April 3, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
attempt to tui'n the Russian flank had already 
been settled after a little-known battle of critical 
importance fought ten miles south of Halicz, which 
ended on March 4 with the Russian occupation 
of Stanislau. 
Such, then, is the present situation of the 
campaign in the mind of the directors of Gei'man 
strategy. They see their original plan all gone 
to pieces, they see the second phase (which was an 
attempt, not to restore the original plan, but to 
redress its disastrous failure) ending in the middle 
of November in a further complete failure. They 
note day by day, with the figures before them, a 
gigantic and unceasing rate of wastage immensely 
superior to that of their enemy, especially to that 
of their enemy upon the West, and they perceive, 
with winter rapidly drawing to its end, with the 
munitioning of the Russians in sight within the 
next few weeks, with the Dardanelles seriously 
threatened, with the new contingents about to 
a})pear in the West, and, perhaps most important 
of all, with the rapid production of ammunition 
and of sufficient hea\T artillery for trench v^^ork 
in the West, that the thijd phase of this plan for 
the immobilie^tion of the Russian armies is head- 
ing straight for a third disappointment. 
It is morally certain that under such condi- 
tions the Great General Staff of the German Army 
no longer presumes upon victor)'. 
It is morally certain that it no longer pre- 
sumes upon imposing its original will upon the 
will of the Franco-Rusoian-British allies. 
A criticxil turning-point in the mind of the 
enemy has been reached. The change has run its 
full course in the directing nart of that mind, and 
the tuning of German public opinion to another 
key has also begun. 
The all-important problem which we must try 
to solve at this moment is the present state of the 
German mind, directing and directed, towards the 
future of the campaign. 
I will hazard the suggestion that it is at the 
present n?oment an attitude to be defined somewhat 
as follows : 
" The war has not gone as we expected. We 
admit it freely. But it has become something 
much more serious for us than the danger of 
defeat. We are — no matter through what accident 
or whether we are to blame or no — fighting for our 
existence. The issue ought not to be of this charac- 
ter. We did not threaten the existence of others-, 
we only threatened their too great power, and tried 
to take the place we thought our due. We are pre- 
pared to meet a reasonable demand upon us and 
to discuss terms. We quite understand that to 
leave certain districts in German hands after the 
war would be unwise. We quite understand the 
demand for limited autonomy in Poland; but, of 
course, Russia will have to follow suit. We do ask 
for certain facilities in the Low Countries, especi- 
ally for trade and outlet to the sea; but we want 
nothing more than that — which is, after all, only 
the public recognition of advantages which would 
be ours anyhow by the natural progress of our 
ti'ade and produce." 
In some such attitude as this they would 
approach Europe and the neutral countries. In 
other words, they would be asking for a draw. 
Now, this is something which has been long 
foreseen and much discussed — in these columns as 
elsewhere. 
But the novel feature which depends upon 
quite recent evidence is the way in which the state 
of mind behind such a demand is already appa- 
rent on the German side. 
It is no longer a case of prophesying that some 
such attitude would ultimately be adopted. It is a 
case of recognising that it is already adopted 
to-day. 
The directing military mind of the enemy has 
decided that victory in the original sense is now 
quite impossible. It proposes, as will be argued 
in a moment, the ultimate resumption of what it 
regards as the vital part of the struggle — the 
attack on England; but in the immediate future 
it wishes for peace upon terms that will leave 
Germany almost as strong in proportion to her 
neighbours as she was last year. It is preparing 
the general public opinion of Germany for a corre- 
sponding movement of opinion upon the part of 
the neutrals, and perhaps of certain elements 
which it believes it can find among the Allies. 
Note, for instance, the double work which is 
appearing in our Press, as in that of other coun- 
tries — one limb of which work consists in the new 
moderate description of German aims and of Ger- 
man successes therein, the other limb of which con- : 
sists in describing the still perfect organisation 
and still calm confidence of the German military 
machine. 
In the first of these matters the most striking 
document has been General Bernhardi's summary 
of the war for the Americans. General Bernhardi 
is a very lucid and, what is more, a very weighty 
writer. His technical work is, I believe, univers- 
ally admired by all those competent to j*adge it, and 
his excursions into politics, if less valuable, are yet 
clearly the pi'oduct of a man who can think his 
subject out and state it well. His religion may not 
be our religion; but one can be certain after read- , 
ing his work that he writes whatever he does write 
with a definite object and fits his means to his end. 
What he has been recently writing for America 
is, therefore, a piece of evidence to be closely 
studied. And it amounts, roughly, to this : " AVe 
have not done what we thought we could, but we 
are not defeated — it is not even possible to defeat 
us in any thorough manner; and meanwhile Ave 
have clear advantages over the enemy which Ave 
permanently hold." 
He then proceeds to summarise those condi- 
tions, and it is Avell Avorthy of note that they are 
the sort of things Avhich particularly appeal to 
civilians, and Avnich few soldiers AAould, if they 
Avere Avriting for soldiers only, take the trouble to 
mention. 
The document is as A^aluable a witness in what 
it leaA^es out as in Avhat it puts in. For instance, 
the (to us) extraordinary description of the battle 
of the ]\Iarne is, from the point of view of the 
writer, and of the effect he desires to produce, ex- 
ceedingly well done. The right Aving of the 
German Army fell back slightly, but before 
superior numbers; it fell back in good order; its 
losses were inconsiderable, &c., «S:c. One can con- 
ceiA'e a less able man making a fool of himself in 
trying to describe so that it should appear faAOur- 
able to neutrals, and particularly to uninstructed 
opinion, that deadly bloAV deliA^ered in the second 
AA'cek of September Avhich Avould seem already to 
haA-e changed the course of European history. 
But General Bernhardi's description is per- 
fectly suited to the object he has in vicAv. It is 
true that the Allied numbers were superior to the 
German right wing. The fact that the concentra- 
tion of this superiority upon one part of the field, 
9* 
