L, A iM U A JN U ,W, A 1 .h li , 
May o, iaio. 
A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE. 
THE GREAT OPPORTUNITY. 
By L, BLIN DESBLEDS. 
No one will, to-day, deny the invaluable services 
rendered by the aeroplane since the opening of 
hostilities. Yet, when the war broke out, there 
were numerous persons — and among tliem high 
military authorities — who were unable to fore- 
see the great part airLUuft were gcing to perform. In spite 
of the accumulated evidence pointing to the great importance 
of the aeroplane for offensive purposes and showing in what 
manner this weapon must be used if it is to be of real value, 
there is as yet no sign of its being employed as it ought to be. 
It can be afTirmed that the aercplana is a sufficiently 
powerful weapon to force the German Fleet to come out into 
the open sea, at our bidding, to accept combat with our 
Fleet, or to be destroyed in tlie seclusion of its harbours and 
under the very nose of their guns and in spite of the protec- 
tion of their forts. The expert knows that there is in the 
aeroplane a potentiality, capable of immediate application, 
whereby the fifteen odd railway bridges on the Ehine could 
be destroyed in the course of a few hours, and thereby cut 
the German Army in the Western field of operations from 
rapid communication with Germany. But no advantage has 
yet been taken of this knowledge. 
People are discussing whether the advent of aircraft in 
military and naval operations has, to any considerable degree, 
modified the principles of war; and it is the general opinion 
that aeroplanes and airships have not revolutionised warfare. 
But why have they not done so? Simply because we have 
not permitted it. And tliis can be proved as clearly as a 
proposition of Euclid. 
If a Commander-in-Chief had some means at his dis- 
posal by which he could prevent the enemy from using their 
guns and their rifles, all along the line, from the North Sea 
to Alsace, would not that method be considered revolutionary ? 
If you could prevent the enemy from using their weapons by 
the employment of your aircraft, would you not consider that 
your air fleets have revolutionised your ordinary, tedious, 
long, and costly methods of carrying on war? If, therefore, 
it can be shown that aircraft can render the enemy's guns 
and rifles valueless to them, it must also be admitted that 
aircraft are capable of revolutionising the present methods 
of warfare. 
It is estimated that, every ten minutes, a military train, 
carrying reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies, passes 
over each of the fifteen principal railway bridges over the 
Rhino. This means that 144 train-loads of ammunition, sup- 
plies, or reinforcements passes over each of the bridges in 
twenty-four hours, or that it requires 2,140 train-loads a day 
to keep the German Army operating in the Western field pro- 
vided with war material. To keep the German Army well 
supplied it is necessary that these 2,140 trains should cross 
the Bhine every day, and on the regular running of these 
2,140 trains the German Army in the Western theatre of war 
depends. 
It is computed that the German Army in Belgium and in 
the North of France has ammunition and supplies sufficient 
for four dap only. If, therefore, you suddenly prevent the 
2,140 trains from crossing the Rhine the German Army will, 
even after twenty-four hours, find itself in a very serious 
predicament indeed. If only a third of the number of 
trains crossing the Rhine — that is, 714 trains — were continu- 
ously stopped from running for a few days, the German 
Western Army would find itself considerably handicapped as 
regards arms, ammunition, reinforcement, supplies, &c. 
Can aeroplanes be used to hamper, to any considerable 
degree, the German railway traffic to the extent of preventing 
some 700 trains from daily crossing the Rhine? This 
question the writer proposes to examine. 
We have read lately, both in the reports is.sued by Sir John 
French and by the French War Office, that the Allies' air- 
men have been busy destroying a number of railway junctions 
some little distance behind the enemy's trenches. That this 
could be done the writer had shown in one of his previous 
articles*, and in it he has also foreseen the reason why the 
recent aerial offensive of the Allies' airmen against the 
railway junctions behind the enemy's trenches has not been 
followed by direct permanent results. This kind of aerial 
attack on railways is, however, of a quite different character 
14* 
and carried out with a quite different object from the aerial 
offensive we are now considering. 
