March 20, 1915. 
LAND AND ,W. A T E R. 
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possibilities that an attempt would be made to collect trans- 
ports at Smyrna with a view to operations against Egypt. 
With a view to protecting these, the fortifications were pro- 
bably being improved. There was also always the possibility 
©f an Austrian squadron managing to evade the French Fleet 
and get into Smyrna. 
One way and another, therefore, it was necessary either 
to disable Smyrna or else to maintain a lengthy and consider- 
able close blockade of the port. 
From all of which it is abundantly clear that the bom- 
bardment of Smyrna comes into a totally different category to 
the bombardment of Scarborough and other of our East Coast 
towns. In the first case, we have definite operations as a 
definite and integral part of a definite scheme; in the other, 
mere aimless destruction in no way commensurate with the 
risk, probably not even worth the cost of the ammunition 
expended. 
THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE. 
The most important event of the week is undoubtedly 
the destruction which has been wrought on hostile submarines 
by British destroyers. It is not impossible that the reported 
tinkings of submarines by merchant ships may be imaginary 
or partial successes. That is to say, there exists a possibility 
of sunken wreckage being occasionally taken for a submarine, 
also the further possibility that a submarine may be struck 
and merely damaged to the extent of her outer skin. To avoid 
being unduly optimistic we should consider these things, and 
perhaps discount by fifty per cent, in order to be certain of 
being on the right side. 
Where destroyers are concerned, however, we have two 
recent tangible cases of organised destruction resulting in the 
loss of the boats and the capture of the crews. This last is 
certainly an application of the truth of the proverb that ' ' a 
live dog is better than a dead lion," because the taking 
prisoners of crews is evidence which cannot be concealed or 
suppressed, and proof to the German people of weak points in 
that submarine blockade on which so much faith was pinned. 
To us it is also satisfactory as indicating that we are 
learning the limitations of submarines, and acquiring practice 
in ways and means of destroying them. In this the ram seems 
easily the best weapon, as it was expected it would prove to 
be, since it is the simplest. 
The problem of the crews has probably been best dealt 
with in the way in which the Admiralty has acted. To accord 
the " pirates " the ordinary treatment given to prisoners of 
war would have been manifestly incorrect. On the other hand, 
to hang them, though logical, would probably have defeated 
the object in view. It is necessary to remember in connection 
with this blockade that the German submarines are acting 
under definite orders from their own Admiralty. All the sub- 
marines have not carried these instructions out to the letter ; 
Fome captains have been careful not to outrage the laws of 
humanity. To ascertain and differentiate during the war is 
necessarily difiicult, if not impossible in many cases. The 
certainty of an ignominious death as the certain result of 
capture would tend to drive all submarine oflicers to Ish- 
maelite tactics. 
The British " reply " has now been definitely proclaimed. 
Whether it will have satisfactory results remains to be seen. 
There ip ever a great deal to be said for the alternative policy 
of ignoring the blockade altogether. We all know the psycho- 
logical advantage secured by the roan who refuses to lose his 
temper in a quarrel or the fate of a boxer who " loses his 
hair." 
To be sure we have not done that, and our proclamation 
is moderation itself. All the same, however, it will so be 
represented in Germany to the German public, and by Ger- 
man agencies to all neutral nations. It is along svich lines 
that wo may lose as much as we gain, correct though the 
" reply " qua reply may be and is. 
THE HIGH SEAS. 
On March 14 the German corsair Dresden (which 
escaped after the battle of the Falkland Islands) was caught 
by the Kent and Glase/ow off the island of Juan Fernandez, 
and after a short five minutes' action hoisted the white flag. 
She was, of course, hopelessly outgunned, and it is little 
wonder that she sank soon afterwards. 
The significance of the incident lies in the state of im- 
potence to which, as a corsair, she had been i-educed. Instead 
of destroying and harrying British trade, she was herself 
harried and in hiding. 
There remains now only the Karlsruhe, also in hiding and 
also impotent. Two armed liners remain, but of these the 
Prim Eitel, should she leave the harbour where she is now 
definitely located, is practically certain to be destroyed. 
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS. 
W. M. (Westmeath). — When Duckworth went through 
the Dardanelles he was fired at from holes drilled in the rock, 
which projected huge stones. This has given rise to the story 
of similar submerged torpedo-dischargers to-day. It is not 
very likely that any such exist — in any case, they could exist 
anywhere just as well as at the Narrows. Ten years ago the 
Germans installed, as part of their defences at Cuxhaven and 
elsewhere, huge submerged drums fitted with torpedo tubes. 
A. F. R. (Montreal). ^There are practically no "tactics" 
in modern naval warfare compared to the tactics of ths old 
days. The German criticisms of British tactics do not count 
for much, and the alleged " bad manoeuvring " of the North 
Sea action was due to t-he fact that Admiral Beatty refused 
to be dragged i)itO a clever German trap. ' 
C. S. P. (Wimbledon). — It is impossible to answer your 
question as submarines vary so, but in a rough sort of way 
you might give the destroyer half a minute if spotted, though 
it has, of course, a fair chance of not being spotted. 
Ducks and Drakes (Ilythe). — The course of a torpedo 
is not to Ims deflected in the way you suggest. I believe that 
in the early days of torpedoes one or two provisional patents 
were taken out, but that they never came to anything. 
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