May 15, 1915. 
LAND AND ;WATES 
chance in an affair of this kind, and, indeed, so 
great are the difficulties that to have attempted the 
thing without every detail having been learned 
would have been a mere courting of disaster. The 
speed at which all these vital manoeuvres were 
worked out and mastered is little short of extra- 
ordinary. Early in April Sir Ian Hamilton was 
reviewing the French troops in Egypt. By the 
21st every transport at Murdos Bay and every 
officer and man on board was apparently ready tor 
action. There must have been a very strenuous 
fortnight's work, though no doubt many of the 
more ingenious arrangementte— such, for instance, 
as the conversion of the River Clyde into the 
modem equivalent of the Horse of Troy— must 
have been put in hand a long time before. 
Our most pressing curiosity at the moment, 
however, is not to do with the past, but with the 
present position and the future prospect. We 
know more of the present position since Mr. 
Asquith's statement in the House of Commons on 
Thursday last. Of the future we can say this with 
confidence, that the success of the entire operation 
will depend upon the extent to which the artillery 
of the Fleet is able to co-operate with the infantry 
and artillery upon shore. Last week I dwelt upon 
some of the limits of this co-operation— such as 
the inability of ships' guns to give the infantry the 
advantage of the sear eking effect that can only be 
got by high-angle fire, the virtual impossibility of 
combining the fire of more than one ship on a 
single target; the necessity of each ship being 
served by a separate observer in every long-range 
bombardment of a fort; and, finally, the difficul- 
ties of keeping up quick and accurate communica- 
tion between each observation station and the ship 
it serves. But there is one limitation to which I 
did not draw attention at all, and it is perhaps 
the most obvious of any of them— I mean the fact 
that thick weather may, at any moment, deprive 
the Array of the Fleet's assistance, and that it may 
remain so deprived for a considerable period. One 
gathers, for instance, from one of Mr. Ashmead- 
Bartlett's letters that, from the 12th to the 20th 
of April, perfect weather conditions, both for 
landing and for long-range artillery, prevailed; 
but that from the 20th to the afternoon of the 
23rd the conditions were altogether unfavourable. 
A Murdos telegram of Friday last tells us that 
there was a gale blowing on the 5th, 6th, and 7th. 
It seems that these gales generally bring with them 
low-hanging clouds and a grey mist, which make 
long-range fire impossible, because the gunners 
cannot pick up the target through their sights. 
There were many interruptions to the bombard- 
ment in February and March owing to this cause. 
The weather was not so bad that the ships could 
not co-operate on the 6th, and there is no inti- 
mation that there was any thick weather 
between April 25 and May 5, so that there 
should have been ten clear days m which to 
make the most of the offensive of the comhiried 
Services. It seems clear that the naval gunfire, 
both direct and indirect, was of vital moment in 
the momentous actions of the 26th, 27th, and 28th. 
The capacity of the Army to stand safely on the 
defensive, if weather should throw the naval gung 
out of action, would naturally depend upon two 
factors— first, how far the offensive had been car- 
ried while the help of the naval guns was avail- 
able, and, next, upon the number and weight of 
the artillery which it has been possible to land, 
emplace, and to supply with ammunition. It was 
no doubt realised from the first that the greatest 
weakness of the position lay in the possibility ol 
a sudden divorce between the two Services. But it 
should be remembered that, with the advance ot 
the summer, the spells of bad weather should be 
at once less frequent and shorter when they come. 
AN AFFAIR OFF THE BELGIAN 
COAST. 
The Secretary of the Admiralty made an 
announcement on "Saturday last to the eft*ect that 
the T.B.D. Maori had struck a mine off the Bel- 
gian coast, that the crew had taken to the boats, 
and that the T.B.D. Crusader's boats had been 
lowered to assist. The enemy then opened fire, and 
Crusader, after being under fire for an hour and a 
half, had to retire, leaving her own and Maori's 
boats behind her. Seven officers and eighty-eight 
men were in them and were taken prisoners. It is 
not stated that either the Crusader or the boata 
suffered any casualties, and to most people the 
story has aopeared exceedingly puzzling. 'Was 
the mine struck before daylight? V/hy was 
Crusader unable to pick up any of the boats? It 
IS possible that Cmsader drew the fire of the forts, 
in the hope that the boats would be able to pull 
out of danger, and manoeuvred quickly to avoid 
being hit herself? Perhaps after an hour and 
a half of this it was found impracticable for 
the boats to make way enough to have any hopes 
of getting to safety. To take in the crews. 
Crusader must have stopped and become too easy 
a mark. To stay any longer was to take a useless 
risk, possibly involving the risk of losses amongst 
the boats as well. What the destroyers were doing 
within range of the forts is not explained. The 
German vessels that took our men apparently came 
out and returned without being engaged. W^hat 
kind of vessels were they ? Perhaps the most in- 
credible part of the story is that our boats were 
taken and not sunk. The loss of a destroyer and 
so mauy officers and men is a serious matter, and it 
is to be hoped that the Admiralty will give us 
further particulars. ___„..,^ -— 
THE STRONG LINE FOR AMERICA. 
By CAPTAIN CLARENCE WIENER. 
tCaptoin W.ener -is the well-known American military expert and 
writer. Hg held a r<,uiini38iou in the British Army during th« South 
Ahican war, when he wm twice mentioned in dispatches, tiia views 
•a an American citiztn have special inlcT,;st at tho present momentJ 
IT would be well if Americana ceased to gaze on the sur- 
face of things only— it would be well if they looked 
closely into the uatura of the great cataclysm that is 
taking place not only on the plains of Europe, but m 
many other quarters of the inhabited globe. For the 
moment the United Statfis might be styled the playground of 
the world, for there no sounds of guns fired in anger are 
heard, no cries of outraged womanhood, none of the miseries 
of absolute devastation. Yet this li!>erty from the horrors of 
conflict may well bo but a moineniary respite. Should the 
Teutonic races win through on thdr policy of " Word and 
iron," America will have but a few brief years of cu pablo 
peace; in the end Prussian military domination will hold her 
in its grasp as the ice holds the polar seas. 
It would be well, while there is yet time, to take these 
thing's to heart. And to act. For never again— if tnie civili- 
Batioli and enlightened progress is throttled now— will vc, tue 
citizens of the United Stat"?, have such great forces acting 
in unity with ourselves. That may appear a sclush view-pouit 
U* 
