May 8, 1915. 
LAND iND 5KATEE. 
The gist of all this point upon the communi- 
cations is that unless the enemy has already estab- 
lished a considerable railway within the hills of 
the peninsula, apart from that which is near the 
permanent works of the Narrows, he will not be 
able to bring up a reinforcement of this sort 
quickly, not can he easily feed very large numbers 
of men. In other words, we are fighting an artil- 
lery already present and not one which can be 
rapidly increased. 
(4) Till some way past the Narrows the Euro- 
pean side dominates the Asiatic side. There- 
fore, it is enough for a force to be completely 
master of the Gallipoli Peninsula and it can 
ensure the retirement, at last, of an enemy from the 
opposing shore. 
(5) The landing-places upon the peninsula 
from the open sea are lew and have to be carefully 
chosen, and this is particularly the case with 
regard to the southern end, where most of the 
coast is steep to the water and rocky. 
There is here but one really good landing- 
?lace of considerable extent, which is Morto Bay. 
'his lies at a ran^e of 5,000 yards opposite the 
Asiatic mouth of the Dardanelles, the Cape Kum 
Kale, and therefore is under the fire of small 
mobile artillery from that point, which must be 
occupied before a landing at Morto Bay can be 
effected. 
AU along the inner side of the peninsula, be- 
tween the Narrows and the mouth of the Dardan- 
elles, are hills falling quite steep down into the 
water in a line of bluffs and sharp slopes-^ 
broken only by three or four valleys of water- 
courses. 
On the side of the open sea or Gulf of Saros 
there is a little more chance of landing, because the 
hills fall for the main part less steeply down to the 
water : but everywhere a landing force finds a de- 
fensive position immediately in front of it. No- 
where is this the case more than at the extreme 
point of the peninsula at M N, where therp is a 
rocky little natural position between 100 and 200 
feet in height, running right across, and this must 
be forced or turned before the landing party 
occupies the extreme of the tongue of land. 
The particular problem of attacking the 
Narrows thus can be judged upon a smaller area. 
If we take the above sketch we shall have before us 
all that is essential to our judgment. 
The first thing to be noted in this area is the 
presence of two main defensive positions for the 
defence of the Narrows against any force 
approaching from the open sea and from the 
south. These two positions, of which I have very 
roughly indicated the contours in the accompany- 
ing sketch (the exact contours are only known to 
those who possess confidential information), may 
be called the positions of Atchi Baba and the posi- 
tions of Soghan Dere. I have expressed the first 
by a line marked A B, the second by a line marked 
CD. A landing having been effected upon the 
point of the peninsula, and the British force so 
landed advancing towards the Narrows in the 
direction of the arrow (1) will necessarily stand 
first well dug in along the Atchi Baba position A 
B. The slopes leading away from this position 
towards the point of the Gallipoli Pensinsula are 
easy. They form a sort of glacis with an excellent 
field of fire, but they are not escarped. At K, the 
village of Krithia upon the only road (the one 
which goes round the hills to Maidos), we have the 
principal concentration at this moment of the 
allied troops, and they will attempt with the heavy 
pieces at their disposal for bombardment and with 
the numbers at their disposal for storming to carry 
this first defensive position A B before what will 
presumably be the heaviest part of the work, that 
against the line C D, can be attempted. 
.Whether this bombardment and storming will 
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