'April 17, 1915. 
E A N D AND .WAT E R. 
Again, we must allow for the possibility of his 
losing stores. He must have lost, for instance, the 
other day, in Przemysl, a huge quantity of accumu- 
lated propellant explosive. A future success of 
the same sort on our Western side, in Belgium, for 
instance, would have a similar result. 
All these considerations point one way, and 
show the utility — I should have thought the im- 
perative necessity — of stopping the supply at once. 
But let us next see what chance of supply he has 
through neutrals. 
There are two sets of neutrals. What may 
be called the North Sea group and Italy. The 
neutral Balkan frontier cannot be used for the 
importation of cotton on any large scale. Now, 
from Italy the enemy is not at the present moment 
obtaining cotton, and has not obtained it for some 
time past, I believe — a significant indication, by 
the way, of the policy of that country. From the 
North Sea neutrals the enemy has been obtaining 
everv kind of munition which we have allowed to 
go through. 
We must always remember, by the way, that 
this is in no way an unfriendly or illegal act upon 
their part. The neutral sells j^ou provisions and 
munitions, if he can reach your market. It is the 
enemy's business to prevent his doing so if he 
can, but not the neutral's business to diminish his 
own chances of trade. If we are right in elimin- 
ating the Italian cotton stopped in transit — as I 
am informed we are — we may probably estimate 
tlie total amount which the remaining neutrals, 
the North Sea group of neutrals, could now spare 
to Germany, if further effort were regulated so as 
to supply their own needs alone, at about another 
25 per cent, added to the present German reserve. 
In other words, supposing Germany and Austria 
could now carry on for four months with what they 
have, the neutral countries in Europe which are 
willing to provide them could extend that four 
months to five; if for eight months, then to ten; 
but no more. Such, at least, would seem to be, in 
a matter necessarily conjectural, the situation. 
The argument on that side, therefore, that the 
horse is stolen and that the stable door does not 
need shutting is not very strong. And we may 
conclude at once the whole of this part of the dis- 
cussion by saying that if we were perfectly free to 
stop the gunpowder going in now we obviously 
ought to do so and that it would be of very great 
practical effect. 
If we are not free that lack of freedom must 
be due to one of two calculations or to a combina- 
tion of both. First, it may be put forward that 
if we interfered with Germany's imports of cotton 
the United States would regard this as an un- 
friendly act, and that what we obtain from that 
source would fail us. It is for those who have 
all the available official knowledge in the matter, 
which no private critic can pretend to, to decide 
whether this is the case or no. But meanwhile the 
private critic and the public in general are pos- 
sessed of certain very obvious facts in the matter 
which certainly do not make the argument any, 
stronger. We know, for instance, that for £1 
paid by Germany for German munitions the Allies 
are paying a great deal more than £10, and one 
does not sec a man giving up £10 or £15 worth of 
trade in order to save £1 worth. 
Further, we may remark that we have not 
hesitated to inflict upon our own Dominions and 
our Allies restrictions which this policy has not 
imposed upon a neutral country. We prevent wool 
going into Germany, and wool is an Australian 
product. I understand that we prevent Indian 
cotton and Egyptian cotton going into Germany, 
It is American cotton that goes in alone. 
But there is no need — or at least there appears 
none, to one having no more information than is 
open to the general public — to inflict any hardship 
upon this powerful neutral. 
The cotton we buy at the present moment in 
open market for British use we get to-daj;^ for just 
under sixpence the pound. Germany in her need 
is willing to pay, I believe, about double this. Had 
we adopted the policy of preventing this reserve 
of ammunition from growing up in Germany (and 
if we had, the war might well be OA^er now) we 
could have paid for the total of her present reserve 
with a sum of somewhat more than ten million 
pounds. Even if we had compensated the 
American exporter at the rate Germany is now 
ready to pay (a thing we need never have done if 
we had begun early), twenty millions would have 
met the bill. 
So it comes to this, that something which 
would have ended the war perhaps already, and 
certaiiily would have appreciably shortened it, 
while at the same time ensuring victory, has 
not been done, although that something would only 
have cost the Allies much less than 1 per cent, 
of expenditure they have already had to meet : 
would have cost Britain alone less than a week of 
war. 
Before leaving the subject there are two 
more points to be mentioned. The first is the use 
of substitutes for cotton, the second is the supply 
for the future. 
The most obvious substitute which occurs to 
one, which has already been mentioned in these 
columns, is wood-pulp. But I am informed that 
there could be no question of the substitution of 
wood-pulp for cotton in the course of the present 
war. The results obtained by experiment are un- 
satisfactory. The change would be, in the course 
of a great struggle, impossible. Cotton with im- 
purities or already made up into stuffs is also out 
of the question. Wc may take it that if Ave stopped 
the enemy's import of this raw material nothing 
could replace it. 
Lastly, let us note the supply. There will be 
no cotton of the next crop available for Germany 
during the critical period of stress immediately 
before us. The picking of cotton is a summer and 
early autumn business, and it is with the winter 
that the new supplies come in. Therefore, apart 
from supplies still available, the critical period of 
the war for the enemy and for ourselves, Avliich is 
approaching, will also be one in which the restric- 
tion of cotton import concerns a lessening stream 
of commerce. 
CONCLUSION ON NUMBERS. 
I began my notes of this week with the capital 
statement that the tide in numbers had turned. 
We shall see during the remainder of the war how 
that prime factor will affect the enemy's decision. 
It must be remembered (and it is forgotten 
perhaps more in this country than among our 
Allies) that the enemy has never presupposed in 
his military writings, in his strategical school, in 
the inmost of his military mind — which affects the 
very training of his recruits and the whole moral 
standpoint of his armies — the possibility of find- 
ing himself in an inferiority of number. He has 
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