March 27, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEE. 
two main lines along the arrow-heads towards the 
Russian depots in Russian territory. I have 
marked this main line of communication in 
double. The four railways across the passes of 
the Carpathians (1, 2, 3, 4) join the lateral rail- 
way along the foothills of the Carpathians, 
which the Austrians have for months been trying 
to get a-straddle of, and only once really domin- 
ated, during the few days when they held Stanislau 
at the end of February. 
Now, in this railway system, the investment 
of Przemysl made a gap and an interruption 
represented roughly by the circle ABC, and the 
Austrian front, moving across the Carpathians 
and attempting to relieve Przemysl and turn the 
Russians out of Galicia, lay along the line of 
crosses D E. So long as Przemysl held out all 
the munitioning and supply of the Russian front, 
which was withstanding the Austrian pressure, 
upon that line D E, was based upon Lemberg, and 
Buffered difficulties in proportion as one went 
westward towards the Dukla. With Przemysl 
fallen, these difficulties disappear, and the whole 
front becomes of equal strength for the recep- 
tion of reinforcements and of munitioning. At 
the same time the main railway line through 
Galicia, which the circle of investment ABC, 
round Przemysl interrupted, is released for fully 
supporting the Russian front towards Cracow, 
which stands about eighty miles away in the 
direction F. 
In a word, the fall of Przemysl will give the 
Russians in the next week or so a complete and 
restored set of communications behind their Car- 
pathian front, which has hitherto been hampered 
and interrupted by the resistance of the fortress. 
Bodies of men can be moved at will, and rapidly, 
against any point that is threatened by an enemy, 
concentration, and such concentration is far less 
easily effected by the enemy along the detached 
lines which separately cross the mountains at 1, 
2, 3, and 4, than by the Russians who hold all 
the connected lines on the Galician side and the 
lateral railway along the northern foothills of 
the range. 
For a further analysis of this important 
piece of news we must wait for the full details 
which will presumably come in during the rest of 
the week, and I will deal with them in the next 
issue of this paper. 
THE WAR BY WATE 
By FRED T. JANE. 
NOTE. 
-This Article tias been subi&Itted to tlie Press Bureau, ivhicb does not object to the publication as censored, and tskes no 
respoDsibility for tbe correctness of tbc statements. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
THE Dardanelles continue to remain the chief centre 
of interest, and, reading between the lines, it is 
clear that at the end of last week the Allied fleet 
had received something of the nature of a set- 
back — the Germans will i>robably eventually call 
It a " decided defeat." 
I have been somewhat severely criticised in the past for 
insisting in these Notes that forcing the Dardanelles must 
necessarily be a very difficult and dangerous operation, and 
not the mere " naval parade " which so many people were 
inclined to imagine that it would be. Now that losses have 
been sustained, there is a tendency for the undue public 
optimism of yesterday to be replaced by an equally undue 
pessimism. It is necessary, therefore, to emphasise the fact that 
whatever public opinion in the matter may be, our Admiralty 
most certainly did not enter upon these operations without 
carefully counting the cost or without being prepared for, and 
anticipating, losses. Nor was it under any delusions as to the 
relative fighting values of ships and forts. Consequently, 
though we have had one set-back, and may yet experience 
others, there is every reason to believe that Constantinople 
will ultimately be reached; though there is always a possi- 
bility that its actual capture may be effected by the Russians, 
if (as now seems established) the Goeben is really out of 
sction. 
A Russian capture would be politically advantageous, 
owing to the fact that Constantinople has been her goal for 
centuries, and in the event of success, will presumably be 
claimed as her prize of the war. If Russia captured Constan- 
tinople, it would clear the air of a possible bone of contention 
between the Allies on " dragging chestnuts out of the fire " 
lines. 
What Russia can or cannot do depends entirely on the 
condition of the Goeben. A disabled Goeben means that 
Russia has undisputed command of the Black Sea, and that 
Russia is, therefore, in a position to land a large invading 
force to the north-west of Cape Rumili, and thence march on 
Constantinople — a distance of twenty miles or so. 
The military operations which would be entailed are out- 
side my province, and I have no means of estimating the 
fortunes of the troops once they were landed. I refer to them 
merely to point out that any operations, to be successful, must 
necessarily be conducted with both naval and military forces, 
the work of the Russian fleet being mainly confined to cover- 
ing the invasion and maintaining oversea communications-— 
a thing which, in all her previous war? with Turkey, Russia 
was never able to do, owing to the Turks always having been 
the superior naval power. 
Now, however, all that is changed, and the mere presence 
of Russian warships off the Bosphorus must teem with un- 
pleasant BUggestiveness for the Turkish Government. It is 
Sea Miles 
MAP OF THE BOSPHORUS. 
also likely to affect matters in the Dardanelles, and should 
lead to the withdrawal of troops from the Gallipoli Peninsula, 
a matter which would greatly facilitate the reduction of the 
forts. One of the many advantages of forts is that, though 
they be silenced by ship fire, their permanent destruction is 
practically impossible, unless landing parties be lauded, and 
that, in the face of a strong covering field army, is a very diffi- 
cult operation for a fleet which necessarily has only a strictly 
limited number of men available. Matters are simplified if 
the fleet is accompanied by a military force capablo of exten- 
sive operations, both against iiie mobile field army and of 
attacking forts in the rear. 
An attack on the Bosphorus by the Russian Black Sea 
fleet, should it take place at all, is likely to be confined to a 
long-range bombardment of the outer forts. From Capo 
11* 
