April 3, 1915. 
L A r^ D A iN U W A T E i{. 
he was most fiercely assailed and criticised, despite the fact 
tliat once at least in test operations his entire fleet was 
torpedoed. However, tlie net result was the rehabilitation 
cf torpedo craft and very large destroyer programmes. In this 
stage the torpedo-boat itself practically disappeared, its place 
being taken by the destroyer, which was facile ■prince ps till 
the Russo-Japanese War, wherein it accomplished less than 
the enthusiasts had expected, mainly because war esperience 
taught means of evading the worst dangers. 
This particular war also taught the future liosslbilities of 
BUbmarines, despite the fact that the elementary boats there 
engaged proved absolutely non-effective. The net result of 
the war was that the destroyer assumed its proper place in the 
Bcheme of things — roughly something midway between the 
two extreme points of view which were held in the past. The 
most generally accepted modern view is that if destroyers find 
battleships at night they will successfully torpedo them^their 
handicap is the finding. 
Now, if wo come to consider the evolution of the sub- 
marine, we find a not very dissimilar series of vicissitudes. 
From being the idle dream of inventors, the submarine 
suddenly came to be regarded as an invincible arm, destined 
to sweep the seas of all above-water craft. That was before 
our Navy had any submarines, or in the early days of the 
elementary Hollands, which have long since been scrapped. 
Later came a period when it became known that only one 
€)f our Holland submarines had ever torpedoed a warship 
under battle conditions. This was subsequently followed by 
a series of disasters of which the net result was a decided 
tendency unduly to depreciate the value of the submarine. 
From here onwards it is, for obvious reasons, inadvisable 
to deal too fully with the course of events. It suffices to say 
that some little while before the war tbe submarine had easily 
reverted to a position of very high importance; while we had 
the official statement that it was probably destined eventually 
to replace the destroyer altogether. 
Since the v.^ar vicissitudes have continued. It is clear 
that the Germans placed unlimited faith in their submarines 
•^a faith which, at any rate till quite recently, appeared to 
be abundantly justified. I say " .appeared " because while 
their successes can be counted, the record of their failures is 
Becessarily vague. Some record of torpedoes which failed to 
hit officially exists no doubt, but a record of how many 
German submp.rines failed to gain suitable positions for attack 
must rocessarily bo unknown. What we do know, however, 
is that means for combating the "new danger" are being 
eteadily perfected — three German submarines having been 
officially stated as sunk by the Navy since the blockade began, 
plus other losses cf which no full details are available. The 
net result of this is perhaps an undue dejireciation of the sub- 
marine qud submarine. 
Very enrly in the war I ventured to prophesy in these 
Notes that for reasons having to do with the pmo/uiel, Gor- 
man submarines would eventually prove far less efficient than 
eur own, and that we should find the bulk of the work cone 
by a few only of their boats. This last has certainly hap- 
pened. U i?/?, sunk last week, was commanded by the same 
officer who distinguished liimself against our Cressies in U 9, 
end who, in his new command, did most of such work as was 
dene by the " blockaders. " In submarines the m.'^.'j is cer- 
tainly more than the machine; and German uaval officers os a 
class lack that ability to adapt themselves to the peculiar 
conditions, as between officers and men, which are essential 
to the successful and effective use of submarines, a.nd which 
obtain in our service. 
Hero a word or two may be said about the curious theory 
held by a somewhat considerable section of the British public 
that the German submarine service is superior to our own. 
It is well to correct this idea. It is obvious that so far as 
materiel is concerned, as a general rule, the bigger the boat 
the more potentially effective she must be. 
Now, any British boat is larger than any German boat cf 
equal date — we have always led in dimensions. Increased 
dimensions necessarily mean increased speed, or increased 
radius, or increased habitability (a very important point), or 
very possibly all three in varying degree. Our boats are, 
therefore, as machines, capable of accomplishing all that the 
.German boats have done, and more. This is obvious. 
As regards personnel I have already explained where 
our advantage lies. Yet there is the unfortunate public im- 
pression which justifies tho sarcastic naval jest: "To the 
public every German submarine is a pirate, every British 
submarine inefficient! " 
In vain did the Israelites of old explain the impossibility 
of making bricks without straw. Egyptian ideas on the 
possible and impossible still prevail. Metaphorically sjjeak- 
ing, our submarine service is "without straw" in just the 
same way as is our battle fleet. And so we hear little or no- 
thing of the weary routine of work of our boats, and as a nation 
fail to realise that they are " containing " the enemy, despite 
the fact that a fast squadron has slipped out now and again 
without loss from our submarines. 
