LAND AND WATER 
May 15, 1915. 
of how, in the original crossing of the Dunajec, 
ths Russian field guns failed from lack of ammu- 
nition within forty-eight hours. 
The difficulty of equipment of the Russian 
reserves — which is perhaps the most crucial diffi- 
culty of all — has been in part got over, but the 
munitioning of field guns, as we have seen, and 
particularly of heavy guns in a sufficient quantity, 
IS a problem apparently still unsolved; and it is 
this which lends its gravity to the struggle now 
taking place in Galicia. 
We must further remember that one feature 
present in the depth of winter has now, happily, 
been eliminated, and that is the inferiority in mere 
total numbers of the Russians to the enemy along 
this Eastern front. The equipment of reserves in 
sufficient numbers to redress the balance was 
already apparent by the end of April. 
It is not everything, but it renders the position 
less acute than it was when the great German con- 
centration was descending upon Warsaw in the 
middle of February. 
THE CAVALRY RAID ON LIBAU. 
Nothing has been said in these notes hitherto 
of the new German raid through Courland — that 
is, along the Baltic Coast — because no military 
importance appeared to attach to it. This judg- 
ment — or, rather, conjecture — still holds. No 
critic can say that a movement of cavalry and horse 
artiUery, with a small proportion of infantry — 
probably dependent upon motor traffic — operating 
at a great distance from the main armies, attack- 
ing nothing vital, even politically, in the enemy's 
state, is an operation of war which can possibly 
be read in conjunction with the general military 
aims of the campaign. It is a raid. 
If we try to estimate the subsidiary objects 
in view when this raid was planned they eeem 
to be three. 
First: The impressing of Russian civilian 
opinion, through the coincidence of so deep a 
thrust, with the new violent and successful effort 
of the Austro- Germans in the southern part of 
the Eastern field. 
Secondly : The impressing of neutral, and 
especially of uninstructed neutral, opinion in the 
same direction. 
Thirdly: The obtaining of munitions and 
supplies. 
No Russian artery of communication is cut 
by an offensive of this kind; no forces sufficient 
to effect any permanent work are present, but 
with these three objects, and especially with the 
second, the whole thing exactly fits. 
It must be remembered that the towns of the 
district raided are very largely inhabited by 
German Jews, with sympathies naturally strong 
in favour of Germany and opposed to Russia, and 
this IS particularly true of Libau. That is a state 
of affairs which would facilitate the temporary 
occupation and the material results expected from 
It. Beyond this there is really no more to be said. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
We have this week upon the Dardanelles no 
news upon which any judgment of the advance of 
the operations can be based. There is no British 
official communique which gives us the smallest 
™\^- . We may conjecture, therefore, that the 
aUied Ime is still upon the slopes at the foot of 
the Achibaba position, passing through Krithia, 
or at least we have no nevv's that this position has 
yet been carried. 
It is evident from the nature of the opera- 
tions that the greatest possible secrecy must be 
observed. The authorities have permitted very 
full accounts to come to England of all that accom- 
plished first stage in the business — which was 
also, perhaps, the most difficult — the landing and 
the getting a footing upon all the southern end 
of tlie peninsula. There iis nothing to do but to 
wait patiently for further official news, which will 
give us the progress of the operations later on. 
Meanwhile it may be suggested that probably the 
interval corresponds to the landing of further 
munitions and particularly of heavy pieces. 
The great difficulty in an operation of this 
kind is the landing of the first advance troops. 
Once these, supported by the fleet, can establish a 
position from sea to sea across the narrow piece 
of land, the transports can at their leisure put on 
sliore the heavy pieces of munitions and all that 
the expedition will need, acting securely behind 
the screen of the troops that have established 
themselves. 
It is remarkable enough that we do not receive 
news of the operations from German sources 
either. After the first few days, when the usual 
accuracy of judgment in Berlin upon military 
affairs in this war was misled by the absurd 
Turkish communiques, there seems to have set in a 
mood of caution, and the last German newspapers 
available will not commit themselves to the future 
of the experiment in the Gallipoli Peninsula, upon 
which so much of the future of the war should 
turn. 
The summary of the Dardanelles position 
remains exactly what it was last week. The end of 
the Gallipoli Peninsula is solidly held. Krithia 
is the centre of the allied position upon the slopes 
of the Achibaba ridge. The enemy position along 
the crest of the ridge still stands. Until the attack 
upon this enemy position has developed, until we 
know the result of that attack, our analysis cannot 
proceed. 
THE OPERATIONS NORTH OF ARRAS. 
Upon Sunday and Monday, beginning prob- 
ably with the Saturday before, the French 
developed veiy heavy pressure upon the line just 
south of the British position— that is, upon the 
line between La Bass^e and Arras. The Germans 
believed them to have advanced with somethin'' 
well over a hundred thousand men, and possibly as 
much as four corps, and the effect of that advance 
so far has been the gain of a belt which at its maxi- 
mum is over two miles broad, and of some three 
thousand prisoners, with a corresponding number 
of machine guns— 50. Of field guns only quite a 
small number has fallen into the hands of the 
Allies at the moment of writing : less than a dozen, 
but even this means that the first positions of the 
enemy were carried. There cannot be, in this par- 
ticular region, any intention of breaking through. 
It is not the place for such an attempt. The 
character of the operations does not point to it at 
all. What is probably the object of the move is to 
relieve the rather serious pressure which was 
beginning to be felt just to the north upon the 
British trenches. Into what it will develop we 
cannot tell, but the engagement is proceeding at 
the time of writing. It cannot but draw down 
