LAND AND WATER. May 8. 1915. 
must be palled, sailed, or towed in proper order to must continue to be, in a niilitarv sense, the Army's 
the section of beach which each unit is designated base. It is probable, indeed, that the troops will 
to attack. As a staff operation, the organisation of be dependent on the ships and transports for liter- 
boat work on this scale is a noteworthy perform- ally everything. It is doubtful, for instance, if 
ance. As a feat of seamanship, the effective land- they could even find water enough anywhere in the 
ing, as near simultaneously as possible, of such peninsula, and this state of dependence must con- 
hirgc forces and in six different places is quite un- tinue long after the whole of it is conquered. And 
precedentcd. And the boat work would not be the Fleet must do more than this. The immediate 
limited to a single expedition for each boat. There objective of the expedition is the opening up of 
obviously couldnot have been boats or rafts enough the Dardanelles — in other words, the subjection 
—nor, for that matter, beach enough — to land of the forts on both sides of this historic water v/ay. 
more than a fraction of the expeditionary force at The taking of forts is a military, and not a naval, 
any one time. So fast as boats were emptied, steam operation. By this I mean that a properly 
piiuiaces, destroyers, and other craft would have equipped army can subdue and take any fort in 
U>wod them back to the transports for fresh loads, the world in time, while no navy, however well 
But theNav)''s duties were not ended when it equipped it may be, can, without an army, take 
had dclivored the Army safely at the beach. It and subdue forts at all, unless it carries so many 
would have to maintain an offensive of the utmost men as to be, in fact, a navy and an army too. In 
intensity on every enemy force within reach, so the taking of the Dardanelles the function of the 
Eis to reduce hostile attack on the disembarked in- ships will be to do for Sir Ian Hamilton's army 
fantry to a minimum. Wlien one looks at the what the 17-inch howitzers did for the German 
largest available charts of the waters round the army in the taking of Liege, Maubeuge, and Ant- 
Gallipoli Peninsula, one is not surprised that the werp. The ships on the spot actually carry the 
Admiral in Command reports that the Fleet is greatest number of powerful guns ever brought 
filled with an intense admiration for the achieve- into use in any military operation. In range, in 
ments of their military comrades. For, as far as numbers, and in mobility they surpass any artil- 
one can see, almost the whole of the northern coast lery force that could conceivably be used from land 
of the peninsula is continuous cliffs. The five positions. The ships' batteries include at least 
separate beaches m.entioned in the official state- fifty of the most powerful pieces, running from 
ment would appear at best to be exceedingly con- Qneen Elizabeth's eight 15-inch (which in a single 
fined spaces, the defence of which by well-placed salvo can hurl — to an incredible distance — -no less 
infantry, machine guns, artillery, and wire should than sixteen tons of high explosive shell) to 
not have been difficult. That a whole army has Trimwph and Swiftsure's four 10-inch. There 
been landed with success on such unpromising are besides these Agamemnon and Lord Nelson's 
ground is undoubtedly a thing of which that Army broadsides of ten 9.2's, Triumph and Stoiftsure's 
may be prouA It suggests a repetition of Wolfe's fourteen 7.5's, and probably at least fifty 6-inch 
adventure on the Heights of Abraham, but on an guns as well. This vast battery can be employed 
incredible scale. And we may be sure that had the at long or short range. It can be moved up the 
work of the Navy been carried out with anything Straits as fast as forts are subdued, mines cleared, 
tbort of perfection the thing would have been not and torpedo stations destroyed. It will be the 
only costly — it had to be that — but impossible. first function of the Army to facilitate the use of 
By far the most difficult of all operations on these guns by helping to ensure the accuracy of 
a coast of this character is the landing of artillery the ships' fire. The Army's own artillery will 
and horses. It is a thing that puts the resource- b^ve the important function of taking the forts 
fulness of seamen to the hardest test. No mention ^^ reverse and, as far as possible, preventing the 
at all is made in the official report of artillery being enemy from returning to the forts when driven out 
used in the first five days'" fighting, but the corre- ^7 the ships' fire. Finally, by occupying and de- 
spondents from Athens and elsewhere assert that stroying the battered forts, the Army will open the 
the guns were landed and employed by the ^^^7 for the Fleet to enter the Sea of Marmora. 
Australians and New Zealanders in their advance A^^ this is the objective of the expedition, because 
from Sari Bahr. But that the attack on Sedd-el- i^ ^^If of them get through uninjured, and the 
Bahr made on the afternoon of the 25th was made Army is able to prevent the enemy from closing the 
through undamaged wire entanglements would Straits behind them, the fate of Turkey will be 
seem to show — first, that by the evening of the 25th sealed, 
no sufficient artillery for destroying these obstacles 
were available at Cape Teke; and secondly, that THE ARTILLERY PROBLEM, 
the lines defended by them were not exposed to ^^m^^^^ta, 
tlffF^^' ordnance. The artillery we may per- This is an exceedingly attractive programme, 
haps take It, was not landed until the subsequent but it is as weU to remember that, vast as is the 
days. The official report spealcs of its disembarka- artillery force engaged, the difficulties to be sur- 
pS^'c ^ r^' ^' ^fu^ co»^z^«^6? on the 28th and mounted in using it with effect are enormous also. 
29th, so that some of the guns may therefore, have That using guns at long range against a ship 
feqfh th. Z^t ? f ? ^""a f.f- ^^^f^' ^^ P^^^^^^ P^^bk"^^ ^f ^ ^^^ ^'^^^7 different from 
the 29th, the whole of the end of the peninsula was using them against land positions is already a 
TnTN^^fy^J'^tT'^'i^^^^^^ ^^"^^^^^^ '"^'^ It i« ^^'^ difficult to keep^thl 
mi^tTth^Tl^lTf^ A^ l^r^ position ten range of a ship when you have found it, bSause 
mues to the north, at the end of the gap in the hills the ship is free to move at any speed it Ukes and 
that runs through to Maidos from the Gulf of in any Sirection ; but it is more dSlt to ^ t^e 
range of a fort, because, first, it is an object far less 
ly 
