March 20, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
English Mites 
yi 
without a vast previous awumulation of transport 
to feed the big guns and the howitzers which are 
going to do the damage. In the earlier part of the 
war such an accumulation would have been 
spotted by the enemy. His air work was still the 
equal of oui's, and often its superior. It is the 
sharp characteristic of this last piece of business 
that the enemy was taken completely by surprise. 
He seems to have had no idea that a concentration 
of this sort was going on right in front of him. 
He seems to have been completely taken in by tlie 
small demonstrations south of Ypres on the 
Monday and the Tuesday before the big attack 
was launched upon the Wednesday and fought 
its way to a conclusion on the Thursday. 
It has next to be remarked that the handling 
of the heavy artillery, when it did come into play, 
was evidently superior to that of the correspond- 
ing large pieces upon the enemy's side, and that 
the munitions, for which there has been .so anxious 
a call from the front, must have arrived in an 
increased stream. 
It is further to be noted that the action con- 
tradicts what many serious observers had feared 
— namely, that the long winter trench work would 
destrov the power for vigorous attack in the men 
who had suffered it. That has been the experi- 
ence of most wars in the past, and it was feared 
that it might be the experience of this war. 
Lastly, the move shows in a particularly lucid 
manner the working of that policy of attrition to 
whicli such frequent allusion has been made in 
these pages. But that is so important a point tiiat 
it deserves a separate passage, for we can seek for 
no better opportunity of examining the method at 
work. 
THE POLICY OF "ATTRITION." 
The truth is that the two combined actions, 
that in Champagne and that north of La Bassee, 
give a very clear model, upon a rather large scale. 
of the working of that policy whicli has been al; 
the back of ail the allied effoVt in the West since 
the beginning of December, and since the enemy 
confined himself in the West to holding his line 
while using all his available men for his greater 
effort against the Russians — an effort so far 
fruitless. That policy is, as we know, the policy, 
of " attrition." 
Everybody knows in general what that word 
means in connection with the trench warfare. It 
means the wearing down of the enemy's numbers 
and qualities until he shall no longer be able to 
hold the great length of trenches— over four 
hundred miles long — to which he is now pinned. 
When he can no longer hold that line he must 
shorten it— a perilous operation, further involv- 
ing the loss of territory he now keeps in Belgium 
and France, or it will break, and in eitlier case 
the critical moment will be the opportunity for 
the launch of the main effort against him. 
The enemy, upon his side, is fighting in the 
East for a decision to enable him to push back 
troops West before that policy of " attrition " 
shall have imperilled him in the West, and if ho 
can, in time, do this, the policy of attrition has 
failed ; but if, on account of his losses in the East, 
or of his being detained there too long, or of the 
renewed equipment of our Russian ally, in greater 
efforts with the freeing of icebound ports or the 
forcing of the Dardanelles, he fails to strengthen 
himself sufficiently in the West in time, then it is 
the policy of " attrition " which will decide the 
war. 
It behoves us, if we are to understand the 
campaign in the West, to see clearly what is meant 
by this policy. You wear down your enemy by 
causing him" numerical losses in men and in 
material, and moral loss in strain, sickness, and 
fatigue. 
Now, it is clear that you con thus wear down 
your enemy by continually attacking him, but it is 
also, luifortunately, clear that you only do so at a 
certain expense to yourself. And if that expense 
is equal or superior to that of the enemy you are 
not succeeding in your policy of " attrition " at 
all. For you are using more men than he is, and 
that is something which, seeing that lie still has a 
numerical support in the whole field, would be a 
disastrous fault leading straight to defeat. 
The policy thus can only be successful if ydu 
are making the enemy lose upon the whole, and 
taking the entire front upon an average, consider- 
ably more men in the process of " nibbling " than 
you are losing, and can make him suffer a greater 
strain than you are suffering. 
At first sight it v/ould seem tliat this was 
impossible, for the attack to which you are con- 
tinually condemned in such a method is normally 
more expensive than the defence. 
But there are certain elements of the exact 
situation in the West which, if they are co- 
ordinated, would be seen to offer an opportunity 
for the success of this policy, although it involves 
continual attack. 
These elements are as follows : — 
1. The enemy is tiot working in the West 
with a large reserve. He must use all the men he 
can possibly spare for getting, as quickly as pos- 
sible, his decision upon the East. He is, there- 
fore, presumably holding his line with only just 
the number of men he requires for that purpose 
and is keeping no considerable number unem-» 
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