L A JS D AND K A T E R. April 17, 1915. 
\rould be useless. In other words, the groom mny has been quite out of proportion to wheat even tho 
plead against being asked to shut the stable door enemy expected. Again, the heavy gun, wiiich is 
now that the horse has been stolen. of course, the great glutton of cotton, was relied 
.Well, if Germany has a maximum potential upon by the enemy m this war m a fashion which 
reserve of less than 200,000 tons of propellant the Allies had not foreseen and was used by them 
explosive and a practical reserve of not more than with a prodigality which has called forth at last 
125,000 tons, let us next ask ourselves how long a similar or even superior effort upon our side in 
this would last, and whether it could be supple- the West. ■■, -. 
mented in any way supposing that after all these In the East, apart from what were until quite 
months of war we did stop the public from going lately his superior numbers, the enemy still relies 
on, upon the much greater supply he has of heavyj 
The estimates of what the enemy is using pieces and of munitions for them. While— most 
yary, of course, enormously. It is an exceedingly significant and most calculable of all the proofs— ^ 
difficult problem to work out even as a conjee- we have the fact that the enemy, although he pre- 
ture. Austria, for instance, uses a powder in pared this war for so long, is, and has long been, 
.which there is a proportion of glycerine higher clamouring for cotton ; a truth easily proved by the 
than that in the German powder. But both of rate of his recent import and his willingness to pay, 
these are higher than the proportion in the French as we shall see in a moment, at a very high price for 
service, and in the American (among others), the cotton he does get. 
Again, we do not know what secret modifications Let us now recall the estimates of reserve 
may not have been introduced in the period during which have already been given — 125,000 tons 
which Germany was actively preparing for this reckoned for, 200,000 tons available at a pinch— 
,war — that is, between 1911 and 1914 — three years and we can easily see the result. The enemy now 
>vhich, as we know, were given up to the designing has gunpowder for about another three months of 
and munitioning of the great campaign that was war, or at the most another nine months or so. 
to be entered on just after the harvest of 1914. That is, supposing the war to go on at its present 
It is, further, very difficult to guess nearer rate and the enemy to lose no stores, 
than a maximum and a minimum very widely The first thing we have to remark upon stating 
separated what the average expenditure is per these figures is that even upon the estimate most 
day, though we know accurately enough the ex- favourable to ourselves the immediate cessation of 
Senditure in cotton of any particular weapon, cotton import would still leave the enemy able to 
'he French 75, for instance, would shoot away continue at the present rate to the end of the year. 
a bale of cotton in four hundred rounds, and the That is the basis, of course, of the argument in 
largest existing guns would shoot it away in less favour of despairing of future action on account 
•than two. The small arm ammunition, the ex- of results of the past action. That is the argument 
penditure of which is perhaps the most difficult for not shutting the stable door because the horse 
thing to calculate, uses up about a bale of cotton, has certainly been stolen. But we should pause a 
1 beReve, in about 80,000 rounds, rather less than moment at this stage in the consideration of our 
more. A machine gun actually in the field is matter to consider certain further aspects of it. 
provided first and last with about half a bale of In the first place, no one can guarantee that 
cotton, and every company in the field, apart from the war is to go on at the present rate. If we allow 
its machine guns, is provided first and last with the enemy to obtain great masses of cotton in the 
about three bales of cotton. immediate future, he will be able to develop in the 
By this I do not mean that your machine gun West perhaps a renewed lavish expenditure of 
or your company will not get rid of more cotton heavy gun ammunition such as that which marked 
than that in the war : it will get rid of enormously his first bid for the victory that he so narrowly, 
more. But I mean that your first provision is at missed, 
least upon that scale. In the second place, the moment the siege of 
The lowest estimate — and I fear it was once any place in the enemy's hands begins, we shall 
the official one, too — has put the total expenditure have a sudden leap up of expenditure, on his part, 
of cotton hj the enemy at 300 tons a day. The most of cotton. The same is true of the defence of any, 
expert estimate I have seen puts it at over three obstacle behind which he may lie, such as the 
times that, at 1,000 tons a day. Ehine. 
Now, it is wise to keep one's estimates always Then, again, we must remember that in all 
heloiv the figure that most helps one's argument, calculations of this sort, though it is wise to 
even though one has good ground for accepting take a moderate estimate against our own wishes, 
Buch a figure. We will, therefore, heavily scale it is also wise to leave no chances to the enemy< 
down the maximum of 1,000 tons and stay at 750 If his real reserve is smaller than we imagine—^ 
tons. which it well may be — if his real expenditure is 
Three hundred tons cannot be accepted for a much higher than we think ; if, for instance, he is 
moment. It is based upon those older calculations using cotton at a rate 50 per cent, greater than we 
which this war has completely upset. Even 750 have allowed for, his reserve is already smaller. It 
tons is less likely than 1,000. Tliere are a number would hardly last out the summer, and any chances 
of observations all pointing to the larger rather of our being able to starve him in gunpowder at 
than the smaller figure. Both Germany and the earliest possible moment should obviously be 
Austria used from the beginning an enormously taken, even if by our own action we have allowed 
greater number of machine guns in proportion to him to accumulate this great store, 
their forces than the Allies had allowed for. The Again, the action of your enemy becomes 
attack throughout this war has everywhere been so embarrassed long before his last munitions are ex- 
persistent, the losses before an attack failed so hausted. The mere condemning of him to husband! 
heavj, that the expenditure of small arm ammuui- his ammunition would be equivalent to putting 
tion by the soldier, as well as by the machine gun, him under a very heavy handicap. 
