LAND AND ffiATER. 
March 27, 1915. 
THE FALL OF PRZEMYSL. 
The fall of Przemysl presents a number of 
points of interest which must be dealt with in 
more detail next week, when a fuller account is 
available than we have at the moment of writing 
a maximum, take the old multiple of three to 
one; but whether so large a multiple is necessary; 
or not depends upon local communication as 
much as anything. The Russians have presum- 
ably laid down sections of light railway to facili- 
(Tuesday). But the news, in its most general fate movements along the investing lines, but we 
cliaracter, at once suggests two very important 
results : The moral effect upon Austria and the 
material effect upon the campaign in the release of 
men and material for the Russian operations upon 
the West and the Carpathian front. The first 
thing we must try and estimate is the number of 
men this success is likely to release. 
,We shall have no detailed information upon 
this, because, naturally, no army provides us with 
figures of that sort. 
But we can fix a minimum without much 
difficulty. 
Przemysl held out for five months. Its per- 
manent works were, therefore, never seriously 
under heavy large calibre fire. Whether it was 
because of the difficulty in munitioning with large 
high explosive shell or, as in the case of Verdun, 
because the big pieces of the defence were moved 
out of the permanent works and put into tempo- 
rary field works upon an exterior circumference 
to the old permanent works does not much affect 
our conclusion. In either case the line of invest- 
ment was a very long one necessarily. Przemysl, 
being blockaded and not bombarded, this peri- 
phery was maintained at its utmost limit until 
quite the last few days, and we may take it as 
have as yet no means of gauging the efficiency or 
the extension of their communications round 
the place. 
Even if it were safe, however, to take a lower 
multiple, and to hazard the conjecture that the 
number of men required for containing the garri- 
son of Przemysl is less than three hundred 
thousand, we must remember that a portion of 
the troops thus occupied were upon the Car- 
pathian side of the town, and that, though the 
troops now released for further action upon this 
front will increase the forces facing the Austrians 
in the foothills of the mountains by Sonak and 
Lisko, yet we cannot count the whole of the 
troops round Przemysl as now forming a new 
offensive element upon the Russian side. 
It is perhaps the lowest safe estimate to take 
two hundred thousand as the force certainly, 
released by the fall of the city. It may very 
well be that this number is far below the mark, 
but in such calculations one must alwaj'S weight 
the scales against the hopes and expectations of 
one's own side. 
More important in its ultimate effect upon 
the campaign than the mere number of men 
released will prove the elimination of this 
fairly certain (though we cannot be quite certain secondary objective in the Austro-German effort 
till full details arrive) that the place surrendered and the new power upon the Russian side of 
as a consequence of exhaustion in supply and not nioving troops at will, without the embarrassment 
of attack upon its permanent works. ' of that large interruption in Russian communi- 
We can only guess at the periphery thus S^^^^^"^ ,^"d movements which the siege of 
held. On the analogy of Verdun (which has never i'rzemysl formed. 
been completely invested even on the date of /^ °^^/^,/.° appreciate the considerable im- 
maximum, Septembers), the periphery of in- portance of this new factor, we shall do well to 
grasp the main elements of which Przemysl is the 
centre. 
The ridge of the Carpathians from beyond 
the Dukla to the Kolomea railway pass is a 
stretch of one hundred and sixty miles. From the 
vestment would not be less than fifty miles. Give 
the outline of the outermost permanent works no 
more than thirty miles, and fifty miles for the 
investing lines cannot be an exaggeration. I 
believe they will prove to have been more. 
Now turn to another factor in the calcula- 
tion — the garrison which was defending the 
place. If we estimate its original strength at 
certainly over 140,000, we shall again be certainly 
within the mark. These figures are purely con- 
jectural, the figures of remaining efficients at the 
close of the siege are necessarily far smaller, 
and for the exact totals we must wait for 
further news. It has been proved in the 
course of this war that the real chance for the 
ring fortress against modern large high explosive 
shell, with their rapid destruction, lies in 
the size and mobility of the defending 
army, which throws out temporary works and 
entrenchments, external to the old ring of per- Dukla itself (which is in Russian hands) to the 
manent works. The Germans have been as busy Kolomea railway pass (4) is just one hundred and 
as bees m doing this round Metz since the battle fifty. The other three railway passes (beino- the 
of the Marne and round Antwerp since a month Lupkow (1), the Uzsok (2), and the variously- 
.later, and the French have been doing nothing named one which leads from Munkacs to Stryi 
else north and east of Verdun. For the holding (3) are twenty, sixty, and a hundred miles from 
of such lines successfully, numbers are obviously Dukla respectivelv. Przemysl stands fifty miles 
oe=cor,f,ni ^ barc hundrcd thousand would give north-east of the' ridge of the mountains (just 
essential 
less than three thousand men a mile, and that 
number is almost certain to be exceeded. The 
very prolongation of the defence is proof of the 
number of men thus immobilised by the siege 
beyond the foothills and about half-way between 
the first two passes) at P. The main Russian line 
of communications for all the armies in Galicia 
, . . c. right up to the front against Cracow runs through 
JNow, to contain such a number, we may, as Przemysl to Lemberg at L, and from Lembero- ia 
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