LAND AND WATER. 
March 20, 1915. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
NOTE.— This AiUcIe has beea submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes m 
rc3>)oasibllity tor the correctness of the statements. 
X..-"'C 
Tasha Vc^h 
ttit^PSSm^ 
THE DARDANELLES. 
UNDUE optimism, or, at any rate, a total failure 
to appreciate the difficulties connected with the 
forcing of the Dardanelles, continues to be a 
feature of the situation where the mass of the 
general public is concerned. 
We have much airy talk about the " v/onderful progress 
of modern gunnery ' ' rendering this or that possible, as witness 
the nonsense which has been written about "the wonderful 
guns of the Queen Elizabeth," enabling indirect fire to be 
used over the Gallipoli peninsula. 
It, of course, makes good headlines to attribute it all to 
modern gunnery, aircraft obsorvation, and so on and so forth; 
but, as a matter of fact, aircraft (if employed) were merely 
a refinement of methods which were common over almost equal 
distances so long ago as the Russo-Japanese War. 
In this particular war, at Port Arthur, indirect fire was 
the order of the day more often than not. Early in the war, 
using the heights as an observation station, the Russian 
Retvixan, herself invisible, landed a couple of 12-iucb shell 
right alongside the Japanese Fuji, firing over a considerable 
neck of laud and at a range of something over ton miles. By 
canting the ship, and so securing extra elevation, the same 
thing could have been done at fifteen. The Japanese at the 
time put it down to land forts; but as none of the land forts 
had such guns, this idea subsequently became untenable for 
obvious reasons. 
Again, Captain Kuroi, commanding the Japanese naval 
shore battery, dropped many a shell on the Russian Fleet in 
Port Arthur, although it was quite invisible to him. For 
" observation " he relied partly on a captive balloon with 
primitive signalling arrangements, partly on observation 
from ships outside, which had to be careful to keep well 
away from unreduced land forts. 
Later on, 203 metre Hill was captured, and an ideal 
observation station secured; but plenty of damage was dona 
before that- 
So far as the Dardanelles are concerned (see plan), any 
battleship at X, given an observing ship at Y (more or le.is 
out of range of A and B), could at any time within the last 
ten or twelve years shell A and B with cousidorablo accuracy, 
the necessary information being wireles.sed directly or in- 
directly as per plan on page 13, using Z as a repeating ship. 
Now all this has been obvious for years. Equally 
obvious is it that at any time during the period, supposing the 
forts at the entrance to be destroyed, the key to A and B 
must lie at C, which should have been fortified accordingly. 
That no defensive works were erected must be put down 
to Turkish casualness or stupidity. It is folly to suppose that 
the Germans failed to recognise the joint in the armour, much 
as they may have relied upon the old verity that the fort is 
superior to the ship. Possibly they calculated that reverence 
for that, doctrine would alone suffice to save the Dardanelles 
from any attack. Possibly also th^y never really expected 
to be able to drag Turkey into the war, and having done so. 
found it impossible to obtain the ijecessavy guns to defend 
Chauak's heel of Achilles. 
It has also to be remembered that merely to erect a 
small extemporised six-inch battery is a matter of a week to 
• fortnight at the least; to establish really efficient big gun 
forts must at least be reckoned in months, and more probably 
in years, even were there no problem of finding the gunn, 
•lountings, ammunition, and other details. 
Here let us take a chess analogy. Everyone who has 
merely a nodding acquaintance with the game (which nodding 
acquaintance incidentally represents more or less accurately 
Turkish knowledge of modern war), knows the wonderful 
things that could be done against the most skilful opponent, 
if on!i/ an extra move could be worked in here and there. 
Black is handicapped from the first by being a move behind ; 
in this particular Dardanelles game Fate or stupidity, or 
both in conjunction, have put Black (the German-Turkish 
combination) three or four moves behind-hand. 
But — if we are to obtain any level-headed or correct 
estimation of affairs — we must keep all the superlatives out 
of court. We must never forget that circumstances have 
been on our side, that the stars have fought against Sisera, 
that an intensely difficult and dangerous operation is being 
carried out, and that its success or failure depends entirely oa 
three factors: 
(1) Outranging. 
(2) Making the uttermost of every weak point in the 
defence. 
(3) The psychological effect of slow but sure progress. 
This, of course, in no way coincides with the general 
public view of the Dardanelles affair. At any moment the 
third factor may intervene and render all else nugatory. Bufc 
failing it, the task is colo.ssal ; and, had the Dardanelles been 
German, I for one am absolutely convinced that they would 
have proved impregnable even against outranging fire, since 
there is no limit to the armour which can be applied to a 
fort gun, nor any limit (other than the financial one, which 
can be neglected) to the number of guns which can b« 
mounted. 
This fact the Germans assimilated many years ago, and 
they have fortified their own coasts accordingly. When, 
eventually, the very third-rate defences of the Dardanelles 
succumb to overwhelming naval force, we may expect some- 
thing in the nature of a public demand for similar operations 
against the really first-class defences of Cuxhaven or Heligo- 
land. We may also expect to find the German Press and its 
naval experts explaining at great length that forts are hopeless 
against ships, in the hopes that they will be quoted over here. 
It is here that danger lies, danger of popular attempts to 
force Admiralty policy. Such attempts do not stand to suc- 
ceed, but the occurrence of them to any extent is bound to 
encourage the enemy as a sign of weakness. Herein lies tha 
true inwardness of " Trust the Admiralty." 
THE SMYRNA OPERATIONS. 
The importance of the Smyrna operations is somewhat 
apt to be overlooked. It is true that they are of less import- 
ance than what is being done in tlie Dardanelles, though in a 
way, of course, they are a natural corollary. For example, 
the capture of Constantinopls is bound to turn Turkey into an 
Asiatic Power pure and simple; so that, in addition to its 
actual value as a great trade centre, Smyrna has a hyjiothe- 
tical value of considerable significance. 
War is necessarily a niatt«r of anticipating and allowing 
for contingeucies. Since a siege and defence of Constantinople 
is put of the question because of the Allied Fleet, we may 
take it for granted that (unless prevented) the Turks will 
withdraw all their European troops to Asia Minor — a concen- 
tration not to be ignored. 
From what we know of Turkish conceptions, or rather 
misconceptions, of sea power, it was ever in the chapter of 
12* 
