April 17, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
inariDe would instantly submerge and torpedo without 
further notice — probably without being seen, and in doing 
•o she would be quite within her legal rights. I am endeavour- 
ing to deal with this very complicated question in the text, 
but you must understand that to a great extent we are faced 
with the unknown, and consequently, though suitable anti- 
dotes will eventually be evolved, they can only be arrived 
at by trial and error. 
0. M. (Cheltenham). — A submarine attacking a 
merchant ship would fire the torpedo at the ship's broadside, 
and ED the bow defence would be of no avail. 
E. M. B. (Hove).— (1) The idea that German gnb- 
roarines are superior to ours is entirely incorrect. The latest 
German boats are very good, but so also are our latest boats. 
The rest of your question about submarines was dealt with 
in last week's article, which appeared a day or two after your 
letter was received. (2) This question is better not answered. 
You may take it that our Garrison Artillery know what they 
are doing. 
H. E. C. (Ealing)". — The " decoy duck " is an idea which 
in some form or other is as old as naval warfare itself. 
J. R. B. (Manchester). — Your invention, or what is 
Ribstantially the same thing, was anticipated by Da\'id 
Boshnell in America in the year 1773. 
C. P. S. (Bath).. — The scheme you suggest has been in 
use ever since the war began. 
J. W. M. (Earlscolne).— See answers to " H. E. C." and 
•• C. P. S." 
T. B. (Bizerta). — There is nothing novel in the sugges- 
tion of your French friend. 
M. N. O. (London, S.E.).— (1) Whether or not it is 
wiser for a merchant ship to go for a submarine or to attempt 
to evade her by a zig-zag course must depend upon a variety 
of circumstances and the judgment of the captain of the 
merchant ship. It is impossible for anyone to lay down a 
general rule to be followed in all circumstances. (2) An 
elephant gun against a submarine would be little more effec- 
tive than a pea-shooter. 
E. S. (Frome). — See first sentence of reply to "Land- 
lubber " above. 
C. T. (London, W.). — You may depend upon it that 
the Admiralty is fully alive to the submarine mena«3. The 
arming of merchant ships is a moot point to some extent, for 
reasons that are dealt with in the text. All through this war 
the situation has been more serious than the public elects to , 
believe. 
A. H. A. (Schatzalp-Davos, Switzerland). — (1) It is 
not to the public interest to make any statement whatever as 
to new warships that the Admiralty may have in hand. (2) 
A similar answer applies. The enemy is equally curious on 
the same subject. (3) I think you may safely put the alleged 
German apparatus for enabling submarines to look about 
them under the water in the same category as the inventions 
of the late Baron Munchausen. The German story is not even 
original, as some years ago an Italian inventor floated, or 
attempted to float, a company with a submarine which was 
to cruise at great depths and discover hidden treasure with 
a powerful searchlight. But even he did not go to the length 
of claiming to see through a brick wall, which is about what 
the German claim amount* to. 
I. S. A. (London, E.G.). — You will see that I have 
endeavoured to deal with the legal poser which you raise in 
the text of this issue. 
Inquikek. — You are mistaken. The German shooting at 
the Falkland Island action was, in the circumstances, un- 
commonly good. 
INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.-IV. 
THE AERIAL DILEMMA. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
# 
WITH few exceptions, arising from very special 
circumstances, victory for a naval country has 
always been the result of the assistance given by 
her navy to her land forces. A navy has, by 
itself, hardly ever won a campaign j but, on 
the other hand, many a war would not have been a victorious 
one to a naval country had it not been for the influence and 
pressure of her sea-power. History, therefore, emphasises 
the value of co-operation between the army and the navy 
of a country. This is not, however, its only lesson. A closer 
•zamination of the contributions of armies and of navies of 
the past to final victories shows that, besides the co-operation 
of tho two Services, there must also be the individual inde- 
p«ndence of each. 
These teachings of history are very valuable as a guide 
in the development of air power, whoso influence upon the 
destinies of nations is now at its dawn. But for the fact that 
there is associated with air fleets a distinctive military feature 
which is not a characteristic of naval forces, it would be 
possible to adapt, bodily, all the teachings of the history of 
naviea to the rising air power — a power which can already 
exercise a direct, aa well as an indirect, influence on the 
destinies of nations. There is, therefore, a parallelism 
between air and sea power. But, unlike navies, air fleets can 
remain in continuous touch with any operating army, and, 
before many years are over, they will, no doubt, be in a similar 
position as regards high sea fleets. This capability of air 
fleets, which can be, and, to a certain degree already has been, 
made of great military value to both armies and navies, is the 
reason why the entire teachings of naval history cannot ba 
grafted on to the growing air power. Whereas a navy always 
exercises its influence, whether direct or indirect, by the 
power wliich it possesses as a separate and independent 
Service, an air fleet cannot give the best possible assistance to 
the force with which it is operating if it be independent of 
that force. The indirect influence of sea power demands co- 
operation, whil.'t the indirect influence of air power necessi- 
tates co-ordination, and, to a certain degree, subordination. 
The soundness of this assertion will be fully grasped by 
considering some examples of the respective indirect influence 
of sea and of air power. 
When a navy employs a part of its organisation for the 
iraasport of troops, or of ammunition, or of supplies to any 
desired place, or when it uses its influence to permit of such 
transport being made by merchant vessels, it exercises its force 
only in an indirect manner. The sea power is then used to 
assist the land forces, and the navy simply co-operat-es with the 
army. When the army has received a sufficient supply of men, 
arms, ammunition, and supplies, it carries on the war on land 
according to its own plans and independently of the navy. It is 
true that it may be required of the navy to see that the expedi- 
tionary force is continuously supplied with all its necessaries. 
This, however, does not alter the relative position of the army 
and of the nayj. It only makes their co-operation a con- 
tinuous one for a specific purpose, and there is no need, on 
that account, to place the navy under the authority of the 
Commander of the expeditionary forces. In fact, such a sub- 
ordination would be inadvisable, and the necessary arrange- 
ments for an efficient co-operation between the army and the 
navy are, in consequence, entirely left to the authorities in 
office. 
An air fleet, on the otlier hand, can produce an important 
indirect influence only if its work is co-ordinat'ed with that of 
the force with which it is co-operating, and if that co-ordina- 
tion is made on the spot as and when circumstances demand. 
Tliis is due to the nature of the assistance which aircraft can 
render to a land or to a sea force. It is obvious, for instance, 
that it must rest with the commander of a force whether, on a 
particular day, or in particular circumstances, he would use 
his aircraft for reconnaissance in conjunction with the cavalry 
or for the purpose of assisting the artillery, or for any other 
suitable work. When an air squadron is co-operating witli 
cavalry, the assistance which it can render to that force is, of 
course, of a different nature to that which it can give by co- 
operating with another arm, the artillery, for instance. 
Neither does it follow that, both as regards machines and 
jicrsonnel, tho air squadron best suited for co-operating with 
U'.e cavalry is also the best one to be employed for assisting the 
artillery; but neither of them may be the best for dealing 
with hostile air squadrons trying to prevent such co-operation. 
That certain eir-squadrons are specially suited to perform 
certain duties is a feature which, to some degree, is also to be 
found in the navy. But there is this difference between the 
co-operation of sea and air power with the land force, that 
whereas the former, from the nature of its work, as 
exemplified above, always exercises its influence, howevejf; 
13* 
