1^ /v. i-N U 
I\. 1\ u 
\\ i\. X 11, n,. 
^ipiii xu, lyio. 
5fl/v/, from the closeness of the trenches ajid their 
size, and its -possibility is partlj' due to the charac- 
ter of the modern weapon and the exact stan- 
dardisation of propellant explosives, but much 
more to the supremacy in the air which the Allies 
have established. It is a matter of legitimate 
pride that the pioneer work here was mainly 
British work. 
We are told by those who have every oppor- 
tunity for forming a personal judgment that the 
mastery of the air acquired by the Allies is a 
mastery due to just those qualities of adventure 
and daring which many have too hastily imagined 
to have vanished from modern war. The enemy 
has flying machines not differing apj^reciably from 
those of the Allies. He can rise as high. He can 
fly as fast. Where he seems to have failed is, as 
everywhere in this war, on the not calculable side 
of human effort : the spiritual side that supple- 
ments the machine. Direct attack in the air, fly- 
ing in difficult weather, flying low, he leaves 
mainly to his opponent, and therefore his opponent 
masters him. 
The essence of the type of attack which the 
French have perfected in the last month or two 
is this : 
On a chosen day the infantry in a particular 
section of trenches are bid to stand by for deliver- 
ing an assault. As against that daj- a great con- 
centration of heaxy pieces and of munition for 
them is arranged. This concentration may be 
grasped by the enemy or missed. More usually, it 
IS largely missed, because of his imperfect air 
offensive, the hea\y gun fulfils another task. It 
next creates a zone of fire behind the captured 
trenches, passage through which zone is sometimes 
impossible and always exceedingly costly. 
It will be .'•'een that tliis method constantly 
pursued does all tlial the war of attrition demands. 
It kills and wounds great numbers of the enemy; 
it leaves initiative entirely in the hands of the 
Allies; it causes considerable batches of prisonei'S 
to be passed continually from the enem3's lines 
into ours. It has but one drawback. It is spas- 
modic on account of tlie enormous amount of 
projectiles it consumes in each effort. 
But it may bo asked why so obvious an 
arrangement is mainly in the possession of the 
Allies, and why the enemy, since two can play at 
any game, does not attempt similar action against 
us. 
Sometimes, of course, he does attempt it; as, 
for instance, in the attack on St. Eloi the other 
day, in front of Ypi'es. But he does not attempt 
it once to ten times that it is tried against him. 
And the reason that he thus finds himself perpetu- 
ally receiving blows which he cannot adequately 
return is mainly duo to his now fixed inferiority in 
the air and next to his husbanding of ammunition. 
Here the second point, the superiority in 
munition of the Allies in the West, comes in. It is 
of the first importance, but, unfortunately, it is 
a matter on which, in the nature of things, we have 
Aery scanty evidence indeed. AVe do laiow, how- 
ever, tliat, for reasons which will be suggested in a 
moment, the enemy is still chary in his use of big 
work. At any rate, once effected, on the morning shell along the Western fi-ont 
chosen the heavy pieces begin to deliver a concen 
trated fire against the enemy's trenches. It lasts 
for a space of time varying with the nature of the 
■work in hand. At Neuve Chapelle this tornado 
was kept up thirty-five minutes. On the Beause 
In the first place, he is certainly lianipered for 
nickel, and probably already somewhat hampered 
for copper. 
In the second place, he probably feels more 
than do the Allies the burden of relining guns and 
iour front it seems to have been kept up usually for of completing new peioes. The reason of this, 
bursts of rather less than an hour. The other'day, 
on the Hartsmannweilerkopf, it was kept up 
almost without intermission from ten in the morn- 
ing until two in the afternoon. 
This cannonade must, to be of value, obtain 
an exact accuracy of range. So close are the two 
paradoxical as it may seem, is that he was so much 
better prepared with heavy artillery than were 
the Allies at the beginning of the war. If you 
have everything ready and thought out for one 
set of things, )^ou exclude by all that preparation 
another unexpected set of things. Just as a back- 
opposing forces, so small is the objective presented ^^^'^ country suddenly developing itself will more 
by a trench, and so necessary to the result is the easily get the latest machinery than an old and 
local effect of each projectile that, save with an '^'ealthier country, long developed, so a country 
exactitude in delivery unknown before the present ^liich has prepared for the use of a particular 
campaign, the method would fail. It is the '"'eapon in a certain maximum quantity, and to be 
machine in the air, partly by its previous recon- exercised over a maximum time, is likely to be at 
naissance of the precise trace of the enemy's ^ ^^ss when the allotted time is exceeded and the 
trenches, partly by its spotting of individual shots, quantity proves insufficient, compared with rivals 
that determines this accuracy, and, once deter- "^^'^^ ^ake up the whole thing on a novel scale 
mined, it shakes the enemy bej^ond the power of 
continued resistance. 
An exact co-ordination must be observed 
between the work of the hea\y guns and the work 
In the third place, he wants many of his 
heavy guns for the Eastern front. The only real 
advantage the Austro- Germans have over the 
Russians is their superiority in this weapon. 
of the infantry that follows it. The infantry in T^^^ ^^ ^'^^'^J ^^^^'^ ^^® enemy in the East and he 
the trenches cannot, of course, move until the artil- ^^ beaten. 
lery work is over ; but the very moment it is over, ^^^ ^^^^ fourth place, neutral markets for muni- 
while the enemy who has been subject to that can- tions are closed to the enemy ; a handicap which 
nonade is still stunned and distraught by it, and ™akes him rage most furiously, for it offends his 
long before the survivors can remodel the trenches sense of justice 
which have been knocked to pieces by the heavy 
fire, the infantry leap from their trenches and rush 
the intervening space and the first trenches of their 
opponents. They establish themselves hurriedly, 
but as thoroughly as they can, before the counter- 
offensive is launched. 
To interfere with the value of that counter- 
And, in the fifth place, counting every man as 
he does in such an industrialised state, and keep- 
ing a bare minimum back to supply his armed 
forces from the factories, he is hampered some- 
what for labour. 
COTTON. 
Explosive he has in any quantity he likes, bothi 
8» 
