LAND AND KATER. 
March 20, 1915. 
E. H. G. M. (Devon). — The wavy gold lace band indi- 
cates Royal Naval Ucierve. The white band indicates that 
jbe is in the pay department of that branch of the Service. 
E. W. S. (London, W.C). — The best known bomb- 
dropper is the Scott, invented by an officer of the U.S. Flying 
.Corps. It was described and illustrated in Aeronautics some 
time ago. If you mail 65 cents to the Aeronautics Press Inc., 
250, West 54th Street, New York, you will get the particular 
copy. Any of our aerial journals would also give you in- 
formation galore. 
J. L. (Glasgow). — No; quite impossible. 
S. M. T. (York). — With reference to the Dardanelles, 
you have not taken into account my point of the immense fire- 
Buperiority of the ships of the Allies engaged. Ships (if 
stationary), armed as the forts were, would have been 
annihilated in seven minutes instead of seven hours 1 
G. McI. (Belfast). — The device you mention is a very 
old one. 
T. L. B. (Windermere). — Your suggestion that, as 
English prisoners in Germany are apparently being badly 
underfed, exchanges should be made on the basis of u-cight 
instead of numbers, is certainly original ! I doubt, however, 
.whether the idea would find favour at Donington Hall ! 
Brune (Kilmarnock). — The original idea of the sub- 
marine was direct attack on the bottom of a ship from below, 
but it has long since been given up. It is not possible to see 
under water for more than a very short distance. That is why 
the submarine when submerged uses a periscope, and has be- 
come a practical instead of an impracticable weapon of war. 
C. R. (Epsom). — I do not think your idea is very 
feasible. It has a certain attractiveness, but you have to 
remember that the average anti-aircraft gun is of small 
calibre. 
W. T. (Canterbury).— Theoretically, of course, a pro- 
jectile from a rifled gun should reach the target point up, but 
that this has never been regularly believed is evidenced by the 
fact that the turrets of most battleships are inclined at such 
an angle that the net result would be the receipt of a direct 
blow instead of an indirect one. 
Some time ago a series of experiments were carried outi 
in America with a view to settling the point, photographs 
being automatically taken as the projectile passed through a 
series of tissue paper screens. In this case the evidence was 
point downwards. 
You will, of course, be familiar with the fact that tlia 
modern rifle bullet in leaving the muzzle has a distinct waggla 
for some two hundred yards or so before it settles down to its 
flight, though it was some little time before this was definitely 
discovered. In some similar kind of way it may be that the 
gyroscopical action of the projectile from a long modern high- 
velocity gun undergoes interferences. 
Be all this as it may, there is not, or until recently was 
not, unanimity of opinion amongst gunnery experts. 
Incidentally, at the Battle of the Yalu the old Japanese 
battleship Fuso was hit by a shell on the side. This shell 
went upwards, and, striking something, was deflected back, 
so that it actually came out through the same side of the ship 
some feet above where it had entered. This was at one time 
evidence for the striking point-upwards theory. 
A. R. B. (Torquay). — Nothing is to be done with 
magnets. 
A. P. B. (Windsor).— (1) Answered in the text. (2) I 
do not think there is any truth in the rumour that tha 
Japanese Fleet is going to participate in the attack on tha 
Dardanelles. For one thing, we have ample force without , 
it. For another, the Japanese Fleet has still its own dutiea 
in the Pacific. (3) Any reply to this question would be 
censored. 
A. J. R. (Rutherglen). — The first cost of a submarine is 
a very variable quantity. According to the German Naval 
Estimates, they work out at about £6,000 each. Our own 
Estimates give little, if any, clue. The latest type could 
certainly be put at about £10,000, and probably more. Many 
thanks for your appreciatory remarks. 
S. G. (Isle of Mull). — Something similar is already 
in use. 
(Several replies held over till next week.) 
INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.I. 
W 
AIRCRAFT AND CAVALRY. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
"HEN Admiral Mahan wrote " The Influence of 
Sea Power Upon Modern History " he had, to 
guide him in his judgments and deductions, 
tha minutely recorded events of centuries. 
Probably a few generations hence another 
Mahan will prove the influence of air power on the produc- 
tion of a state of world politics which, to his readers, will be 
modern history. And although to us the influence of air 
power on generations to come, or in shaping the course of 
history, is still enshrouded by the mist of our limited know- 
ledge, yet it is obvious that, side by side with the influence 
of sea power, so cogently made evident by Mahan, there is 
now another power, brought into being by the advent of air- 
craft, which is forcibly asserting itself. 
The writer will not attempt to predict to what degree 
the war will be influenced by the work of air navies. There 
are not sufiicieut data on which to base any conclusion; but 
the information contained in the official reports already pub- 
lished by the War Office and the Admiralty is enough to 
indicate the character of the influence which air power has 
already exercised. From this it will bo possible to make 
certain deductions of considerable value for the immediate 
future. 
Not taking into consideration the number of combatants 
of the opposing armies now trying to force history into two 
different channels, there are two factors wliich, so far as the 
land operations are concerned, distinguish the present war 
from previous ones. These two factors are the employment, 
on a large scale, of railways and quick motor transport for 
strategic purposes, and the application of aircraft to the needs 
of war. To a certain degree, as will be seen, the influence of 
these two factors is interdependent. Aircraft affords a quick 
method of reconnaissance, and railways and motor vehicles a 
means of taking advantage of the results of those observations 
jvith as little delay as may be. 
But it is important to note that the employment of air- 
craft for reconnaissance work has not diminished, and can- 
not diminish, the value of cavalry reconnaissance. In reality, 
ft has made the cavalry of even greater worth than before. 
This is due to the fact that aerial reconnaissance and cavalry 
reconnaissance are of two entirely different characters, and 
can be made to supplement each other. The former has 
already, in numerous instances, relieved the cavalry of cer- 
tain duties and responsibilities which were placed upon it 
simply because, before the advent of aircraft, no other arm 
could undertake them. Certain tasks were assigned to the 
cavalry not because they could be perfectly accomplished by 
it but because those tasks v/ould be less satisfactorily pei-- 
formed by any other arm. It was, for instance, part of the 
cavalry's work to be sent out, unsupported, to very great 
distances from the main force, in order to gather, at random, 
and in all directions, information concerning the enemy which 
might prove of strategic value. The cavalry had, for this 
reason, very often to undergo a strain quite out of proportion 
to the results achieved, and which wasted much of its 
strength and resources. By relieving the cavalry of at leasli 
a considerable portion of long-distance and random recon- 
naissance, the advent of aircraft has greatly diminished tha 
strain to which it was hitherto subjected. 
Unless prevented by a superior force of aircraft, an air 
squadron, or even a single machine, can carry out in clear 
weather long-distance reconnaissance with very satisfactory 
results. This work can be accomplished by the airman much' 
more quickly and witli much less strain than is possible to tha 
cavalry. Since the beginning of hostilities it has, therefore, 
been possible, by the employment of aircraft, for the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to save his cavalry much fruitless marching, 
and, possibly, much fighting, for the same amount of informa- 
tion which his airmen obtained with ease. The full significance 
of this fact must not be overlooked. Unprovided or insuffi- 
ciently provided with aircraft and reliable aerial observers, 
an ai'my, forced to depend entirely, or almost entirely, upon 
its cavalry for strategical reconnaissance during the period 
preceding a battle, would, when the opposing armies began 
to close, have its cavalry so tired and scattered that their 
useful employment at a critical moment in the battle might 
be seriously hampered. 
There are, however, many details of reconnaissance whic^ 
14* 
