May 8, 1915. 
LAiN J) AM D W A 1 Eit, 
elementary point which was as true of tLi i ■' 
attack that failed two months ago as it is now : 
the ultimate success of the Allies will depend 
more than anything else upon the number and 
calibre of their heavy pieces — that is, of their 
siege train. If both are sufficient they will suc- 
ceed; if insufficient they will fail. For both the 
preparation of the attack upon the two main 
positions, and — given both attacks to be suc- 
cessful — the reduction of the permanent works 
of the Narrows will depend upon the big gun 
and the big howitzer. 
THE HINDENBERG METHOD IN 
THE WEST. 
The fact that Field-Marshal von Hinden- 
berg was present in the West, during the recent 
violent attack upon and failure against the 
junction of the British and French lines north 
of Ypres, might seem to indicate, to the student 
of this war, the appearance in the fighting in 
Flanders of certain features with which that 
name has made us familiar in the East. 
It is not well to exaggerate the effect of any 
one man in general operations of this kind. The 
commanders of the German armies in front of 
Dixmude, Ypres, and Armentiferes will retain 
to the full their responsibilities and know the 
war in this quarter after so many months in a 
fashion forbidden to von Hindenberg, even if 
that aged and successful General be put 
directly over them. That he has thus been put 
in direct command is doubtful enough. It is 
more likely that he was sent into this field 
merely for the effect that his name might pro- 
duce, and that he did no more than inspect. 
But let us take the point for what it is 
■worth, and ask ourselves what the method of 
this Commander has been in the East. 
It will not lead us to the expectation of any 
startling novelties upon the Belgian front. 
Von Hindenberg' s point was a careful 
Btudy of the Masurian Lake region upon the 
Bouthern and eastern boundaries of East 
Prussia. Using his local knowledge, not to say 
his hobby, in the early part of the war, he did 
achieve a very striking success against the 
Russians at Tannenberg. He enveloped with a 
force, possibly inferior, certainly not largely 
superior, the Russian Army of invasion and 
nearly destroyed two of its army corps out of 
five — thoroughly defeating the whole 
Since that success he has had in the eyes of 
the civilian German nation a label attached to 
him which the German Government has used 
for all it was worth. His name alone heartens 
Berlin— and, for that matter, the rank and file 
of the troops — whenever it is mentioned ; and 
therefore the presence of von Hindenberg is 
expected to work a miracle. 
But all that has nothing to do with either 
strategy or tactics, and what this Commander 
has done in point of fact since his local and 
very striking success for his country on the 
Masurian Lakes, has not perceptibly differed 
from the action which we can predicate of any 
Prussian General officer acting anywhere. 
He has massed men with successful 
secrecy. He has used them, once concentrated, 
in the battering ram fashion. He h ^^ ^^ raoidlv 
pendent always upon the tactical tiv ^ ^ . ^ 
his service, with its enormous wasta-:,':'- . „ 
he has failed. His use of the railway sybtl ^. 
behind him in the East was nothing eithei 
original or unexpected, and if he has any say 
in what is going on, or to go on in the immedi- 
ate future in the West, he certainly does not 
mean enveloping movements such as those 
which he practised in the East, because in the 
West those are not possible. It means no more 
than what we have already seen, unexjjectedly 
rapid concentration, an unexpectedly heavj'^ 
blow (delivered at enormous expense) upon a 
selected point and hitherto, on the Bzura, at 
Przasnych, the checking of that blow before it 
has had any definite effect. 
There is no other feature in the Western 
fighting worth new comment tnio weok, unless 
it be the dropping of bombs upon Dunkirk. 
That piece of futility will stand in the history 
of this war in the same category with fifty 
others. There is nothing remarkable in dis- 
charging a large missile over the trajectory in- 
volved. Anyone can work out a ballistic for- 
mula of initial velocity, air resistance, and 
the rest, and discover what gun it is, with what 
charge, and what elevation, that would drop 
a missile, of what weight, at what range, 
and everybody knows that any gun such 
as there are many hundreds of in the modern 
world, can fire a missile from behind Dixmude 
or behind Nieuport which would fall some- 
where within the large area of Dunkirk. 
What you cannot do at those ranges is to 
take useful aim, or to keep your gun safe. All 
you can do is to drop a missile within some 
rather large area and trust to Providence for 
the result. And meanwhile yovi must emplace 
your gun in some immobile fashion which 
renders it liable to discovery and to destruc- 
tion. If anyone asks what object the enemy 
had in view when he thus dropped shells into 
Dunkirk at a maximum range and without 
aiming, the answer is simple enough. Ho was 
after moral effect. It is exactly what he did" 
when he dropped bombs on Scarborough or 
when he dropped them the other day on Nancy, 
or when he dropped them on two occasions 
upon Paris. It is a perfectly legitimate method 
of warfare, as is the Chinese method (now 
abandoned) of imitating the cries of wild beasts. 
In attempting these "moral" effects, all you 
have to do is to gauge three things. The ex- 
pense to yourself, the intelligence of the enemy, 
and the nei-ves of your enemy. Upon the first 
of these three things an accurate calculation 
can be made ; to the two others no exact calcu- 
lation applies. It is a matter of judgment, and 
perhaps of a sense of humour. 
At any rate, the bombardment of Dunkirk, 
while imperilling three German heavy guns 
(probably naval) will have as much effect 
upon the war as though the shells had been 
sent out to sea 
One last point in the news of the week, the 
raid into the Baltic provinces of Russia, I shall 
deal with later, if, as is not probable, it comes to 
anything considerable. So far it is mainly, 
cavalry work, it has no effect upon the mam 
dispositions of the campaign, and its fruit is 
yet to be discovered. It is probably an isolated 
effort 
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