April 17, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
and it is tlie slope tliat looks towards the south. 
But this is not wholly a disadvantage to the defen- 
sive. It gives better opportiuiities for trench work 
and much better opportunities for concealment. 
.What the gradual disappearance of the snow 
in the whole range during the next few weeks will 
accomplish is the provision of pasture for the Rus- 
sian irregular cavalry, and the freeing of separate 
bodies from being tied to the few roads across the 
hills, and in particular the horsemen will be able 
to come into action. 
It is probable that the defensive along the 
range has been very far from continuous. It has 
been concentrated upon the points where the roads 
cross, because during the winter all advance on the 
part of the Russians has been tied to these roads. 
But as the weather moderates, the defensive will 
have to be spread out more evenly along the whole 
line, and this is a factor in weakening that line 
which must not be neglected. 
Meanwhile, the efforts to check the slow 
advance of our ally over these mountains are not 
always without fruit. 
Where the Lupkow Pass Railway comes down 
from the summit on the Hungarian side, round 
alx)ut the station of Mesolaborcz (at X X on the 
above sketch), there has been a series of sharp 
actions which have quite held up the Russian 
advance in that district, and have probably in- 
ilicted a local reverse upon our ally, for the 
Austrian claims to 10,000 unwounded prisoners 
remain uncontradicted, and the Russian line has 
here been quite stationary for three weeks past. 
But it is not a local success of this kind, nor 
the more numerous small and steady advances of 
the Russians upon the whole of this course, which 
really decides the issue. The whole thing is a 
furious corps h corps; a swaying, now just upon, 
now just over, the summits of the hills ; a wrestling 
bout in which superiority of numbers will be IHt* 
ultimately deciding factor, and which every new 
week's further equipment of the Russians inclines 
in their favour. 
A NOTE ON NEUVE CHAPELLF. 
There has been a tendency, as the exact truth 
about Neuve Chapelle began to come through, not 
from the Press, but from the great numbers of 
men who have returned wounded from that action, 
to under-rate its effect and to misunderstand its 
character. It is therefore worth while to re- 
emphasise both. As it has been very well put in 
the phrase of one correspondent, to whose experi- 
ence I have had access, " The thing for the public 
in England to note is not how much might havo 
been done, but how much was." 
Now what was done may be briefly tabulated 
as follows : 
1. Through superiority in air- work now fully 
established, great quantities of munitions were 
concealed for several days without the enemy's 
guessing what was happening. It is the first 
time this has been done npon the Western front. 
2. The local weakness of the enemy through 
the same superiority and through the co-ordina- 
tion of this effort with the attacks in Champagno 
was equally established. 
3. At a heavy expense, especially during tho 
counter-offensive, to our own side, it inflicted a 
still greater loss upon the enemy who could afford 
it far less. 
4. It discovered the continued or rather im- 
proved capacity for a vigorous offensive in men 
v. ho have passed months under the strain of trench 
work. 
5. In general, it showed that, with a sufficient 
preparation, the piercing of the line or its shorten- 
ing under the threat of piercing was certain. 
COTTON. 
I MUST beg my readers to permit me 3'^et 
another reference to cotton, and that for 
the purpose of giving more details upon 
the subject. 
Everyone by tliis time knows in a general way 
that cotton is gunpowder, and that yet cotton has 
been allowed to come freely into Germany through 
the blockading cordon ; which is exactly as though 
guns and submarines and consignments of shell 
had been allowed to get through the cordon, 
save for this difference: that Germany and 
Austria-Hungary can, at a certain rate, make 
guns and shells and submarines, whereas for 
cotton they are absolutely dependent upon supply 
from over the sea — that is, upon the goodwill of 
Great Britain among the Allies. 
But while this verv startling fact is now 
public property, the precise significance of it in 
detail is less generally appreciated. How much 
cotton there is. what it is worth, how much the 
enemy proljabiy use, the difference tiiat even at 
this date the preventing of his getting this 
material woirld make— -all these points arc left 
vague in the public mind. If the public can got 
a grip of them it will help to strengthen opinion. 
There are probably in Germany now, in re- 
serve, as I said last week, one million bales of 
cotton. It is doubtful whether Austria has any 
reserve. Supposing, therefore, that all supply; 
from neutrals in Europe and all supply from over- 
sea were to stop at this very moment, the enemy 
would presumably have to fall back upon rather 
less than 500 million pounds, or, in round 
numbers, 250,000 tons of cotton. 
It is believed that hitherto he has used about 
half his cotton imports for textile fabrics and 
about half for making what I shall continue to 
call his gunpowder, because that inaccurate, old- 
fashioned term gives the quickest impression of 
the truth. 
He has therefore in reserve, having accumu- 
lated it during these months during which we 
have permitted him to obtain it in spite of the 
blockade, about 125,000 tons of gunpowder, which, 
if he could afford to stop all his civilian weaving 
and to throw immense numbers of men out of 
employment, could possibly be increased to a 
maximum of something less than 200,000 tons in 
round numbers. 
I give these figures first and insist upon them 
because the extraordinary situation by which 
enemies working for the destruction of this 
country are supported in obtaining the material 
with which to destroy it can only be defended 
upon the plea tliat cotton has already come in in 
such quantities that belated action taken now 
V 