The recent aerial offensive against railway junctions had 
for its object the hampering of the distribution of men, 
supplies, ammunition, &c., in the theatre of war, whilst the 
aerial offensive now under consideration would be to prevent 
reinforcements, ammunition, supplies, &.C., from ever reach- 
ing that theatre. The first kind of offensive aims at the 
destruction of nodal points on the railway system almost 
immediately behind the enemy's lines, whilst the object of 
the second is to prevent trains from passing from Germany 
into Belgium or France. 
To be successful this second kind of aerial offensiva 
against railways should result in a simultaneous and pro- 
longed intarruption or in repeated interruptions on all, or 
some, of the lines from Germany into Belgium or France. 
It is clear that a single aeroplane or a small number of 
flying-machines, of the existing types, cannot produce any 
permanent destruction of railway engineering works such 
as bridges, culverts, &c. Besides, it is very probable that 
such works are protected against possible aerial raids. This 
would force aircraft to fly over them at a great altitude, and 
one would hardly expect that, dropped from a height of 
7,000 to 8,000 feet, the few bombs that could be carried by a 
small number of aeroplanes, destined to a journey of some 
considerable duration and to fly at a great altitude, would 
hit the mark. But if, instead of a few machines, a larga 
number, say 150 or 200, set out to destroy a bridge, the 
chances are that they would succeed. If they did not suc- 
ceed once, they would certainly succeed if the operation wera 
repeated. The necessity, therefore, of employing a large 
number of aeroplanes for offensive operations against railway 
lines from Germany is made apparent. 
Besides attacking the engineering works of the permanen4 
way, aeroplanes operating simultaneously in numbers of 40 
or 50 could also bomb running trains. Such destruction of 
trains would be of especial value if it were performed at 
points where they enter into, or emerge from, tunnels, for, 
in such cases, the aerial attack, if successful, would produce 
considerable delay in the traffic. 
It will thus be seen that aeroplanes on the offensive, pro^ 
vided there be a great number of them, could, without doubt, 
considerably dislocate the railway traffic from Germany into 
France or Belgium. They could do this in three ways:: 
(a) By destroying, or seriously injuring, railway bridges over 
the Rhine ; (b) by attacking running trains, especially as they 
enter, or emerge from, tunnels; (c) by causing damage to 
local stations, junctions, &c. The writer estimates that the 
possession by the Allies of an offensive air fleet, 1,000 aero- 
planes strong, and kept at this strength, would, in a very 
short time, render the maintenance of the German Army in 
tlie Western theatre of war a matter of extreme difficulty, if 
not of impossibility. Add to this the fact that with a dis- 
organised railway traffic the enemy would be unable to 
transfer quickly troops from the Western to the Eastern 
theatre of war, and vice-versa, and that the damage which a 
strong offensive air fleet could do the German arsenals, and 
you will come to the conclusion that a powerful air fleet 
could now not only prevent men, ammunition, and arms from 
being sent to the German front, but could also actually inter- 
fere with the manufacture of those arms and ammunition. 
Just as a large number of machines is necessary for the 
destruction of railway permanent works, so it is indispen- 
sable for the destruction of the enemy's arsenals. In one of 
his previous articles the writer estimated that some 1,000 
aeroplanes were required to destroy for good Krnpp's 
works at Essen, and, after careful investigation, he ex- 
pressed the opinion that that number of machines could be 
produced in Great Britain in the course of about five months 
without in the slightest degree interfering with the estab- 
lished aeronautical industry. He arrived at that number of 
machines as he had calculated that it would require some 70 
tons of explosives to annihilate for ever the great arsenal. 
Now, if aeroplanes could render guns and rifles useless in 
the hands of the enemy through lack of ammunition, is it too 
much to say that they could revolutionise warfare ! 
• " The VerUcal Battle," Land akd Waiib, February 13, 1915^ 
