LAND AXD .WATER. 
April 24, 1915. 
cavalry, the iufantn', or the engineers. It is to 
their success in closely co-ordinating the employ- 
ment of their aerial arm in co-operation with the 
other arms that the writer has been led to ascribe 
the principal cause oi" the aerial ascendancy which 
the British have now obtained, and which has 
already proved oi' such consequence that very great 
care should be exercised in order that it may not 
be impaired. Although to that close co-opera- 
tion and co-ordination the efficiency of British 
air work is directly traceable, yet it must 
be kept in view that there are other very 
important causes which have contributed to 
Great Britain's aerial ascendancj'. Among 
these are (i.) the efficiency of the machines 
themselves, resulting from good design, careful 
manufacture, efficient repairing and supervising 
staff, and adequate transport service; (ii.) a very 
careful training of the aerial pilots and of the 
aerial observers, rendering their piloting safe and 
reliable and their observations of real value; and 
(iii.) the personal factor, which has resulted in the 
British airmen making a better use of their 
machines than tlieir adversaries and employing 
them with success in circumstances in which their 
opponents would not dare risk themselves aloft. 
When, however. Great Britain's aei-ial 
ascendancy is carefully and coolly scrutinised 
and only incontrovertible facts are allowed 
through the sieve of exacting criticism, one is 
forced to the conclusion that as a service, capable 
of independent action like the Navy, for instance, 
no country has, as yet, obtained any marked 
ascendancy, although 'to be strictly accurate it 
■would seem that, at present, so far as its offensive 
or direct value is concerned, the advantages of 
aerial power lie, perhaps, with the enemy. The 
writer would not draw public attention to this 
state of affairs if he could not at the same time 
propose a remedy, Avhich is not available to cur 
opponents. But, before doing so, he would like 
once more to state clearly the nature of the aerial 
dilemma now facing the belligerent Powers. Shall 
a commander look upon his air fleet as a service 
and employ it to exert direct influence, in which 
case he would have to forgo the advantages result- 
ing from the co-ordination of his aircraft with the 
other arms, or shall he employ his aerial force as 
an arm to exert the indirect influence of air power, 
in which case he would have to renounce the pos- 
sible direct effect of the influence of air power ? 
The tendency, both among the Allies and the 
enemy, has been, up to the present, to employ their 
aerial force mainly as an arm. But, the offensive 
value of aircraft having been recognised, several 
air raids have been undertaken both by the Allies 
and the enemy. Those air raids which have lacked" 
m boldness so far as the number of macliines is con- 
cerned have not had very lasting" effects for various 
reasons. All these reasons, however, can be traced 
directly to the fact that the present organisation 
of an aerial force does not allow it to operate as a 
service, with freedom to act entirely on its own 
initiative as and when circumstances demand. In 
this connection it is veiy important to note that the 
enemy, not from any special effort of their own 
but through the force of events and, to a very great 
degree, through Great Britain's very ascendancy 
in tue employment of the aerial arm, has, in part 
escaped from the horns of the aerial dilemma 
enunciated above. This is a point worth consider- 
ing with care 
The readers of this publication will perhaps 
remember that in one of his previous articles* the 
v>'riter explained why the Zeppelin airships were 
unsuited for land fighting but were valuable for 
naval warfare. The ascendancy Vvhich the Allied 
airmen have obtained since the writing of that 
article further increases the misuitability of the 
Zeppelin airship as an aerial arm for land opera- 
tions, and, therefore, the German artillery or 
cavalry commanders never ha^c recourse to the co- 
operation of their Zeppelins. While the vselcss- 
vess of the Zeppelins as an arm. for land opera- 
tions has had the result of releasing them to an 
independence of action of their own, so far as land 
warfare is concerned, yet, as a naval aerial arm, 
they are still of potential value. In this respect 
again their utility has not been in evidence, but, 
in this case, through no defect in the airships them- 
selves. This is a point worth understanding 
fully. As regards the war on land the Zeppelin, 
as an arm, is of no real value in view of the anti- 
aircraft organisations of the Allies and of their 
aerial ascendancy obtained by a judicious and bold 
employment of their aeroplanes; with reference to 
sea warfare, the Zeppelin, as an arm, is, again, of 
no real value, not through any anti-aircraft 
superiority or aerial ascendancy of the Allies, but 
throuo-h the enforced seclusion of the German 
fleets in their harbours. There being no German 
naval operations of any importance, there is no 
use for the Zeppelin airships as a naval aerial 
arm. The net result of these various circum- 
stances is that the Germans are now in possession 
of an aerial force capable of entirely independent 
action — that is, one which, within restrictions im- 
posed by the machines and their personnel, can, for 
all intents and purposes, be considered as a ser- 
vice and thereby capable of exercising its influence 
directly. Thus it is that the enemy, on account 
of the unsuitability of their airships for co ordi- 
nation in land warfare and of their inability to 
co-operate vvith naval operations, have not, at the 
present moment, to consider the dilemma in 
exactly the same light as the Allies. In conse- 
quence they have somewhat evaded a difficult 
situation, and are even able to turn it to their 
advantage. Thus they have carried out recent 
airship raids in the neighbourhood of Paris and 
on the North-East and East coasts of England. 
It is very likely that, with the coming fine season^ 
the Zeppelin service will attempt to exercise direct 
influence of air power on a more comprehensive 
and more sustained scale. 
Now it is necessary that the Allies should 
possess means of exercising the direct influence 
of air power to at least the same degree as their 
adversaries. In other words, it is imperative for 
them to devise some method v/hereby to escape 
from the dilemma, and, as regards Great Britain 
the writer ventures to suggest a simple plan 
whereby this can be done. 
Great Britain's direct influence of air power 
at the present juncture, should possess three char- 
acteristics : (a) It should" be at least as great as 
that of the enemy; (b) it must be capable of ward- 
ing off the enemy's menace; and (c) it must not be 
detrimental to the aerial ascendancy which Great 
Britain already possesses. It is not a very easy 
matter to calculate the number and exact poten-^ 
tiahty of the existing Zeppelins for offen- 
I 
8» 
• " TiM Modern MiliUrj Z«pp«Un," Lira isB Wiieb, D«o. 26, 1914. 