To turn to more general matters, it seems clear from 
recent events that the submarine is essentially the weapon 
of the stronger power, and likely to grow less and less impor- 
tant as the weapon of the weaker. The whole or most of the 
destruction which our Navy has inflicted on German sub- 
marines has been mainly due to the fact that we are the 
stronger power. Had the Germans been able to support their 
submarine " blockaders " with cruisers, they would have had 
none of the hazard of secret bases, and their liability to be 
rammed would have been reduced to a minimum. 
If, and when, the German big ships offer opportunity to 
our submarines, these two inconveniences will be absent on 
our side, and we may confidently look forward to the sub- 
marine coming definitely into its own as the weapon of the 
stronger naval power. As the weapon of the weaker we may 
(as measures to neutralise its menace are developed) look to 
see it fade in importance. This, of course, is exactly what 
eventually happened with torpedo craft. 
For the rest, the Admiralty figures of the net result of 
the submarine blockade during one month are nineteen 
British m.erchant ships sunk, out of 5,970 which reached or 
left home ports during the same period. The chances of loss 
were, therefore, just about 1 in 314; and something like half 
a dozen " pirates " may have been accounted for — ^Icst in the 
jirocess. This works out at an average of six ships per pirate. 
The cost of German submarines {pace a recent omission 
of a cipher in an answer to a correspondent) works out at 
from £60,000 to £100,000 for the little boats, and about 
£170,000 for the larger. As the blockaders are mainly largo 
submarines we may pool the average cost per boat at, 
roughly, £150,000. Allowing for torpedoes expended, up- 
keep of tenders, and what not, the blockade must have cost 
Germany at least one and a half million pounds in dead loss 
— quito probably it has cost her two millions, and this irre- 
spective of loss of war services of her submarines, and effective 
crews now drowned or captured, who can hardly be replaced 
within the time-limits cf modern war. 
AERI.\L OPERATIONS. 
German aircraft have also co-operated in the submarine 
" blockade," but so far without any result whatever. A story 
has been published of one British merchant ship which fired 
rockets at an attacking aeroplane and frightened it off accord- 
ingly. The story may be accepted — with some limitations; 
the chances of hitting being to all intents and purposes non- 
existent. The aeroplane is reported to have sought higher 
altitudes in consequence of being fired at; possibly the pilot 
suspected some new kind of war rocket with wire entangle- 
ments attached. 
While the German aircraft have been mostly engaged in 
more or less fatuous operations, the British aeroplanes have 
been conducting operations of a direct military significance. 
Bombs have been dropped on a German submarine yard re- 
cently established at Hoboken. 
The exact amount of damage done is necessarily conjec- 
tural ; but, according to Dutch reports, one submarine was 
destroyed, and others damaged, considerable havoc being also 
wrought on the workshops. 
MR. HIL.MRE BELLOC S WAR LECTURES. 
LonJon '.. Queen's Hall Wednesday 7 April, 8.30 p.m. 
A series of lectures on the Progress of the War from month to month 
will be give:i at Queen's Hall on the first Wednesday in April, May, 
and June. Seats arc now being allotted. 
A lecture will also be given at the Opera House, Tunbridge Wells, 
on Friday, April 9, at 3.30, on " The Strategy of the War." 
MR. FRED T. JANES LECTURES ON THE NAVAL WAR. 
Torquay I'avilion Saturday 3 April, 3 p.m. 
Plymouth Guildhall Wednesday 7 April, 8 p.m. 
MR. CRAWFURD PRICE (Eye-wUness in the East) LECTURES 
ON SERBIA— The Ta'e of a Gallant Naiioo. 
Blackpool Winter Garden. ...Tuesday 13 April. 
York Opera House Wednesday 14 April, 3 p.m. 
Manchester Free Trade Hall. Thursday 15 April, 8 p.m. 
Southport Cambridge Hall.. Friday 16 April, 8 p.m. 
We have received a copy of " Wan-en's Map Guide " to the motor, 
motor-cyele, and cycle trades in liOndon. It forms a useful and valuable 
director!', as it contains every one connected with these trades in 
alphabetical order, and also geographically arranged over seventy map'!, 
£0 a.s to show the eJ.act position of each fii-m. It is a -street guide to 
over 8,000 streets, and addressp.s can be turned up either from the 
streets or from tho aliduibelicaJ list. It is a valuable book for motorists 
and motor cyclists. 
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