LAND AND .WATER. 
May 8. 1915. 
be successfully accomplished or no, only the future 
can show, but that must necessarily be the first 
step in the operations. 
It may bo asked why the co-operation of the 
fleet cannot determine the issue — the ranges are 
comparatively short (the whole peninsula along the 
line A B is only a little over 4 miles across)— and 
.why tho Turkish line cannot be taken in reverse, 
ffhe reply to this lies in the conformation of the 
land towards the ^gean at the A end of the A B 
line. There the land goes so steep down on to the 
Bea that ships have to lie far out in order to have 
any effect upon the Turkish lines above. 
It is none the less true that their co-operation 
wiU have a certain weight at this end, and may 
help so to weaken the defensive as to permit the 
storming of the line. 
Let us grant this first position A B to have 
fallen — which it has not yet done. There remains 
the much more formidable position of the Soghan 
3Dere, which may also be called, from the big hill 
round which it is grouped, the position of the 
tPasha Dagh. 
The Pasha Dagh is a plateau with very steep 
iescarpments upon the west, and possessing a 
southern outlier, also with very steep escarpments, 
wluch overlooks the valley of the stream Soghan 
Dere and the village of Maghram (M). These 
escarpments, at the southern or C end of the bent 
line C D, run to about 600 feet in height, at least 
their chief summits are of that elevation. 
The slope is about that of one of our chalk 
escarpments at home, like that of the Cotswolds, 
for instance, above the Severn Valley, or that of 
the Surrey Hills upon their southern side. 
The position is thus a formidable one. And 
even if A B is carried, C D may give the Expedi- 
tionary Force a task greater than it can perform. 
Meanwhile, with command of the sea, there is 
still the possibility of the last and stronger line 
C D being turned. For this to occur it will be 
necessary for a separate force of the Allies to 
advance successfully towards Maidos (along the 
arrow 2). 
The British have already landed a force at E 
(Gaba Tepe), which occupies an entrenched posi- 
tion upon the flat of the seashore, and will be ready 
to co-operate against the northern or right flank 
of the entrenched Turkish position C D when 
occasion serves. 
But it cannot move, of course, until the pres- 
sure upon the enemy from the south becomes very 
serious. For the forces are too evenly matched to 
permit of a comparatively small and isolated de- 
tachment risking itself until the enemy is engaged 
heavily as a whole. 
When that engagement takes place, however, 
it would seem certain that an advance from E 
towards Maidos will be undertaken. The country 
between the two is easy. The advance can be sup- 
ported by fire from the sea (the whole distance 
across the peninsula from the open sea to Maidos 
being not much more than 8,000 yards range) and 
the road between the open sea and the Straits rises 
not much more than a hundred feet. 
If the Expeditionary Force should succeed 
not only in storming the first defensive Hue, the 
Atchi Baba line A B, but also in breaking the 
second defensive line C D and establishing itself 
upon the Pasha Dagh, then the permanent works 
in the Narrows would be at its mercy, and that 
for the following reasons. 
(a) It would have swept free of concealed 
a* 
batteries and submarine torpedo tubes (if such 
have been established) all the shore of the Dar- 
danelles up to the Narrow's. 
(b) It would be in possession of the domi- 
nating heights upon the European side, which 
would at the worst keep down the fire of, and at 
the best completely clear, the Asiatic shore. 
(c) It would have the permanent works on 
either side of the Narrows at its mercy, and this 
particularly from the fact that the Expeditionary 
Force has at its disposal very numerous air 
machines, which are a weak point in the enemy's 
equipment. 
Indeed, did the Expeditionary Force succeed 
in setting foot permanently upon the plateau and 
summits of the Pasha Dagh, the main task of this 
difiicult venture would have been accomplished. 
The ships could freely use all the lower Dar- 
danelles up to the Narrows, and the only fear 
would be that of drifting mines. There would be 
no fire from either shore. 
As to what has been actually accomplished of 
this task so far, one can only give the most general 
lines, because the details since more than a week 
ago have not been given us, at least at the moment 
of writing (Tuesday evening), but the following 
points are clear. 
(1) In order to use the little bay marked F 
upon the accompanying sketch (called Morto Bay), 
which is controlled by fire from the point G on the 
Asiatic side (which is the Cape of Kum Kale), the 
latter point had to be occupied. 
The French— only a division of their Colonial 
troops were employed — developed a strong attack 
upon the whole of that ground, which is, by the 
way, the Plain of Troy and the scene of the Iliad. 
This aEtack was a feint, and while they were doing 
it a portion of the force, screened by the attack, 
entrenched themselves on Kum Kale. The forward 
bodies in the Plain of Troy then retired, remaining 
in occupation only of the extreme point G, from 
which the opposite bay F is threatened. 
But upon the security of this bay depended 
the landing of the Expeditionary Force on the 
extreme of the Gallipoli Peninsula, because there 
lay, as we have remarked, a good defensive posi- 
tion along the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula below 
the point where I have marked the double line 
MN. 
With the landing of the bay thus covered, this 
defensive position was turned and the invading 
force could advance up the main road to Krithia 
at K, where apparently it lies at the moment of 
writing. 
A further advance along the Asiatic shore 
would be quite useless and will presumably not be 
attempted, and all that we have to watch is the 
progress and, let us hope, the success of the assault 
upon the first enemy position of Atchibaba, A B. 
It should be said in closing this department 
of our subject that the Turkish communique with 
regard to all this piece of fighting have been very 
unreliable and that the German conclusions 
drawn therefrom are certainly too optimistic. 
The task is an exceedingly difficult one, it 
may well end in failure, but it has not so far pro- 
ceeded upon the fantastic lines indicated from 
Berlin ; and the critics of the campaign in the Ger- 
man Press, whose opinions have been quoted, are 
altogether too confident of the result — or, rather, 
altogether misread the extent of the progress al- 
ready achieved. 
It is further necessary to reiterate the verj 
