April 24, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
tiie Gernians to contain tliem, the containing force being 
•ubjected to the perpetual menace of submarine and destroyer 
attack at a considerable distance from any satisfactory base. 
It has to be remembered in this connection that all the 
tnain development of German bases during the last few years 
has been on the North Sea front. Even Kiel has sunk con- 
iiderably in importance during the last few years, while 
Danzig has vegetated for years. Its status is about equal to 
that of our dockyard at Pembroke, less the fine anchorage 
which MiJford Haven aifords. Kiel is, or was, the Portsmouth 
of Germany, but from Kiel to the retiring places of the 
Russian Fleet is a far cry. Swinemund is to all intents and 
purposes an open roadstead, and the German Baltic Coast 
offers nothing to be compared with the bases and estuaries 
which are available for our Grand Fleet. 
Admiral Jellicoe's task is hard enough, but it is child's 
play to the task of the Germans if they seriously attempt to 
bottle the Russians, and if the attempt be made, it means the 
virtual withdrawal of all such menace as the High Sea Fleet 
may have represented where we are concerned. It means that 
Germany, compelled to assert the mastery of the Baltic, is 
giving up all ideas of contesting the sovereignty of the North 
Sea, at any rate so far as big ships are concerned. 
Very early in the war, in one of the early issues of these 
Notes, I ventured to prophesy that the Baltic might very 
probably become the keynote of tlie major naval operations 
owing to the fact that Russia possessed a " fleet in being " 
which had been underestimated in German calculations, and 
which Germany dared not ignore any longer. 
All the present indications are to the effect that, numeric- 
ally small though the Russian Fleet is, it is yet sufficiently 
powerful to constitute a very serious strategical menace in 
Germany's rear. 
Feints are, of course, no mora uncommon in sea strategy 
than on land. But allowing for all possibilities in that 
direction, the probabilities at present all point to the Baltic 
as the scene of future big ship activities, leaving the North 
Sea to submarine and coastal craft operations, plus, perhaps, 
a determined effort on the part of the German battle cruisers 
to get on to our trade routes. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
The vague reports which come from here emanate chiefly 
from Turkish sources, and so need not be too fully relied upon. 
For what they are worth they indicate that progress, if any, 
is very slow. 
That the forts are capable of giving a very good account 
of themselves now seems clearly established; and every day 
will see improvements effected. How much real damage 
they can inflict is a matter of speculation. Danger would be 
not so much from direct fire as from high-angle guns and 
howitzers, the projectiles from which, falling on the decks, 
■re liable to go right down through if sufficiently heavy. 
The 11-inch howitzers employed by the Japanese at Port 
Arthur on several occasions penetrated the armour decks of 
the Russian battleships and made their exits through the 
bottoms. The damage thus done was altogether out of pro- 
portion to anything inflicted on the same fleet by ordinary 
gunfire, which ships are normally constructed to resist. 
Apparently the Turks are fairly well supplied with 
howitzers, and the Germans have taught them the art of 
keeping these concealed till the psychological moment. Evi- 
dence as to this is that at long range the enemy has never 
•ucceeded in doing any damage; all the mischief having been 
done when the ships have closed in to finish off forts which 
have appeared to be more or less out of action. All this 
damage is suggestive of howitzers, which on account of their 
high trajectory are relatively speaking too short-ranged to be 
available for anything of the nature of long bowls fighting. 
For the rest, we have had the misfortune to lose sub- 
marine E15, and as a set-off a Turkish torpedo-boat has been 
destroyed in the JEgean. 
As regards the first, E15 ran asshore, and the majority of 
her crew were taken prisoners by the Turks. As some loss of 
life occurred the presumption is that she was under fire before 
or after her wreck — more probably before, though the currents 
in the Dardanelles are bad enough to acconnt for anything 
unaided. 
The Turkish torpedo-boat accounted for attacked the 
tran.<;port Manitov, which had British troops on board. She 
was subsequently chased by the Minerva and destroyers, and 
driven ashore. 
AFTERMATH OF THE COMMERCE WAR. 
