LAND AND ,W A T E E. 
March 20, 1915. 
counter-offences for country almost devoid of 
colour between the occasional stunty pine and 
larch plantalions with which the policy of 
Napoleon III. studded this region of the camp 
of Chalons and its neighbourhood. The dry, poor 
chalk soil is often capable of no other crop, and 
the plantations take the place of what was once 
useless waste. 
In the French communiques, both that pre- 
ceding and that following the long German com- 
munique of this week concerning this section of 
the Western front, we have also this feature, 
peculiar to the French records which have been 
noted. 
Thus there is a remarkable absence — common 
to all these statements — of figures, which could be 
of no use to the enemy. Masses of German pris- 
oners have been taken. We know this from the 
evidence of e3'^e-witnesses describing columns as 
they passed through to the rear. Portions of the 
French Press and certain private letters bear 
sufticient witnesses to what we would, in any case, 
have expected to be the result of so prolonged and 
euccessf ul an effort. But when it would be at once 
interesting to the student and of high political 
value in heartening opinion at home, the full 
ifigures of these captui'es are not given us. It is a 
fixed French principle that they should not be dis- 
closed. Captures by the British, both of guns and 
men, are differently treated, and the German 
method is in high contrast, for it perpetually men- 
tions the number of prisoners captured, and 
usually makes a point of exaggerating this. 
The French communiques are again largely 
concerned with a detailed refutation of the Ger- 
man claims. They are careful to mention what 
the enemy already knows, the extent of his con- 
centration. They even point out — what is valu- 
able for us to learn and know — news of the enemy, 
the way in which that concentration was effected 
by borrowing men from other parts of the line. 
On the other hand, they say nothing of their 
own losses, rarely even to make them out less than 
the enemy claims. 
In genera], we may say of these two present 
communiques that they are not only the latest but 
the fullest examples of the principal witnesses we 
have in the judgment of this great debate, and are 
a fair guide to tlie temper of those witnesses in 
the future evidence that will be laid before us. 
THE EASTERN FRONT. 
On the Eastern front there is virtually 
nothing to record this week — or at least in progress 
— worth analysis at the moment of writing (Tues- 
day evening). 
It is evident that the forcing of the Dar- 
danelles is going to be — what everyone who knew 
the district and the means employed was prepared 
for — a lengthy business. 
The chief element in the delay is, of course, 
the weather in that district and, at this time of 
the year, the " black sea .scud " hanging low and 
preventing all air work, the gales from tlie North, 
together make the chances of bombardment only 
available sometimes after rather long intervals'^; 
with a very high wind or wi£h low-lying clouds, it 
is impossible for the machines in the air to correct 
the indirect or long-distance firing of naval guns; 
and, with this fire uncorrec'lied, even tlie largest 
high-explosive shells at such ranges would be 
wasted. 
The chief drawback to these delays does not 
lie in the postponing of the task — though that is 
of considerable moment to the Russians — it rather 
lies in the time which the larger interval gives 
the enemy to recuperate his forces. Unless a 
permanent work has been totally destroyed, the 
guns dismounted, or shattered, or the mountings 
displaced, a few days' grace will enable the de- 
fenders to set things more or less right again. 
Whereas a certain number of shell of a certain 
calibre — say, 11-inch shell — falling upon a per- 
manent work, may destroy it if the delivery of 
such shell be unintermitted and rapid, a very 
different effect would be produced if the same 
number of shell is only delivered in small groups 
and after long and irregular intervals. The moral 
effect alone counts here, and the material damage 
done by a partial bombardment is, as we have seen, 
capable of being restored if a sufficient breathing 
space is afforded. 
Further, the reader must remember that when 
you are dealing with over a score of permanent 
works, as is the case with the Narrows, the diffi- 
culty is multiplied by much more than the mere 
multiple of guns. A group of permanent works 
like this are much more than ten times as formid- 
able as a couple of works would be. First, because 
of the way in which they support each other 
against a gun platform upon the water; secondly, 
because of the way thej'^ can support each 
other against attack from land. No permanent 
work can be regarded as finally reduced until it 
has been destroyed to the satisfaction of the land- 
ing party. Its mere silence, even its wrecked ap- 
pearance as seen from alx)ve, does not completely 
guarantee shipping that m.ay have to pass it for 
the future. Until a landing party has occupied 
the work, and either completed the necessary 
destruction or satisfied itself that there is no more 
to do, the work may still be formidable. 
Where you have a small group of works this 
task is much easier in proportion than where you 
have a large one ; for against the parties landing 
to effect the final destruction of partially wrecked 
forts and batteries, other forts and batteries still 
in existence can fire. 
All these considerations combined should 
moderate the expectations of those who looked for- 
ward, after the first unexpected success of the 
Allied Fleet in entering the Straits, and after the 
development of the novel principle of attack to 
which the Nari'ows was subjected, to a rapid ad- 
vance by us upon Constantinople. 
There is, of course, as was pointed out in this 
paper at the time (and German criticism was made 
to that effect), the problem of the land forces. Until 
the shores of the Dardanelles on either side are 
sufficiently held, commerce cannot use that channel. 
The problem of holding the land is partly 
political and partly military. Only those ac- 
quainted with the Near East (which the present 
writer is not) can decide how far a political threat 
to the capital would disarm the Turkish armies 
in the field ; such a threat to the capital might be 
delivered by the fleet Avithout procuring tlie sur- 
render or the withdrawal of the troops to the 
south. The military problem, supposing the fleet 
to be successful in reaching the Sea of Slarmara, 
but not successful in causing the withdrawal of 
troops through political action, is two-fold. The 
occupation of the Straits by the fleet, should the 
forcing of them be successful, will prevent the 
Asiatic shore from reinforcing the European. But 
the reduction or the dispei-sion of troops waitin"- 
10^ 
