LAND AND WATER. 
April 3, 1915. 
cannot be less than a quarter of a million, wliicli 
estimate has been used in the above notes upon the 
present Carpathian position. 
It is further clear that no considerable 
destruction of tlie railways of which Tizemysl is 
the junction can have taivcn place, because tlie 
movement of troo])3 began almost immediately 
after the entry of the Russiaii forces into the city. 
The main interest of the siege can only, it is 
to be feared, arise nuich later, when full details of 
its character arc published. What military 
6tudents in the West really want to know is 
whetlier tlie power of prolonged resistance which 
I'rzemysl showed was due mainly to the organisa- 
tion of ter.iporary works outside" tlie inner ring — 
as at Verdun and Metz— or whether it was mainly 
due to the absence of a proper siege train on the 
Russian side. It is fairly evident from the very 
brief notices received that the fortress, when it 
did fall, fell from exhaustion, and not from bom- 
bardment or assault. Therefore, if Przemysl held 
out of its own strength against regular and 
developed siege attack, it would go far to show 
that the opinion formed at the beginning of the 
war, that the modern siege train has destroyed the 
modern fortress, must be revised. That the modern 
Biege train can, with superiority in air craft, 
destroy the restricted permanent work, and that 
in a few days, is now a commonplace. But it by no 
means follows that fortres.ses cannot be devised for 
the future which shall be possessed of very numer- 
ous mobile batteries, in only some of which guns 
need be placed (and which these were the enemy 
would have to find out for himself), while the 
opportunity should be afforded for the completion 
of still more numerous temporary works at short 
notice. What dooms the peruianent work as v.e 
row understand it is the restricted and known area 
upon which the high explosive shell of the assault 
has to work. Once eliminate or modify the two 
factors of restriction, in area and knotvn site, and 
the strength of the defence may be revived. 
Another matter of interest would be to dis- 
cover what was the sanitary condition of Przemysl 
at its fall, what was the proportion of death from 
wounds and what from disease, as also the organi- 
sation of large sorties under modern conditions. 
But for all this we must wait until detailed news 
anives. 
THE WESTERN AND OTHER FRONTS. 
There has been no news of consequence this 
week up to the moment of w-riting (Monday even- 
ing) upon the Western front. 
The Hartmannsweilerkopf, a wooded height 
of over 3,000 feet in tlie Vosges, which stands 
boldly out from the foothills and dominates the 
whole plain of Mulhouse, has been recaptured by 
the French. Here, as nearly always, the French 
are silent upon the number oi' their prisoners. 
The Belgian troops liave achieved two slight 
successes upon the Yser. The trenches captured 
by the French south-east of Verdun at Les 
Eparges, just at the base of the hills called the 
Heights of the Meuse, were in part retaken by the 
enemy on Sunday, and were then almost entirely 
recaptured by the French before the end of 
the day. 
In genei'al the mass of local attacks upon 
various parts of the 400-mile line does no moi-e 
than continue the series of these during the last 
winter months. The choice of assault remains 
almost always with the Allies ; the object of attri- 
tion remains the same. 
An insignificant skirmish took place towards 
the Suez end of the Suez Canal. Of its nature wo 
can guess nothing except that it can have dealt 
with nothing more important than reconnaissance. 
The enemy retired towards Naklal, half-way to 
Akaba. 
On the East Prussian front w^e have very brief 
news describing fairly heavy fighting, especially 
at the western end of the line between MlaAva and 
Plock. But there is no appreciable change of ad- 
vance or retreat in the opposing lines that face each 
other from the point where the Niemen eiiters East 
Prussia to the Vistula. It is probable that this 
immobility is principally due to the spring thaw, 
which turns the whole of these marshy districts 
into an impossible sludge. The bombardment of 
Osowiecs still continues in desultory fashion, and 
has now entered its sixth week. There is no result 
apparent. 
A REVIEW OF THE GERMAN 
MIND UPON THE WAR. 
IT is important from time to time, even in con- 
nection with the mere diy bones of military 
study, to review the mental attitude of the 
enemy. 
The conclusions in this field are not suscep- 
tible of positive proof. 
Evidence is at large, and may be variously 
interpreted, but one cannot forgo periodical judg- 
ment of the matter, because it is ultimately upon 
the moral attitude of the two opponents that a 
campaign depends, and the moral attitude of the 
enemy at particular critical moments helps us to 
gauge the development of the phase succeediiig. 
Such a critical moment is approaching. The 
end of winter, the enemy's continued heavy 
jW-astage, his limit of reserves, the new contingents 
about to appear in the West, all determine this; 
and it is advisable to take stock novv^ of the enemy's 
mind, from the opening of the campaign to tho 
present apparent change in his moral attitude. 
The mood in which Germany, controlling also 
her poAverful ally, began the war is by this time 
a matter of history. 
The enemy possessed an instrument of war 
amply suflicient for victory (in his opinion), 
according to the plan he propo.sed — a plan, in his 
opinion again, morally reasonable; and, as a mili- 
tary operation, so practicable as to be certain of 
success. 
He had not used this instrument for aggres- 
sion, he had not used it even (save quite recently) 
to threaten; but he knew that it was ready to use 
whenever he chose, and the moment for using it at 
last arrived. 
If we desire to grasp this simple attitude 
common to the directing minds in Germany, we 
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