May 15, 1915. 
LAND AND iSKATEB. 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
MOTE.— This article lias been submitted to tlie Pres* Bureau, wliich doei not object to the publication a« ceosored, and takes no 
respoDsibility (or the correctness of the statemeats. 
In accordance with the requirements ot the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only b* 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE news this week ill repays analysis, 
because while it is of great importance, 
it is not yet definitive. The great Austro- 
German movement in Western Galicia is 
still upon a confused front, and we cannot even 
be quite certain what that front is. 
The French movement north of Arras is in 
full progress at the moment when these notes 
must cease, and beyond the bare statement of the 
official communiques there is no general result to 
determine. 
Of the Dardanelles, perhaps the most impor- 
tant point of all in the campaign at this moment, 
and certainly the most important from the British 
point of view alone, we have been told nothing 
since the landing, or, rather, nothing of a sort 
which enables us to define positions and to analyse 
movements. The last declaration of Lord Crewe 
in the House of Lords upon Tuesday night, just 
before sending this j^aper to press, was no more 
than a reafiirmation of the success of the landing 
and the repelling of the enemy's attacks upon the 
line already formed. 
The German raid into Courland, probably; 
a purely political move, offers no ground for 
analysis either. It is not directed towards anVj 
definite result as yet. Libau is occupied, but with 
what object this cavalry movement (for it is iu 
essence no more than a cavalry movement, though 
supported by a brigade of infantry, probably^ 
dependent upon motor traffic) has been under-< 
taken there has been no sign, and, as I have jusfi' 
said, it probably has no direct military object ati 
all. 
What is of real importance this week, and 
what I shall attempt to go into fully, is the 
orientation of the enemy's energies at this momenfij 
towards a moral effect : his increasing reliance 
upon what he believes will check the intervention 
of neutrals and produce a moral disarray in the 
civilian opinion of the Allies. That is of real 
importance for us to grasp. It connotes a certain 
state of mind in the enemy's higher command 
which is well worth recognising, and it must be 
stated plainly with details before we can grasp 
its full significance. I shall deal briefly, there- 
GENERAL PLAN OF THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIAi 
1* 
