LAND AND .WATER. 
April 3, 1915. 
THE PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. 
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E. 
DURING the last few weeks the Allies, each in their 
separate spheres of action, have completely demon- 
strated their power to hold their ground anywhere 
and everywhere that it may please the enemy to 
assail them. On the French frontier we have indeed gone 
farther, and have given convincing proof that we can make 
the Germans dance to our piping — in other words, they must 
attack lis where and wiien we dictate, and not where they 
might tlieniselves choose to strike. 
This ought to satisfy the most greedy for the moment. 
But no sooner is one bogey laid than another springs up. 
Judging from my correspondence and the daily papers, our 
people now appear to be obsessed by the fear that wo shall 
oever be able to force the passage of the Rhine. 
I cannot share this fear, or doubt, for after studying 
that river from this point of view for very many years, and 
setting aside for a time the question of improvements in arma- 
ment, I know very well that the passage of the Rhine has 
been forced again and again, and " What man has done, man 
can do." is a good working motto. 
Now tl'.ere is a curious paradox about the passage of 
waterways which has never received the attention it deserves; 
it is one that military history shows as holding true within 
limits quite wide enough for the present purpose, and this 
is, that once a stream becomes too deep to wade and too 
wide to jump, the wider it grows, still remaining navigable, 
and the longer it becomes, the easier it is to surprise or force 
its passage. - 
This is only another way of expressing the axiom that the 
Power which controls the sea can disembark its troops, within 
certain limits, wherever it pleases. But though sea power 
depends on fleets, it is the fire power carried by the ships, 
not the ships themselves, that confers the ultimate power. 
In all fighting, since firearms definitely established them- 
selves as the principal weapons on the battlefield, no position 
has ever been carried, except by surprise, until or unless the 
assailant has first established a local superiority of fire power ; 
and as far as the defenders are concerned it has been quite 
Immaterial to them, once the superiority has been acknow- 
ledged, whether the weapons which delivered the bullets were 
fired from a floating or a land platform. 
The case of the Yser Canal and Dixmude is not to the 
point here, because it was not only too short for the numbers 
engaged to admit of a genuine surprise, but also because the 
Germjins never really succeeded in obtaining a sufiicient fire 
superiority, except quite locally, and for an insufficient time. 
Tiie Rhine, however, is some 400 miles in length from 
Basle to the Dutch frontier, and is navigable throughout the 
whole of this course. 
It is also everywhere so wide that unless it is illuminated 
From end to end by flares, star-shells, or searchlights — a some- 
what large order— ordinary darkness is quite enough to hide 
the movements of men on the one bank from sight on the 
other side of the river, except where it runs between rocks, 
i.e., from Bingen to Coblentz. From below Gear to Bonn 
the clay banks, some 15 feet sheer, are covered with reeds 
and scrub, giving concealment from anything except aero- 
planes. 
Behind this screen the concentration of men and gear 
necessary for ihe construction of rafts or bridges has always 
been made. 
Below Cologne — indeed, in several other places— where 
the river wi<lens out, the breadth is too great for the fire of 
the old-fashioned muskets to reach across it; even the field 
artillery of Napoleon's time did not effect much damage 
against such targets as tlie enemy allowed them to see. 
The boats attempting the crossing therefore had to face 
the unshaken — i.e., aimed fire of the defenders, which up to 
200 yards was about as accurate as that of modern rifles at 
800, and there was then no shrapnel shell to compel the 
attackers to keep their heads under cover. 
Of course the assailant always tried to surprise an 
unguarded passage; very generally he succeeded in so doing. 
But he could never be sure that his surprise would in fact 
materialise; consequently he had to set his teeth and be pre- 
pared for the worst before making the attempt. 
At the present time, thanks to the increased range of all 
arms and to the immensely augmented power of our shells, 
the conditions have altered enormously in our favour. I us* 
the word "enormously" with deliberation, and not loosely, 
because it is impossible to give an exact numerical ratio to 
define it. 
But let anyone who wishes to arrive at a real approxima- 
tion of the advantages wo now possess, take a scale map of any 
big river running through plains or lightly rolling country, 
and having selected any point for crossing, strike two arcs 
from it — one of 3,000 yards, the other of, say, 12,000 — and 
then calculate the area enclosed between them which would 
be available for placing his covering batteries. 
Then remember that the advantage accruing is not only 
due to the greater opportunities for concealing his guns 
afforded by the outer area, but also to the ampler space 
secured for the placing of still more batteries-— which do not 
need to be in one line nowadays, but can be arranged behind 
and in front of one another to fire over each other's heads. 
You can have either perfect concealment and fewer guns 
or less concealment and more guns, but the advantage is 
always partial concealment and in proportion a greater 
number of guns. 
On such an area you could in fact place all the heavy 
batteries of the French and Briti)?h Armies without serious 
inconvenience to one another, and thanks to our aeroplane 
ascendancy, you could converge all their fire on a single point 
of your own choice. 
The passage of a river is in fact only the same problem 
of the assault on Neuve Chapelle, for example, with the 
advantage thrown in that a close fire defence of the last 
100 yards or so is quite impossible owing to the sheer fall of 
the banks into the river. 
Trenches could not exist on this slope in view of the 
enemy, and the firing line must of necessity be drawn well 
back from it, while we, on our side, can scarj) dovvfn the edge 
of the bank, and convert it into a firing position for our 
subsequent advance. 
Moreover, by the lime we reach the Rhine — and that may 
not be long ahead as things are going now — the quality of 
the troops opposed to us will be very much lower than tliose 
wo have already faced, and, after, all, whatever may be the 
nature of an obstacle, it is not the natural impediment to 
physical progress that signifies, but the courage of the men 
who stand behind it. 
This subject is of such great practical interest at the 
moment to those of our men who will have to undertake the 
exploit of carrying the Rhine, that I would suggest to ray 
readers to secure, if possible, some military histories of classic 
passages of rivers, with maps, and send them out to their 
friends in the trenches, so that the men may be familiarised 
by lectures, given in billets, with the real nature of the task 
before them. 
Joiirdan's passage of the Rhine at Neuwied in 1794; 
Napoleon's passage of the Danube at the Isle of Lobau, in 
1809; the Russian passage of the same river below Silistria 
in 1877; are instances which occur to me. 
No very precise detail is needed; the essential point can 
easily be brought out — viz., the increased area between the 
two arcs referred to above for the placing of the guns. This 
can be convincingly shown with a blackboard and chalk; 
failing that, the diagram could be drawn with a stick on the 
ground. 
The essence of the thing is that what our ancestors did 
that we can also do, more especially since we now possess an 
overwhelming advantage on our side. 
That much of the correspondence that has been addressed 
both to the Editor and m3'self on military matters has been 
unanswered must not be regarded in any way as an act of 
discourtesy, but has been due to the ill-health of the writer, 
who hopes to deal with them at an early date. 
A Wellington and Waterloo loan collection of pictures, trophies, 
fee, in this centenary year of the great battle, is contemplated in aid of 
Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund ; and the Hon. Chai'lotto KnoUys, 
at Marlborough House, has addressed a letter concerning it to Mr. J. 
Land fear Lucas, of tlie Hurlingham Club and the Spectacle Slakers* 
Company. 
At the Annual General Meeting of the Hunters' Improverapnt 
Society it was unanimously resolvtd that tlie sum of £25 should ba 
allocated for the relief of sick and woundeil horses in the War. After 
considering the claima of tho Blue Cross Society and of the R.S.P.CA- 
Fund for sick and ^vounded horses, the meeting decided that the suns 
vot«d should be equally divided between the two above-named Societiesi, 
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