April 24, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
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On this map of Heligoland is shown the position of a Zeppelin ehed, completed and handed over to tha German 
anlhoritiea since the outbreak of hostilitioa. In view of the recent activity of t-he Zeppelin airships the exact position of the 
Zeppelin base in the North Sea cannot but be of very great interest to our naval authorities. A description of that most 
np-todate aerial base was given in the issue of Land akd Wateb, dated January 15, 1915. The shed is about 625ft. long 
and 18Cft. wide, and like the one near Cuxhavcn, it is of the "revolving" and "collapsible" tj^je. Close to it is a 
factory for tlie manufacture of the necessary hydrogen. It is estimated tliat the Zeppelin base of Heligoland, wliich, 
oormaUy, contains two airships, has been built and equipped at a cost of £20,000. 
give purposes, so that, for complete safety, the 
plan must allow for a liberal estimate of the 
enemy's direct aerial potentiality. Since the 
enemy can aerially menace a great number of 
places the plan must provide for preparation and 
readiness at a great number of points. It is 
evident that this cannot be done by employing, at 
various places, the machines or military pilots who 
are necessary for the maintenance of the British 
aerial ascendancy. 
The plan which the writer proposes, and 
which fulfils all the preceding desiderata, . is the 
formation of a National Air Service by arousing 
local initiative, especially in the sea-coast towns. 
The National Air Service could only be successful 
if it received Government sanction and if it 
worked in consultation with the official aeronauti- 
cal departments. In accordance with the sug 
tested plan every seaside to\vn would be asked to 
e responsible for the construction, locally or other- 
wise, of one or two aeroplanes and for the training 
of one or two pilots. Every seaside town would, 
besides, undertake to have always under construc- 
tion and training one or more machines and pilots. 
In this manner there would be, in a very short 
time, a number of aeroplanes distributed along the 
coast of Great Britain in constant readiness to 
ward off a Zeppelin visit. After a short time 
there would be a nucleus of an offensive air service 
ready for independent offensive operations. Such 
a fleet would not only be a suitable one for carry- 
ing on war, on a large scale, into the heart of the 
enemy's country, but also would be especially valu- 
able for coping with the German submarine war- 
fare on commerce. There are, of course, many 
details that would have to be settled with regard 
to rendering efficient such a National Air Service 
as outlined above ; but in principle the scheme, as 
a solution of the dilemma facing us, is simple and 
practical. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
ROTE.— This Article ku been tnbmltted to the Press Burean, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibility for the correctness of the statements. 
THE NORTH SEA— THE POSITION OF 
HOLLAND. 
ALTHOUGH it yet seems early days to speculate as 
to Holland being dragged into the war, there 
are not wanting various recent indications that 
Germany is seeking a pretext to establish herself 
in the Netherlands. 
German ideals as to possessing the Rhine down to the 
sea are, of course, neither novel nor secret; but we appear to 
be on the verge of a situation created by the naval war which 
has no connection with past sentiment, but which has been 
entirely brought about by modern needs. 
On the outbreak of war Germany had a very restricted 
sea front. This restricted sea front was then and before that 
time generally regarded in Germany (and here also for that 
matter) as a German asset. We are all familiar with the 
comparative diagrams which used to be produced: " What 
Germany has to defend," represented by a species of dot; 
" What Britain has to defend," indicated by a very lonj 
line. 
In its way the diagram was misleading, becaus* 
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