LAND AND WATER 
May 22, 1915. 
past Ablain nnd Carency on both sides and were 
nearly abreast of Souchez. In the course of that 
same day, Wednesday, and in the following night, 
they carried the wood to the west of and in front 
of Carency, the hill marked 125 metres to the 
north of Carency, and ultimately the fortified 
village itself, accounting for four battalions of the 
enemy which were as garrison, and taking, 
apparently, over and above the killed and 
wounded, about a thousand prisoners. 
It is curious to note that the German com- 
munique instead of being silent upon this success, 
admits only a tenth of the garrison of Carency, 
using the words " we lost " in that place from 600 
to 700 men. But all communiques of a reverse 
naturally minimise its defect, and it is possible 
that these figures refer to unwounded prisoners. 
At the end of the whole operation the French 
were in possession of all the fortified area between 
the three villages along the stream of the spur of 
the chapel above, of part of Souchez, and of nearly 
all the village of Neuville, their line being approxi- 
mately that of the dashes in the preceding sketch. 
THE OBJECT OF THESE OPERATIONS 
The question has certainly occurred to nearly 
all those who read the news in this country, " How 
are we to estimate the iinportance of such a 
success as this of the British near Festhubert or 
the French at Carency ? " 
The first, the most obvious, and, unfortunately, 
the most erroneous suggestion is that one should 
measure success by the belt of territory gained, 
and correspondingly measure a reverse by the belt 
of territory lost, and estimate the credit and debit 
in the width of such gains and losses of ground. 
It is inevitable that this sort of reply should 
suggest itself to the mind, because, roughly 
speaking, in all fighting the successful force 
advances and the unsuccessful force retires. 
But it is, as has been frequently pointed out 
iu these columns, a complete misconception of the 
trench work in the West to estimate it in these 
terms. 
The next less obvious suggestion which occurs 
to those who watch such movements is to estimate 
success or failure by the shape of the line held. 
They notice a prominent salient and connect 
it with the idea of danger. They notice a dent 
in the line and connect it with the idea of a break 
at that point. 
Now, this reply to the question is not so false 
as the first one, but it is still erroneous, from the 
simple fact that the " line " in question is not 
comparable in texture to a thin cord, but rather 
to a rather tough and broad sandbag. It is per- 
fectly true that if you see the Allied line, for 
instance, give way badly at one point and see a 
" V " in it very rapidly and dangerously broaden- 
ing and deepening, you might argue a tolerably 
bad breach of the line at that point. Common 
sense tells everyone that a breach in a line, if it 
be sufficiently wide and inflicted by a sufficient 
force, means the turning of what v>as one large 
army into two smaller ones, and the rolling up 
and defeat of the lesser portion. 
But this watching of the shape of the line, 
unless the shape varies very much indeed, is not a 
true gauge to apply. The real test of success or 
failure is simply this : How far has stick and such 
an openitioii udoanced us towards that point when 
4* 
the enemy will be covtpcUcd to shorten his line or 
to run the risk of seeing it break? 
Now, no one can estimate the full value of an 
operation judged by this standard, save the com- 
manders upon the spot, who have before them the 
evidence of the enemy's losses and of their own, 
who can judge of the enemy's moral, of his shoot- 
ing, of his air work, and all the rest of it, and 
who can estimate the number of men the enemy 
can still put up in front of him. 
Eoughly speaking, the question we ought to 
ask in au this struggle in the West and about 
each particular operation is two-fold, each por- 
tion of the ansv/er being directed towards the 
general reply upon the approach we have made to 
compelling the enemy to shorten his line ; and the 
two questions are, first, what effect has the opera- 
tion had as a 'preparation for a final offensive? 
Secondly, what losses have ^ve compelled the 
enemy to sustain compared with our own ? 
As to the second of these two questions, we 
will for the momicnt neglect it, because it is diffi- 
cult to apply to particular actions. We only get 
the answer in general results after all the evi- 
dence has been co-ordinated. It is published with 
some accuracy by the French General Staff from 
time to time; or, at least, the conjectured enemy 
losses are published. This unknown factor is, of 
course, the most important, because the Com- 
manders of the Allies in the West will not under- 
take a general offensive until they find that the 
enemy is nearing the breaking point. To attack 
too early would be exactly like buying a stock 
before it has reached its lowest quotation. It 
would be a waste of energy. There is only one 
thing that will make them launch a strong offen- 
sive before this critical moment, and that would 
be so decisive a defeat of the Eussians in the East 
as to threaten the approaching return of numerous 
enemies towards the Western front a week or ten 
days later. Such an event would indeed pre- 
cipitate what would otherwise be a premature 
offensive; but in the absence of such an event, 
the offensive will certainly be delayed until the 
critical moment of which I speak. 
But the first question, " How far does our 
action advance us in our preparation towards the 
final attack? " is easier to answer. 
Colonel Maude has very aptly compared all 
this preliminary work to the action of an engineer 
who is at pains and great expense of time in 
laying down strong foundations which, when" they 
are once achieved, will permit of rapid and secure 
building. 
Of what nature are these " foundations " 
which the Allied Commanders in the West are lay- 
ing down and the efforts in the preparation of 
which have now spread over so many months ? 
It is a point very well worth considering in 
detail, because it is perhaps that which is least 
apprehended in general conversation upon the 
war. 
LATERAL COMMUNICATIONS. 
In order to understand this point, it is 
essential to grasp what is meant by lateral com- 
munications. 
A fixed line held with a certain minimum 
number of men (as is the German line across 
France and Flanders from the Swiss mountains to 
the North Sea) and so placed (as is this line) that 
It cannot be turned at either end (reposing, as it 
does, one end upon neutral territory and the other 
