May 15. 1915. 
LAND AND kWATER* 
from the north some portion of the enemy forces 
now operating east and south of Ypres, and when 
it has thus relieved the pressure upon the northern 
part of the allied line its task will presumably be 
accomplished. But it is not here that the coming 
offensive will fall, and, viewed in the light of that 
great expectation, the whole of this considerable 
piece of work is of minor importance. 
THE ENEMY'S ESTIMATE OF THE 
NEWLY-TKAINED BRITISH LEVIES. 
Among the most important factors in the 
future of the war is the estimate the enemy may 
make of the new British formations. More impor- 
tant still, of course, is the real value of these new 
formations, because events will in any case correct 
any erroneous estimate the enemy may make. But 
the enemy's estimates are none the less of value 
because according to them will his plans be laid. 
It must be remembered that these new formations 
are just becoming a principal character in the war. 
They will, henceforward, be the chief source of 
recruitment in the West. It is the British recruit- 
ing field (in which term one includes, of course, 
the Colonial troops) which is the most elastic and 
the largest, for the French have put in everyone 
they could, and their recruiting field only consists 
now of the young men growing up to military age 
this year. 
Now, it is important to note that the German 
estimate of the new British material seems to have 
changed very sharply in the last few weeks, and 
that the enemy's respect for it has as rapidly in- 
creased. There has already been wasted during 
this war so much ink in the alternate efforts (no 
doubt with laudable objects) to raise and to depress 
the spirit of civilians, according as it was thought 
that a certain spirit was needed to win the war, or 
another spirit to promote recruiting, that one feels 
a natural reaction against anything which could 
savour of rhetoric in this connection. But it is 
the sober truth that the new British formations 
appearing in the field, with whom one includes 
the Colonials, have had an effect in Germany 
which is appreciable not only through private 
reports but also through the printed descriptions 
of the fighting. 
It is not remarkable that this should be the 
case, but it is extremely important for us to 
appreciate that it is the case. 
It is no wonder that this change between the 
German opinion unexperienced and the German 
opinion experienced should have taken place ; and 
at the junction of the two national organisations 
north of Ypres three weeks ago, where there was 
a medley of races and units more heterogeneous 
than upon any other front in the whole war 
(Zouaves, Belgians, Coloured French Colonial 
troops, French Marines, British Colonial troops, 
&c.), it was the action of the Canadians which 
necessarily impressed itself most upon German 
observers. 
The story is now an old one. Until we had 
" Eye-Witness's " full description it was not 
quite clear what had happened, but now we all 
know the story pretty thoroughly. The French 
retirement, imder the effect of the new gases, left 
a great breach in the line. The Canadian left was 
completely isolated, and at one moment there must 
have been a gap of many hundred yards, perhaps 
a thousand yards or even more, rapidly increas- 
ing, between the extreme Canadian left and the 
right of the French line. There had not been a 
hole torn through the line at the junction of the 
two organisations, but the position was like that 
created when a blow breaks a slat of vrood. The 
part receiving the blow breaks back and away 
from the part just below the point of impact, 
w^hich part still stands on the old line. The old 
line had faced roughly east and west, and the gap 
between the Canadians and the French troops 
faced north and south. If the Germans could 
have rushed that gap they would have broken the 
first line round Ypres. That they did not so nisb 
it was due to the promptitude with which the 
Colonial troops swung round, but much more to 
the tenacity they displayed in resisting an 
enormously superior enemy when almost en- 
veloped. 
If two points may suffice to illustrate the 
quality of this action they may be cited as 
follows : — 
First : The heavy guns abandoned in the 
retirement far beyond the line were recaptured^- 
that is, a strong counter-offensive, assumed on 
the field itself immediately after the first blow 
and against greatly superior numbers, was under- 
taken and successfully carried. 
Secondly, and much more important : While 
certain units suffered losses up to seventy per cent, 
in killed, wounded, and missing, the organisation 
as a whole remained and the line was not broken. 
You get much the same thing in the case of 
the Dardanelles. Though it was a regular divi- 
sion that did perhaps the hardest work, the land- 
ing (upon the impossibility of which Berlin had 
really seriously counted) was also effected by 
great numbers of the new troops. 
Though it will be a very heavy asset in our 
favour if this opinion is maintained — and every- 
thing points to its being maintained — we must 
remember to estimate its causes and to see its real 
nature. It is partly due to the excellent physical 
quality of the human material employed. No one 
could have looked at the new armies without 
appreciating that point. It is partly due to the 
fact that this siege work luckily demands qualities 
in which old and new troops do not greatly differ 
so long as the moral is sound, and, further, has the 
advantage of seasoning and training the men who 
have recently come in. 
Next, we note that if the proviBion of officers 
for very large new formations is the great diffi- 
culty, which we know it is, yet these new forma- 
tions are coming to the war at a moment when the 
enemy's losses in officers have been far greater than 
anything he had allowed for, and in which his 
cadres are seriously and unexpectedly weakened. 
To some extent the very delay in equipment and the 
corresponding length of time during which many 
of the new formations had to be kept under train- 
ing was an advantage in seasoning. 
Lastly — a factor not to be despised, though it 
is often exaggerated in the history of war — the 
spirit with which new troops will go into action 
is increased by every blunder which the enemy 
makes in what I have called in an earlier part 
of this article his " political policy," 
THE POLITICAL OBJECT OF THE 
ENE.MY. 
It is in this dearth of really decisive news 
throughout the whole field of the campaign that 