Apparently there was fome fire to the fmoke of the 
German protest that the Drf^den was E'^nk in neutral waters, 
a« the circumstance has now been the subject of a practically 
unqualified apology to the Chilean Government from Sir 
Edward Grey. I say " practically unqualified," because care 
is taken to point out that the British Government is stOl not in 
possession of the full facts. 
We may expect to see a good deal of spurious capital 
made out of the circumstance by the Germans, who are great 
sticklers for the letter of the law when any advantage is to be 
secured therefrom for themselves. 
As a matter of fact, however, if ever International Law 
were a dead letter, and if ever circumstances justified cases 
even from the legal standpoint, this incident of the Dresden 
is a case in point. 
Although all the facts as to the Dresden are still un- 
known, we have ample evidence that Chilean neutrality has 
in the past been persistently outraged by Germany, and so 
far as can be gathered the island of Juan Fernandez was to 
all intents and purposes a German base — a base, too, not 
made use of owing to the exigencies of the naval war, but 
apparently arranged for long ago. Indeed, in some quarters 
it has been argued that Juan Fernandez is no more Chilean 
than Kiao-Chau was Chinese, on the grounds that the 
Chilean Government had leased it to a German. This argu- 
ment is not on the face of it correct; because the Kiao-Chau 
lease was a Government affair, whereas the lessee of Juan Fer- 
nandez was, or purported to be, a private German subject 
interested in Robinson Crusoe's Island. 
But — unless my memory deceives me — it was airily put 
forward by the late Admiral von Spee as a reply to questions 
raised as to his abuse of Chilean neutrality. Along these 
lines Germany at any rate has no case — she cannot expect to 
have things both ways. 
The Chilean Government was inevitably placed in a very 
awkward position. Juan Fernandez is the other end of no- 
where, unconnected with the mainland by cable, and with a 
Chilean governor in no position to assert his neutrality — even 
assuming Chilean sovereignty to be undenied. There were 
no means of interning the Dresden, and so far there is not 
the remotest proof that she ever intended to intern herself, 
except, perhaps, as a temporary measure. 
Consequently, for our cruisers to have acted other than 
they did would have been rank folly. 
International Law is really International Custom rather 
than Law. It was Captain Marryat who long ago described 
an armed neutrality as " generally meaning a charge of 
bayonets" — an apt illustration of the position of a strong 
neutral. A weak neutral, on the other hand, is compelled to 
trust to the observance of custom, and the Chileans were thus 
very much placed between the devil and the deep sea. They 
had no means of enforcing neutrality with a " charge of 
bayonets " while von Spee commanded the victorious fleet in 
being, and it is to say the least of it wildly improbable that 
the captain of the Dresden informed the Governor of Juan 
Fernandez of the circumstance that von Spee had ceased to 
exist. 
From every point of view, therefore, the action of the 
British cruisers in destroying the Dresden was logical and 
justifiable, while Sir Edward Grey's apology to the Chilean 
Government was at once dignified and diplomatic. 
Finally, it may be worth while drawing attention to the 
extraordinarily small amount of friction with neutrals which 
our war against the German corsairs has produced. In one 
way and another every weak neutral has been fully exploited 
by Germany, and it is to the lasting credit of our Government 
and our Navy — the latter especially — tihat this fact has been 
recognised, and that no neutral has ever had cause to complain 
that we have misused our naval power to sacrifice a neutral to 
our own ends. By this prodecure we have at times, perhaps, 
lost certain small advantages; but the circumstance should 
stand well to our credit in the peaceful, but fierce, trade com- 
petition war which will follow the cessation of hostilities. If 
we have shown that we do not hesitate to disregard neutrality 
where the enemy has previously done the same thing, we have 
none the less consistently indicated the possession of a sense of 
justice which should ever be remembered in our favour. 
We very much regret that, owing to indis- 
position. Colonel Maude has been unable this week 
to contribute his usual article on Tactics and 
Strategy. The large circulation of Land and 
Water compels us to go to jyress with the cover 
and advertisement pages some days before publica- 
tion; as a result Colonel Maude's name was printed 
on the cover before the news of his indisposition 
reached us. — Editor. 
11* 
