LAND AND .WATER 
May 8, 1915. 
there is no iletermining the thing at all until 
further news is ••K-eived, only awaiting that news 
we must be careful not to belittle too much the 
enemy's claim. He h.as done something certainly 
unexpected, certainly of considerable moment, 
though not, so far as we now know, either decisive 
or upon the scale which his rumour warrants. 
THE PROBLEM OF THE DARDA- 
NELLES. 
In order to understand what has happened in 
the Dardanelles we must iirst of all seize the heart 
of the problem, which is the mastery of the 
Narrows. 
There is indeed nmch else besides this capital 
matter. 
of the Narrows, may on occasion go as fast as four 
knots and runs upon an average at two. 
The large permanent works all stand round 
about the two sides, the European and Asiatic, of 
the Narrows, round the two projecting capes, 
that upon the Euro}>ean side at E being known as 
Kilidbahr and that on the Asiatic side as the town 
of Chanak at F. The projecting tongue of land 
covering all the European side of the Straits is 
known as the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Its 
narrowest point is at the Isthmus of Bulair. 
This tongue of land has certain features, 
vv^hich it is important to note carefully if we are 
to grasp the main problem. 
I will tabulate them in their order. 
(1) It is, topographically, a somewhat con- 
fused tangle of hills which commonly rise to sum- 
The enemy can establish temporary batteries ; 
he can, as we know from past and unfortunate 
experience, devise unexpected forms of attack 
against the ships advancing along the waterway. 
But the pith of the whole affair is the mastery 
of the Narrows, because there, within a compara- 
tively small area, are established the permanent 
works and the large guns which make the action 
of the fleet so difficult. 
It is true that torpedo tubes under water and 
floating mines and, as I have said, the temporary 
batteries could molest the fleet even if the per- 
manent works were destroyed, but supposing these 
works to be destroyed, the resistance of temporary 
forms of offence could not last very long. If the 
Expeditionary Force obtains possession of the 
Narrows it will be able to clear both banks of any 
such temporary weapons of offence, and the fleet 
will be able to go through. 
Now, the Dardanelles as a whole run after 
the fashion apparent in the accompanying sketch. 
Our readers are already familiar with the main 
features. In a 30 miles stretch of water aver- 
aging, say, 2 to 4 miles across, there is a gut at C 
a mile across at its narrowest or southern end (a) 
and a little more than a mile across at its northern 
end (b), which is the centre of resistance to any 
hostile passage up the straits. From the straits, 
running from North to South in the direction of 
jthe arrow, runs a stream which, just at the strain 
mits of 3, 4, 5, and 600 feet, but which in one long 
stretch coming steep on to the Gulf of Saros touch 
at one point, H, over 1,300 feet. It is therefore a 
country very well situated for the erection of tem- 
porary defences and possessed of a number of 
natural positions for defence. 
(2) Its water supply is ample — at any rate, 
at this season of the year. A number of little 
streams run in between the confused series of 
ridges and summits. Nothing, therefore, is to be 
feared by an invading force upon that score. 
(3) Its communications by land are very, 
poor. One fairly good road runs down as far as 
Gallipoli itself from the North. After that there 
is only, running southwards towards Maidos, a 
road which bifurcates into two, one running more 
easterly than the other. Both branches are bad, 
the eastern, nearest the Straits, being roughly 
paved only. 
On from Maidos to the lighthouse at Sedd el- 
bahr there is a somewhat better road, which bulges 
out towards the west through Krithia (K) in order 
to avoid the high plateau of the Pasha Dagh, or 
hill of KUidbahr. 
Unless some temporary line has been laid in 
all these months of warning, some rough light raO- 
way or other, by the Germans, there is no artificial 
means of communication, and even petrol traffic 
would have a very rough time south of Gallipoli. 
There are numerous tracks up and down thai 
peninsula, but they are tracks and no more. 
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