April 24, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEE 
valleys is of no particular importance. Having 
got a good grip of the Carpathians, they will not 
proceed further towards the Hungarian plain. 
But in the fii'st case the conformation of the valleys 
is very important indeed, for upon the way in 
which they " bunch " together towards Plungary 
Russian success would depend. And, further, the 
effort which has captured the Dukla and the 
Lupkow, and which is now menacing the Uzok, 
would become explicable. 
If it is the Hungarian plain which is the 
objective of the main Russian forces (and the 
chances are that this is their objective), then it is 
manifest upon the argument developed, and from 
the lie of tne roads, the railways, the valleys, the 
width of the chain at various parts, its difficulties 
of ground, and its varying height, that a success- 
ful passage over the narrower, lower, and better 
traverse northern and eastern end automatically 
masters the southern and western. 
It is manifest, in other words, that in attempt- 
ing an invasion of Hungary under modern condi- 
tions, with troops so numerous that the front of 
the whole ridge over 200 miles long can be 
defended, is best accomplished by hammering hard 
upon the right of the invaders, and that the 
attempt at the defence to counter this by an 
advance upon the broader part of the mountains 
against the invader's left is handicapped in every 
way. 
Whether the Russians are aiming at the in- 
vasion of Hungary or no we cannot tell. They 
have the initiative, and their commanders know 
what we do not. But if they are, then pressure 
upon the north and west is the very fashion in 
which to attain their end, and the command of the 
passes of that lower end of the chain, including 
the Uzok, will deterniine the struggle. 
The immediate future will show whether this 
object is theirs or no. If it is their object it is 
best obtainable in the manner they have chosen 
during the last six weeks of the present fighting. 
So far we have been examining the whole 
problem of the Carpathians statically upon the 
assumption of an equality in numbers and in 
munitions upon either side. 
But the problems of war, like all problems of 
human activity, are not static, but dynamic, and 
an appreciation of the position on this Eastern 
front can only be arrived at when we have trans- 
ferred our estimate from static to dynamic terms. 
In less pedantic words, the problem of the 
Carpathians would be solved not only and in part 
by the advantage of positions, but also, and mucK 
more, by the advantage of numbers. 
Now, here direct evidence fails us. 
We have no statistics to guide us. But we 
can adopt certain general conclusions based upon 
the " feeling " which each side has made of its 
opponent, and also upon the knowledge of the 
recent Russian munitioning, of the recent German 
efforts in this region, and of the recent German 
weakening upon the Western front. 
It is no unfair estimate to gauge the opposinff 
forces between the Dukla and the frontier or 
Bukovina as approximately equal since the fall of 
Przeraysl. The extreme severity of the struggle, 
its doubtful fortune, and the tenacity of the 
counter-offensive beyond the mountains all point 
to such an estimate. 
Further, we know that there has been a com- 
paratively slow, a rather reluctant, but recently a 
considerable lending of German troops to the 
Austrians here. We have been given the estimate 
of three army corps, rising to seven, and possibly 
later to ten. 
Now, all that points to a very special effort 
made by the enemy, and yet that effort hardly hold- 
ing its own. We know, on the other hand, that the 
Russians have been receiving munitions in an in- 
creasing stream during the last month, and per- 
haps during the last six weeks. We further know 
that the numbers of the Russians in this region 
have been increasing during precisely the same 
period, and we know that the total numbers 
they can put in the field are chiefly limited by 
this power of munitioning and equipping, in 
which they have been handicapped during the 
winter. 
The conclusion is clear. If the Russians are 
making the Hungarian plain their objective, they 
can, to the strategical condition analysed above, 
add, as the season proceeds, the dynamic element 
of numbers. 
I repeat : One may not presuppose in the 
course of a war which of two alternative objectives 
is in the mind of a commander who has captured 
and retains the initiative. And that is the posi- 
tion of the Grand Duke to-day. If his objective 
shall be Cracow or any other, the arguments given 
above lose, not their cogency in respect to the 
Carpathian chain, but their importance in the 
study of the campaign. But if his objective is the 
Hungarian plain, then this analysis oi the obstacle 
which covers that plain will prove its value in the 
operations in the near future. 
INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.— V. 
THE AERIAL DILEMMA: A SOLUTION. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
READERS of the notes on the Influence of 
Air Power which have already appeared 
in these columns v/ill, perhaps, remem- 
\-)0v that the writer, in his previous 
articles, has endeavoured to show that, when ana- 
ly.sed, it is found that the capabilities of aircraft 
in actual warfare at present give rise to a difficult 
situation, which auiounts to a real dilemma. 
That difficult}' is due to the fact that air fleets, as 
we now know them, can be used lx)th as an arm 
and as a serrice. As an arm, an aerial force is 
used to supplement other arms, such as the cavalry. 
the artillery, &c., and, in consequence, it must be 
subordinated to the commanders of those various 
arms. Thus, if an air squadron is working in 
co-operation with the artillery with a view to 
assisting or correcting gunfire, or to discovering 
the position and arrangement of hostile batteries, 
or to carrying out other kindred tasks, it is evi- 
dent that, for maximum efficiency, that air squad- 
ron must be sulx>rdinated to the artillery com- 
mander. Subordination and co-ordination are 
equally necessary in the cose of co-operation 
between the aerial arm and any other arm, be it the 
