April 3, 1915. 
LAND A N D W A T E R. 
'Parallel RiJgtsrestmbUn^ \ 
Jamjorni<ition\ ''^ ■*» ^ 
V/oO 
i< iidtnUt of 
10 
fhCiUt. 
* i . a i L ' - I I I ■ 
Carpathians is only the last : and such formation 
admits of no easy system of coinniunication. The 
last lateral road by which a Russian concenti*ation 
against the pass can be effected comes in on Tui-ka 
itself. The forcing of the pass, therefore, cannot 
be aided by the advent of bodies arriving from 
either side. It can be accomplisiicd only by direct 
attack on a very narrow front. Nor is the line of 
the railway turned upon the further side until we 
reach the road from Homonna, wliich comes in as 
low down as Berezna, nearly two days' march from 
the summit. 
For more than three days of very good marcli- 
ing, and more like four average days, troops 
attempting to force the U/.ok Pass are tied to a 
single road of a true mountainous character. 
(When we return from this general cliaracter of the 
pass for road and railway alike, to the railway 
alone, the ease of its defence or destruction, and 
the corresponding difficulty of its seizure are also 
apparent. 
A detailed sketch of the railway crossing is 
somewhat as follows : 
• • • t • 
,_,,,.. J 
^ 
■• ••V J « ^Su4i««:*^ -■ •■•■"••Jf 
x"" 
lizogf^i* 

1 it > 
,.™,i« 
Milts. 
At the summit itself a tunnel of a mile, 
between A and B, vulnerable from its length, diffi- 
cult of repair if it were destroyed, meets one. 
Immediately beyond the summit upon the 
Hungarian side the railway is compelled, from the 
steepness of the ground, to turn and loop in true 
mountain fashion, continually passing through 
short tunnels and over not inconsidez'able ravines. 
At every such point a retiring enemy could cut it, 
while tile fall on the Hungarian side is so steep 
that by the time the railway has reached the neigh- 
bouring point X it has already fallen nearly 2,000 
feet from its summit. 
The Uzok, therefore, is a railway pass far 
less capable of rapid seizure and use than is the 
5* 
Lupkow. Nor is it remarkable that the line Avas not 
carried across the Uzok at this point until many 
years after the engineers had thrown a raihvav 
across the Luf)kow. 
Before leaving this front it must be premised 
that a very rapid advance is unlikely until tiie 
spring weather liberates the roads completely. 
The ]M'esent eltort of the Russians is rather 
to master the summits and to open the gates into 
Hungary tlian to pass through tliose gates in force. 
Though, if they succeeded in capturing those, 
gates, the advance into Hungary would hardly be 
delayed beyond tlie month of April. 
It is wortliy of remark in this connection that 
the Austrian manoeuvres— I think three years ago . 
-—turned upon tiie thesis of tlie defence of the 
Hungarian plain under conditions presuming the 
loss of Przemysl and the loss of the main range. 
It is generally believed that the lesson drawn from 
those manoeuvres was that a crescent position 
taken up along the western foot of the mountains 
could not be held, save with the aid of strong rein- 
forcements from the north. 
Now it is fairly certain that the enemy could 
not find heavy reinforcements from the north in 
the case of a Russian advance. If Austria and 
Gerniany had been fighting Russia alone, and if 
Russia had attained her present position in such 
single combat, one might imagine such reinforce- 
ment to be possible; but Germany v/ouid not be in 
a position to throw considerable numbers into 
this field in aid of her ally with Warsaw untaken 
and with the siege conditions, with Germans to 
their trenches in the west, unbroken. 
We have been many months expecting the 
ultimate effect of Russian numbers. Their sup- 
posed immediate effect was a, grave error of judg- 
ment, and tl;e delay under wliich they would begin 
to tell was far longer than opinion was led to 
believe in tliis country by most military critics and 
by all public men. But it was an ultimate factor, 
bound to come into play if the enemy could obtain 
no decision in the East and sliould let '-lonth after 
month slip by v/ithout pinning or decisively oefeat- 
ing his opponent in that quarter; nnd it would 
seem as though, with the fall of Przemysl, this 
double element of time and of numbers in fa%our 
of the Allies v.ere at last beginning to tell upon the 
Carpathian front. 
PRZEMYSL. 
The further news and details following upon 
the capture of Przemysl, lacking which we 
remarked last week that it was impossible to state 
the full effect of that achievement, are not yet to 
hand. The only definite figure we have to go upon 
is a C[uasi-official statement that tlie total numlicr 
of prisoners was 120,000. The estimate of 100,000 
was, therefore, not so far out, and, indeed, it 
should be clear that the defence of so large a peri- 
meter as from thirty to thirty-five miles could 
hardly be undertaken with a smaller number of 
troops. We are also told that the total number 
of Russian prisoners found within the fortress was 
about 3,000, and, further, that the greater number 
were, as v/as to be expected, cases of wounded. 
Of captures of material, only four locomotives 
were seized, apparently intact ; but of other rolling 
stock a very great quantity, and a certain stock of 
coal. Of the fate of the guns we have heard 
nothing as yet. 
It is clear that the least number of men set free 
on the Russian side by the fall of the fortress 
