May 15, 1915. 
LAND AND J7.ATER, 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
THE "LUSITANIA" AND THE SUBMARINE WAR. 
By A. H. POLLEN. 
BOTE. — This article has been sabmitted to tbe Press Bureau, wblcb does oot object to tbe publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibility for the correctness ol tbe statements. 
THE sinking of the Lusitania is an event 
which strikes the imagination with 
extraordinary force. No disaster in the 
long history of men's conquest of the sea, 
save the loss of the Titanic, compares with it. 
But the Titanic kept afloat for several hours, and 
the Lusitania sank, it seems, twenty minutes after 
she was struck. It is the awful suddenness of the 
thing that horrifies. It was this that cost so dearly 
in lives. There were boats enough for all, but no 
time to lower them. It is a singular comment that 
the number of the boats was dictated by the lesson 
of the Titanic loss and was prescribed by the Inter- 
national Commission — called at the Kaiser's in- 
itiative I That over one thousand civilians, some 
two hundred of them neutral, should have been 
murdered in cold blood has excited an emotion 
simultaneously expressed in widely separated 
countries in almost identical terms. I do not pro- 
pose to discuss the moral aspect of this singular 
crime. No one needs conversion to right views on 
the subject, except those to whom moral appeals 
have no meaning. I propose, therefore, to deal 
with it solely as an incident in the new kind of war 
which Germany has declared upon our seaborne 
trade. 
It is perhaps as well to remind ourselves how 
it was that hostilities took this form. On Decem- 
ber 10 last came the news that the whole of 
Von Spec's squadron, except the Dresden, had 
been sunk at the Falkland Islands. The blow was 
a heavy one to Germany, and it became imme- 
diately necessary to restore her prestige. Within 
a weet a powerful squadron had been sent across 
the North Sea. had bombarded Scarborough, 
Whitby, and the Hartlepools, and had escaped 
home again unengaged by any British ship. "The 
event was hailed in the German Press as a great 
victory, and a proof that Great Britain did not 
command the North Sea. Great Britain, though 
indignant, showed no signs of fear or panic. The 
rest of the world, particularly America, spoke of 
the bombardment of unfortified places as a lapse 
into barbarism, and jeered at the runaways. As an 
assertion of Germany's sea prestige the raid was 
not a success. A new situation seems then to have 
arisen. To strike those who could not strike back, 
to run away as soon as the chance of a fight 
showed, and then to proclaim this as a victory 
had made the German Navy ridiculous in the eyes 
of the world. What was there to do? It was 
suicide to seek a fleet action. To sit down under 
the domination of the English Fleet was equally 
impossible. In a spasm of anger Von Tirpitz 
taunted the Americans with stopping their trade 
with Germany at England's dictation, and asked 
them how they would like to see all trade with 
Britain stopped by submarines? There would at 
least be nothing ridiculous about that. This was 
within a week of the Hartlepool raid. The threat 
was received by the American Press with the com- 
ment we should expect from those whose business it 
is to give educated expression to the judgment of a 
civilised people. Tbe answer seems to have been 
exasperating to those to whom it was addressed. 
But, if I remember right, no more was heard of 
the threat until after the affair of the Dogger 
Bank, when the German Fleet suffered that final 
eclipse of reputation that must follow flight — 
and unsuccessful flight — in action. Had raiding 
been given another chance? Was it the loss of 
the Bliicher that determined the German Emperor 
to turn the submarine threat into an actuality? 
The terms in which the new blockade was declared, 
no less than President Wilson's reply, wiU be 
fresh in the reader's mind. Both have been ex- 
tensively quoted during the last few days. The 
point to remember is that the threat arose out of 
the defeat at the Falkland Islands and the failure 
of the cross-ravaging raids. It was resolved upon 
after the great discredit of the Dogger Bank. Its 
execution was only delayed until Germany could 
construct a justification. A Government mono- 
poly of corn and flour was forthwith put into 
effect, and it was proclaimed that as the German 
people were on the point of famine no mercy could 
be shown to the Power that was starving them. 
The blockade itself came into effect on 
February 18 and has now been in force for the best 
part of three months. As a means of reducing 
our food supply or of diminishing our willingness 
to continue the war it has been a complete failure. 
Hardly one in every 400 of our ships has been 
sunk, and untU Friday last no big ship had been 
sunk at all. 
Is there anything in the sinking of the Lvsi- 
tania to make us fear that the submarine is a more 
effective weapon than we all thought ? More effec- 
tive than its past failure would indicate ? Is any 
greater success in the attack on our trade to be 
expected ? 
The time has been ample to prove that, so far, 
the judgment of every competent critic, expressed 
before tne campaign began, was correct. Between 
August and February the only successes of any 
note which the enemy's submarines had scored 
against our fighting fleet were the sinking of the 
three cruisers on September 22, of Hawke on Octo- 
ber 15, and of Formidable on the night of New 
Year's Day. No other warship had been touched. 
It is generally agreed that rational precautions 
would have saved these five ships also. On each 
of the three occasions the victims had been going 
at slow speed, or were stationary; on two they 
were said to have been cruising in neighbourhoods 
they had been frequenting for some days ; in none 
was there any destroyer protection. 
During the whole of this period a very 
crowded traffic had plied daily between the 
Southern ports of England and the Northern ports 
of France. Some hundreds of thousands of men 
had been sent across to fight, and a constant 
stream of supply ships, hospital ships, and trans- 
ports had been in regular passage, from one end 
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