LAND AND .WATER 
April 24, 1915. 
*' defence " is an iiit.ii'-ect term to use in relation to warfare — 
•epeciaUy naval warfare, of wliich the be-all and end-all (if 
■uccess is to be hoped for) is attack. 
However, this coastal question obtained as a classic, and 
It is merely quoting ancient history to say that Germany 
regarded her small coast line as a valuable asset. She more 
or less fortified every yard of her coast line at a cost which 
would certainly, if otherwise expended, have provided her 
with a fleet fully equal in strength to that British Fleet which 
the war found her faced with. 
Approximately the ideal adopted was an impregnable 
inverted V, in the centre of which lies Heligoland. It is to 
be expressed diagrammatically as indicated in Figure 1, " x "■ 
representing the passive shore defence, the arrows the active 
local naval defence based mainly on Heligoland. 
From the impregnable barrier thus created the German 
Fleet was theoretically to emerge as convenient — being able 
to_ fight or retire to safety when desirable, as circumstances 
might dictate. 
On the face of it this seemed a very strong and alluring 
position, especially when contrasted with the relatively vast 
and undefendable (by complete shore defences) British coast 
line. There — till the war broke out — the matter remained. 
A very short experience of war, however, revealed the 
now obvious fact that the smaller the coast line the easier it 
is for a superior enemy to establish an efiicient watch over it, 
limiting all egress to the range of the local defences. Para- 
doxical as it may at first sight appear, Germany's weakness 
lies in the very strength of her inshore defences. 
Her tardy recognition of this is evidenced by her frantic 
efforts to reach the sea at places beyond the German coast 
line. From the military point of view (using militaiy in the 
strict Army sense) there was, we may take it, no very special 
advantage m securing Calais. Yet Calais was sought for at 
extravagant cost. Similarly large efforts in Belgium were 
directed to establishing control of a sea front— that is to say 
operations for naval rather than strictly army purposes— the 
obvious objective being the creation of a more extended .sea 
front, and so a corresponding increase di the area to bo 
watched by the British Fleet. 
We can see the advantages of an extended front in our 
own case m the failure of the German submarine blockade 
It IS impossible for the available hostile force to watch more 
than a small fraction of the total area; on the bulk of the 
mileage merchant ships can come and go with impunity. 
With Germany the exact conditions are different; but 
the main principle involved remains the same. So far so 
good But, the mouth of the Scheldt is closed to Geri'nan 
war shipping. The submarines which slie is putting together 
at Hoboken can hardly reach the sea except throu<rh what are 
now neutral Dutch waters. Every really suitable harbour 
•n the coast IS Dutch, not Belgian. The Dutch fieet is insuf- 
tcient to offer any effective resistance in defence of its b^-^es 
and it happens to consist of ships which, being de.signed to 
operate in Dutch and contiguous waters, would be a useful 
reinforcement to Germany if captured. 
To this add facts as they have happened during the last 
rew days Dutch vessels have made their nationality abun- 
dantly clear. Not content with names and nationality 
painted in huge letters on their sides, they have been veritable 
sea picture palaces of Dutch flags and other evidences of 
neutral nationality. The very stupidest of German sub- 
marine captains could not po.ssibly have sunk any Dutch 
vessel " by mistake." Such slaughter of the innocents as has 
taken place viust have been entirely deliberate, entirely in 
the category of " things ordered." 
There is no other possible hypothesis under which this 
matter can be explained. Wherefrom we are driven to assume 
that, for purposes of her own, Germany is bent on driving 
Holland into war, and that a war against her is well inside 
the probabilities, mainly or entirely in order to secure for 
Germany an effective extended North Sea coast lino and bases 
which Belgium, despite Zeebrugge, has been unable to afford. 
Holland — once a great Sea Power — can, however, provide 
them. Not to put too fine a point upon it, Holland is Ger- 
many's best trump in the war by water. By driving Holland 
into the Allied Camp, Germany has everything to gain and 
nothing to lose. Holland is equally useful either as friend or 
foe. But as a neutral she is a hindrance and a nuisance to 
Teutonic schemes. 
Military matters are not my province; but I take it 
that we are in no position to assure Holland much more im- 
munity on land than we were able to afford to Belgium. On 
which account we may yet see the Dutch driven to accept a 
German alliance. If tliey do, we cannot blame them — we can 
only put it down to our lack of military power to back up our 
Sea Power. So far as Sea Power alone is concerned, we may 
safely rely upon it that the British Navy has the possible situa- 
tion well in hand. But, whichever way this particular cat 
jumps, we must remember that Holland is gradually being 
forced into an invidious position, and we shall do well to 
remember that, since Germany is obviously endeavouring to 
force her to side with us, it will probably appear to Dutch 
statesmen that the lesser evil will be to take sides with 
Germany. On the whole, it may be the lesser evil for us also. 
Our main business is to see to it that Germany does not 
extend her sea front. The rest— pregnant as it may seem— is 
a matter of relatively small importance. In the coming sub- 
marine warfare every extra mile of coast that can be utilised 
will have a value far above anything that could have been con- 
ceived of in the old days, when warships operated in consider- 
able groups and were always easily located. With submariucs 
the groups are much sm.aller, and single action is not un- 
common, while location is very difficult. Equally difficult will 
shutting them in be, a very high numerical preponderance of 
blockaders being essential to any success. 
One way and another^ it looks as though future North 
Sea operations are going to be coastal affairs, having for their 
prime objective the curtailment of hostile bases, as opposed to 
the old idea of endeavouring to entice the enemy out and then 
fight him on the open sea. 
Of course, there never was a time when it was not 
recognised that, given the dc-struclion of the base, the sequel 
would ba the anniJiilation of the fleet operating from it ; but 
co-incident with this, there was ever the fortification of bases 
to an extent which more or less rendered them imprpcrnable 
to ordinary warship attack. Bases have been captured by in- 
vestment from the land side, as in the case of Port Arthur 
but such operalions are necessarily very lengthy, and they 
are not possible in many cases. 
Submarines, however, from their ability to use extem- 
porised bases, will, of neces.sity, force the pace and render it 
more and more imperative for us to curtail in every possible 
way Germany's access to the North Sea. On that, more than 
anything else, the main issue depends. 
THE B.\LTIC. 
Considerable importance may be attached to the Swedish 
report that a large German fleet has been seen in the Abo 
direction. If there bo any truth whatever in the report ("and 
It has a circumstantial sound) it would look as though the 
pressure of Russian sea power in the Baltic has made itself 
telt, and tliat Germany has seriously embarked upon an 
attempt to destroy the enemy at her '•■ back door " 
Such an attempt would naturally be made in very con- 
siderable force, for the Russian Fleet has lately been added to 
by the completio^i of some or all of the Dreadnoughts of the 
Gangoot c ass. Equally naturally, there will be nothing for 
%l'cIZ ri'f ^"' \° '"'''' ^° ^^°^"" P'-'^'^^^^e^ '^a.e where 
the Germans will have to contain them— an operation not to 
be carried out without depleting the High Sea Fleet of some o5 
Its best capital ships-half a dozen at the very lea«fc 
The alternative is to allow the Baltic to become a Russian 
ake, with the n,ore or less total cutting off of all such supplTe, 
from Scandinavia as at present reach Germany ^''l-P^'e' 
For the Russians to attempt any fleet action a-ainst odds 
IS quite unnecessary: they can accomplish more by"ompe'lS' 
10* • ' ' 
