LAND AND ^V. A T E R. 
March 20, 1915 
paffne or from La Bassde, though it does not niean 
and is not intended to mean the approaching 
breaking of the German line, does mean the 
further grave weakening of the total force witli 
which the enemy can hope to meet the mam 
advance when the moment for that mam advance 
has sounded. 
THE GERMAN AND FRENCH 
COMMUNIQUES. 
There has been given us during tliis week in 
connection with the movement just described a 
verj- excellent example of the contrast between the 
German and French ofllcial communiques; and 
we shall do well to compare the two, not because it 
is profitable to abuse an enemy or praise an ally, 
but because our judgment of the war is largely 
based upon the oiiicial communiques issued by the 
five principal belligerent lowers, as an apprecia- 
tion of their methods is essential to such a 
judgment. 
It has already been pointed out in these 
columns some weeks ago that the French and 
German communiques are distinguished by two 
elements in the German report : 
First, it is detailed and accurate in certain 
particulars, and has maintained that accuracy 
from the beginning of the war. 
Second, it contains statements often detailed, 
but deliberately and positively false. 
It is, we may remark in passing, to no purpose 
to abuse the enemy for this second feature. It is a 
feature deliberately inserted with a legitimate 
military purpose — to wit, the confusion of the 
enemy. 
Now to this second feature there has been 
added in an increasing degree during tlic last few 
months a third feature, which it is impoi'tant for 
us to note particularly if we desire to follow the 
state of mind and the aims of the enemy since the 
war entered its present phase. This third feature, 
as has been also pointed out in these columns, con- 
sists in vague statements applying to large opera- 
tions in a general fashion, and apparently betray- 
ing a puzzling lack of judgment in a people who 
have so carefully considered all the cliauces of this 
great war, which is of their own making and 
brought about at their own chosen hour. 
The features of the French communique can, 
I think, be put down with equal simplicity. The 
French communique has for its cardinal character 
tlie omission of all things wOiatsoever that may be 
of advantage to the enemy. However indirect this 
advantage, it is avoided by a reticence pushed to a 
degree which would perhaps be impossible any- 
where else than in France. For the French con- 
ception of national discipline, utterly different 
from the German (for it is spontaneous), is quite 
as severe and certainly more practical. 
Coupled with this reticence, the French com- 
munique often admits deliberately optimistic 
explanations of a reverse or check. I mean that 
it does not only keep silent about numbers, casual- 
ties, movements, and so forth, but it wall fre- 
quently counter adverse rumour by publishing an 
ofiicial explanation intended to support the 
national temper. 
We must remark that (as is to be expected) 
this second feature in the French communique has 
been less frequent during the last phase of the war 
than at the moment of great trial in the first weeks 
of active operations. 
Lastly, we note a feature increasingly common 
in the French communique since the correspond- 
ing feature appeared in the German com- 
muniques—I mean the detailed reply to those 
detailed false statements which the enemy has 
recently increased in number. 
Now, in order to have a reasonable estimate 
of both witnesses in this series of evidence, we 
must, if possible, estimate not only their habits, 
but their motives for these habits. 
Why does the German communique show the 
features we have noted in it ? 
Why does the French communique show^ the 
featurcs"we have noted in it ? 
The accuracy in detail which is a uniiorra 
feature of the earlier German communiques, and 
which is still a leading feature in the present ones, 
proceeds, I think, from a tendency observable m 
a]] modern German work, which tendency a friend 
would call " thorouglmess " and an enemy " plod- 
ding." As in their historical works and m many 
other departments of modern German activity, so 
in these military records, the modern Germans 
have an appetitc'for detail, and whenever you con- 
sider detail vou are unusually inclined to accuracy 
in detail. It is indeed the mark of too close an 
attention to detail in iuiy de]>artment of thought 
that, while your general judgment is often im- 
paired by it, your precision of particular state- 
ment is improved. And, other things being equal, 
a German official record will usually be more 
trustworthy for its details, will contain less errors 
due to emotion, fatigue, or lazincos, than will 
corresponding records of other societies. 
In a mood which does not lend itself to false- 
hood, or in the absence of motives for the same, the 
German comnumique has been thoroughly trust- 
worthy. 
What, then, of the inaccurate elements which 
we have noted ? . , 
It has been pointed out frequently m these 
columns that the main moti^-e in this has been the 
misleading of the enemy commanders by state- 
ments which may be accepted for the short time 
by those commanders, and would, if accepted, dis- 
turb their plans. 
For instance, the enemy receives a severe 
check, loses a grea t number of men and guns, and 
is occupied in a confused and too rapid retire- 
ment. His commanders are not for some little 
time able to compute the exact extent of their 
losses. If the moment l)e immediately seized and 
the Germans jjublish estimated losses much larger 
than the true ones, and as much as the enemy can 
be got to believe during this period of confusion, 
it must affect that enemy's plans adversely, and 
this fact is magnified if, intermixed with tho 
exaggeration, you mingle undoubtedly true bits of 
statistics. For instance, you say : — 
" In the lake near Lotzen we discovered such 
and such a number of heavy pieces which the 
enemy had thrown in during his retreat, because 
he could not take them away with him, and we 
captured such and such a number of unwounded 
prisoners." 
The commander of the defeated and retiring 
force surveys the great confusion of his command 
and knows that he has lost very heavily, and is, 
perhaps, ready to accept, for forty-eight hours or 
so, before tiie full statistics come in, the figures 
given by his adversary. He cannot v;e\\ tell of the 
men missing, what proportion are killed, what 
wounded, and what unwounded prisoners. If the 
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