They can never realise that the tncmy uill not be idlt 
in the meantime. Our Army would have been in Berlin by 
now if German guns and German rifles had not been in tha 
way. 
" Encore RET.^Li.iTios." — Sorry I misunderstood you. 
What you now explain as the idea suggested has been ia 
operation ever since the war began. 
GREAT BRITAIN'S AERIAL POSITION. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
DURING six consecutive weeks the writer has, in 
these columns, endeavoured to draw the serious 
attention of the authorities to the great value of 
the aeroplane for offensive purposes, and in one of 
his articles he suggested the creation of a special 
air fleet 2,000 strong. In studying the potential capabilities 
of the fifth arm he has been led to certain conclusions, which 
were explained in his articles, and some of which it may now 
be useful to repeat. He therefore asks those who may bo 
concerned with the adaptation of the new weapon of war for 
offensive purposes to bear in mind the following vital points :, 
(1) An air fleet may be used for two distinct purposes : 
(a) It may form part of a land or sea force, when its rfil* 
must necessarily be limit-ed to the operations of that foroa 
considered as a whole. It is as a part of a. land or a sea 
force that, generally speaking, the belligerents, whether 
allied or opposed to us, have, up to the preeent, employed 
their aircraft. In such employment of their aeroplanes 
the British have obtained so great an ascendancy over 
their adversaries that they now claim to possess tha 
"Supremacy of the Air." This term should, in reality, 
convey no other fact than that our airmen can carry out 
more comprehensi\o and more detailed and reliable obser- 
vations than those of the enemy. 
(J) It maj' be looked upon as a force of offensive and destruc- 
tive value, to be employed either independently of, or in 
co-operation with, a land or a sea force. With the excep- 
tion of a few raids, which can only be regarded as very 
timid aerial attacks, tht cmpJoi/ment of aircra/t for offcn- 
tilt and dettructive purpoiej hat not yet becomt an 
accomplished fact. 
(2) Froni considerations based upon the carrj-ing capacity .)f 
existing aircraft and upon the lack of precise know- 
ledge of aerial bailistica, as well as upon various general data, 
anoffcmivcair fleet must be strong in number. 
|3) Tilt same air fleet should not at one time bi used to form part 
of a land or a tea force, and at another time to act as an inde- 
pendent force. Tii8 plan of d«tacliiug from an air fleet forming 
hostilities, been adopted both by the Allies and by tlio enemy. 
This, although it may not have led to permanent results, has 
been useful. It has proved in actual practice the potential 
value of the offensive aeroplane, and has established the im- 
portance of the number of aircraft in a licet carrying out offea- 
sive operations. But it is an action whicii must cot be too 
frequently repeated, as such a course may compromise the aeriai 
supremacy whicij ii already ours and yet have no reaJ influenca 
0-1 the war. 
(4) A ■powerful offensive air fleet specially built to act either inde- 
pendentlij of or in co-operation with a land or a sea fore* 
should be created at once. That force could permanently itv- 
fluence both the character and the duiation of the present wa^, 
BRITAIN S UNIQUE POSITION. 
In considering the capability of the British Isles to pro- 
duce in a short time a very large number of aeroplanes, ona 
cannot fail to realise that a great part of the resources of tha 
country which could be employed in the production of an offen- 
sive air fleet are still unutilised. In his last article* the writer 
referred to the two principles which seem to have guided our 
military authorities in the production of aircraft durin" the 
period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostiUtiea. 
These two principles — (a) every promising constructed aircraft 
must be given a trial, and (b) every promising constructor 
must be given work — were also, in a greater or less decree, 
those which guided the foreign countries. To these two prin- 
ciples is due the fact that at the beginning of the war all the 
principal belligerent countries possessed several successful 
designs of aircraft and a number of firms who had acquired 
experience in aircraft construction. But now, owing to her 
voluntary system of military service and to her command of 
♦"A Not* of Waiuiui," Land a^'d Waxkb, March 6, 1915, 
12* 
