March 13, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
the seas, the capability of Great Britain to construct aircraft 
on a large scale is unique. 
Of all the nations now at war, Great Britain, by reason 
of her system of voluntary military service, has had her 
industries the least disturbed, and on account of the 
supremacy of her Navy she is not short of any material that 
nay be required in the construction of war weapons. Hence 
these two causes have given to the country the means of supply- 
ing her armies with more and better awcraft than is possible 
to the enemy. The full significance of these two causes of 
the aerial supremacy which is at present ours — ((7) an undis- 
turbed industry; (J) the naval supremacy — will be readily 
understood when it is remembered that the aeroplane con- 
structor depends for the carrying out of his v/ork upon a great 
number of industries which, in their turn, depend upon an 
adequate supply of the necessary materials. Confronted by 
a disorganised industry, an aeroplane constructor, however 
talented and however experienced, could not easily produce 
a single machine. To give the reader an idea of the various 
industries on which the aeroplane constructor depends for 
the construction of an aeroplane, eome of them will be men- 
tioned. The motor industry must supply him with a light and 
reliable motor; the propeller maker with a suitable propeller. 
The winsrs of the machine must be covered with a strong and 
light linen fabric, which must be supplied by the linen in- 
dustry. This linen fabric itself must be treated with a 
" dope," the manufacture of which depends on the chemical 
industry. The wheels of the machine are provided by the 
cycle maker, and their covers and inner tubes by the rubber 
industry, and the production of hundreds of other small but 
important parts, such as turn-buckles, different flanges and 
connections, tee-pieces, various taps, valves, nuts, nipples, 
petrol fillers, fuel and oil tanks, pulleys, bracket seats, chassis 
springs, and many other parts, the mere mention of which 
would require some several hundred words, depend upon a 
large number of miscellaneous engineering industries. It is 
thus clear that with her industries disorganised and deprived 
of the necessary material, comprising wood, rubber, steel, 
copper, aluminium, fibre for linen, petrol, lubricating oil, and 
other substances, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a 
country to try to create during the war an air fleet capable 
of offensive operations of permanent value. 
In her ability to produce aircraft Britain stands alone. 
France, on account of her com.pulscry system of mlHtsry 
service which called to the colours thousands of men who 
suddenly had to leave her industries short of labour and or- 
ganising power, docs not now possess the tithe of our resources 
for aircraft construction. The occupation by the Germans 
of the highly industrial districts of Northern France still 
further reduced the industrial resources of our Ally. It is 
for this reason that France, who, under more fortunate cir-' 
cumstances, would probably have created a grand offensive 
air fleet, now finds herself incapable of even attempting the 
effort. It is upon us that the burden rests of creating 
such a fleet. It is a duty which we are bound to perform, 
since it may, without interfering with our other arrangements, 
lead to a much shorter war and to a smaller sacrifice of Uvea. 
THE BUILDING OF 2,000 AEROPLANES, 
Aeroplanes can now be built much quicker than at the 
beginning of hostilities, both because fewer types of machines 
are constructed and because greater practice in the construc- 
tion, on a larger scale, of the various parts required has been 
obtained. The rate of construction can be further increased, 
and in creating an offensive air fleet 2,000 strong, the writer 
suggests the adoption of only one type of machine. This type, 
which would be the standard type for the offensive independent 
fleet, should be built outside the regular aeronautical industry, 
which is already fully employed in producing the necessary 
machines for our present aerial fleet, which, on account of its 
various duties, must necessarily contain units of various 
standards. The offensive air fleet, being brought into existence 
for one single definite purpose, would consist of only one 
type. The creation of such a fleet would not prevent the 
development of aeronautics, would not interfere with the estab- 
lished aeronautical industry, and would employ numerous, 
and as yet untapped, engineering and other resources 
of the country which are now unutilised and are lying fallow. 
The writer makes this comment advisedly. During the last 
few weeks he has been in touch with scores of industrial firms 
all over the country where work is slack through want of 
orders, and who are desirous, and capable, of supplying all 
the various necessary parts for the creation, within six months, 
of an offensive air fleet on the scale indicated. The list of 
these firms the writer is prepared to communicate to the 
authorities should it be required. 
THE ASCENDENCY OF THE ALLIED 
AIRCRAFT. 
WHAT IT MEANS IN THE COMING ADVANCE. 
By COLONEL F. 
WHILE everyone is wondering when the Great 
Advance from France and Flanders to the 
Rhine will begin, no one seems to have noticed 
the growth of a new factor in the conduct of 
warfare, which, working quite silently, his 
completely changed the nature of the vast problem before the 
Allies. 
It began to make its appearance some six months ago, 
when Sir John French in his dispatches wrote of our 
Buperiority which was evinced by our airmen as compared to 
those of the Germans. 
But, even then, scarcely anyone began to speculate 
seriously on what might follow this ascendency, because no 
one could have believed that by degrees such a power would 
In so short a time be so firmly established as to render the 
German air fleet for all practical purposes as non-existent as 
the ships in the Kiel Canal. But, reading between the lines 
of the French communiques, it was possible to see what was 
coming when day after day artillery duels were decided ^rlth 
the vantage to the gunners of the Allies. 
If we look back to the dates when this remark first ap- 
peared with regularity, it will be evident that at that time 
there could be no question of our numerical superiority in 
guns, or even in ammunition supply, to account for the fact, 
and aa between the actual skill of the gun-layers the advan- 
tage could only be trifling. 
The factor which remains as explanation of the phrasing 
of the reports was "facility" or "superiority of observa- 
tion," and it was in the domain of the flying men that we 
could look for this facility, as all other methods were the com- 
mon property of both sides. ,, . 
Week after week, as the communiquds told of enemy 
guns smashed up by direct hits, of batteries silenced, and 
N. MAUDE, C.B. 
whole lengths of trenches blown in, it became more especially 
evident that our ascendency was increasing, and when at 
last began the series of French local attacks on a considerable 
scale, in Alsace, then near Soissons, and since in almost every 
sector of defence in turn, there could be no doubt that wo 
had firmly established it. 
In each case these offensives were seen to compel the 
Germans to bring up reinforcements to avert the danger 
threatening some vital point, generally one of the lateral 
railways,^n which the cohesion of the fighting front depends. 
As Im. Hilaire Belloc has so well shown in these pages, 
the Germans were very haxd put to it indeed to find rein- 
forcements for the threatened sectors. At Soissons, thanks 
to the local superiority of numbers which they were able to 
accumulate and to the rise of the Aisne, they could claim aa 
advantage which loomed very large through the turgid lan- 
guage of their announcements. But this did not by any 
means suflice to put the observers of the game off the true 
line. The recent operations between Perthes and Souain, to 
mention only the principal group, have confirmed the impres- 
sion which has been forming in my mind for some time — • 
viz., that the French have now attained so entire a mastei-y 
over enemy movements that they can oblige him to come out 
into the open and attack them when and wherever they please. 
This is the m.eaning of the announcement they made officially 
last week that " at a given point and at a given hour we are 
free to do what we will." 
I believe the claim to be thoroughly justified by the 
circumstances, and its importance it is difficult to over- 
estimate. 
In every battle, siege, or campaign the chief object of 
the commander on one side has alv.-ays been to compel his 
adversary to use up his reserves prematurely at some point 
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