April 3, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
cannot do better than recall the attitude of similar 
men in this country towards the position of 
England at sea. Consciousness of superior 
strength did not here produce aggression. It does 
not necessarily mean aggression. It always pro- 
duces a party which \vould like to use such advan- 
tage actively, but, especially after a long peace, 
there will be stronger counsels against the running 
of the slight risk involved and for letting well alone. 
We know that the higher authority in 
Germany was for many years against action. 
But there was this great difference between 
the two parts of the parallel here drawn. The 
British fleet had one aim only, to defend an amply 
sufficient national patrimony long acquired. 
Whereas the German forces, though conscious 
that time was with them (for the numbers and 
vi^ealth of the German Empire were rapidly in- 
creasing), were in the hands of men who felt two 
things which might move them to action at last : 
First, that Germany had not her due, especially 
in the matter of Colonial expansion ; secondly, that 
Russia, which was in proportion increasing even 
more rapidly than Germany, might ultimately 
become dangerous. Against the Slav spirit as a 
whole the German spirit is arrayed in a 
mixture of contempt and fear difficult for the West 
to understand. 
Rather more than three years ago elements 
provoking action began to outweigh the conserva- 
tive factors in the German directing mind. The 
ultimate cause was, of course, the change in the 
attitude of Britain, which had, in its turn, been 
due to the German threat by sea. Germ.any had 
chosen to build a great fleet, manifestly designed 
to challenge that of this country. 
The immediate action was the French move 
towards Morocco, ultimately supported by the 
British Government. But, though less acute, the 
Russian menace (as the Germans thought it) was 
increasing side by side with this Western provoca- 
tion — as the Germans regarded it to be. 
We can be mathematically certain when the 
decision which changed the German attitude from 
one of indefinite delay and of a mere reliance upon 
time as the ally of their Empire to a determina- 
tion to attack came. 
It was in the summer of 1911 that the direct- 
ing minds in the German Empire decided upon war. 
When I say that this is mathematically 
certain, I mean that it is a judgment susceptible of 
mathematical calculation. The accumulation of 
stores and of complete equipment for a particular 
date, the study of the effect of heavy artillery in 
the field, and the necessary length of and prepar- 
ing ammunition therefor; the enlargement of the 
Kiel Canal ; the increase in the number of trained 
men — every step which we now see to have been 
taken by the military authorities and the Govern- 
ment of Berlin — exactly converges upon the 
summer of 1914. It was not, however, believed 
that Great Britain would actively join the Franco- 
Russian alliance against Germany when Germany 
forced war, though it was believed that Great 
Britain was the author of the general scheme 
which threatened German expansion. 
When a preparation of about three years, 
designed for the summer of 1914, was afoot, it was 
obvious that the war must be forced as soon as 
possible after tlie harvest. Everything was well 
thought out and accurately ordered, as befits a 
civilised nation preparing secretly for an act of 
war to be effected at its own moment. 
Stores of cereals, dependent upon the harvest, 
must be waited for, but for some months before 
that date other accumulations of stores not depen- 
dent upon the harvest must be provided : money, 
certain metals not sufficiently present within the 
boundaries of the Empire, and so forth. The finan- 
cial dispositions began to be taken, apparently, 
shortly after the beginning of 1914. 
There was a realisation of foreign invest- 
ments; there was a steady accumulation of gold; 
and, most important of all, there was a plan laid 
whereby the City of London should, even if Great 
Britain did not enter the war, be hampered in the 
financial support of those who (in the German 
conception) were to fight England's battles upon 
the Continent. 
An admirable occasion for the pretext of war 
was afforded by the assassination of the heir to the 
Austro-Hungarian thrones at the end of June. 
Immediate advantage could not be taken of it, how- 
ever, because it came a little too soon. The harvest 
was not gathered and the last preparations were 
not made. For a whole month Europe was allowed 
to believe that the crime would have no serious 
international consequences. At the end of July 
the Austro-Hungarian Government presented to 
Serbia — that is, virtually to Russia— a challenge 
of such a sort as had never been presented in 
Europe before. It was a direct demand for war. 
But the ally of Germany, which in this matter 
acted as her servant, had not the determination of 
the master. As late as Thursday, the 30th of July, 
Austria hesitated. The Government at Berlin at 
once stepped in and made matters certain by the 
double ultimatum presented within the twenty- 
four hours to Russia on the one side and to France 
on the other. 
Now, the mood in which the directing mind of 
Germany entered a great campaign at this moment 
was one absolutely certain of immediate victory. 
The Russian mobilisation would be slow, Russian 
communications were bad, the Russian object in 
the war was not national salvation. To hold up 
Russia upon the East was at once easily possible 
and amply sufficient. It would be many months 
before Russia could be a menace, though ultimately 
— within a year, say^Russia might have found 
time to equip and to munition those very consider- 
able numbers which were her principal asset. 
But meanwhile in the West a decision could 
be arrived at, and that without peril of miscar- 
riage. France could be suddenly attacked in over- 
whelming numbers and in a fashion for which she 
was not prepared, and the destruction of the 
French resistance would make possible in a com- 
paratively brief space of time an arrangement 
with Russia upon the East. 
The space of time thus required for the com- 
plete success of the enemy's plan was the more 
restricted from the fact that this plan did not in- 
volve too large a direct political achievement. It 
hardly aimed at annexation at all. It aimed at 
undisputed hegemony in Central and Western 
Europe. Franca was not to be dismembered, but, 
already in active decline (as the Germans thought), 
was to be rendered incapable of giving further 
trouble. 
Russia had only to withdraw her pretensiona 
in the Balkans, and to leave the economic expan- 
sion of Germany and Austria a free hand towards 
the South and the East. England, after these first 
rapid blows, would accept the result. 
In the popular mind this decision took the 
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