May 22, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATEE. 
broaden in width and increase in difficulty of com- 
raunications as one goes from north-west to south- 
east. If all this were taking place in a flat 
country, with excellent lateral communications — 
that is, communications parallel to the Austro- 
German front — then applying great pressure on 
to the Bukowina end of the line would no doubt 
tempt the Austro- Germans to bring round their 
troops from the north and so relieve the difficul- 
ties of the Russian line on the right, communi- 
cating upon the San. But these lateral communi- 
cations are lacking. The troops would have to be 
brought a long way round by rail from Hungary, 
along the railway line which follows the Galician 
foothills of the Carpathians. But this line 
is not in Austro-German hands, save at its 
western extremity. For the Russians have the 
important junction of Stanislas, and possess 
many other sections of the line further west. 
Therefore all that the heavy pressure against the 
Bukowina, now being exercised by the Russians, 
can do at the best is to compel the withdrawal of 
the Austro-German troops now occupying that 
province, and perhaps to draw to the front certain 
local reserves lurking behind the Bukowina across 
the passes in Hungary. But it will certainly not 
have the effect of bringing men and guns down 
from the north to save the threatened point in the 
south. The Austro-German effort against the San 
and against the salient of Przemysl, and in 
general the Austro-German attempt to take the 
whole of north Galicia from the Russians, will 
hardly be affected by this counter-move in the 
south. 
Thirdly, it may be asked : Do^s the Russian 
counter-offensive here presume an attempt to get 
ultimately into Hungary over the Southern Car- 
pathian passes if the northern Carpathian passes 
are lost ? The answer to this question would seem 
to be almost certainly, No. The distance is too 
great and the communications too difficult at the 
moment for such a stroke to expect success. If, 
indeed, the Austro-German advance on the north 
can be checked and thoroughly held, if in the 
fruitless attempt to prosecute it the enemy were 
to waste great numbers of men and to emplace 
more or less permanently great numbers of guns 
along the San, thefiby the time considerable bodies 
of reserves could be equipped, and by the time the 
artillery could be properly munitioned— which is 
the great weakness of the Russians — it is conceiv- 
able that the new attempt towards Hungary might 
be made across the higher, broader, and wilder 
Carpathian country of the south-east, close to the 
Roumanian border. If the Roumanian Array 
intervenes, it is obvious that a blow would ulti- 
mately be struck in that direction, but for the 
moment the Russian advance into the Bukowina 
does not seem to be aiming at crossing the moun- 
tains. 
THE DARDANELLES. 
We have from the Dardanelles news confirm- 
ing the strength of tlie Achibaba position, and 
showing that the enemy still maintains himself 
along the Achibaba ridge and is continuously 
resisting the attack delivered by the Allies from 
beyond Krithia. 
On May 6, 7, and 8, the British attacking up 
the slopes below Krithia on the left, the French 
making for the buildings of Halar on the right, 
failed to carry the ridge. 
Meanwhile it may be of interest to the readers 
of Land and Water to examine the exact con- 
figuration of this first main position, the Achibaba 
Ridge, upon the carrying of which will depend all 
the first part of the campaign in the Gallipoli 
Peninsula. On the next page I append a sketch of 
the contours defining this strong position. The 
heights of the contours are given in metres, and 
the probable contour lines (the important ones over 
100 metres) are given at 120, 140, and 150 metres 
above the land. The contours are given at dis- 
tances of 15 metres from the only two points at 
which such contours may be shown — to wit, the 
summits of the ridge of the cliff at the south- 
eastern end above the Dardanelles. 
I give the scale in ranges of 1,000 metres, 
8,000 metres being approximately five miles. 
It will be seen from the above sketch that the 
position is a very strong one as against attack 
coming from the south-west — that is, from the 
direction of Krithia and from the slopes there 
falling towards the extremity of the peninsula, 
upon which slopes the main allied force now lies. 
The main line of the position, which from the 
contours would seem to be that which the enemy 
would occupy (though, of course, all this is only 
conjecture, for nothing but observation on the spot 
can tell one exactly where upon the ridge the 
trenches will be drawn) is indicated on the sketch 
by the dotted lines. In front of it on the slope 
nearly as far as Krithia are parallel enemy 
trenches. Below the ridge is hidden the enemy's 
artillery. 
It will be observed that both ends of this 
line, the north-western end on the ^Egean Sea 
and the south-eastern end upon the Dardanelles, 
reposes upon a very precipitous descent towards 
the sea, while it is further remarkable that the 
difficulty of turning the extremities of such a line 
are increased by the presence running inland from 
the Dardanelles at A and from the JEgean Sea at 
B of two ravines with precipitous sides, which 
protect from direct assault any position drawn 
above them. 
The vulnerable part of the line is therefore 
to be discovered apparently only in its centre. It 
is true that the extreme steepness of the sides of 
the ravine at B, and probably also that at A, will 
create a certain amount of dead ground upon the 
slopes. That is a ground which cannot be searched 
by rifle fire from the ridge above the point. A 
glance at these contours shows that each of these 
ravines can be searched thoroughly by enfilade 
fire from that part of the position which lies at 
the head of each. Thus ravine A is commanded 
entirely by the spur of the 150 metre contour in 
front of the buildings at Halar, which spur is 
seen projecting at the point C, while the ravine 
at B is similarly commanded by the spur marked 
D at the north-western end upon the 130 metre 
contour. In general, and so far as mere observa- ■ 
tion from the air is of any value in such conjec- 
tures, it would seem that the position is not to be 
taken by force save somewhere in its central por- 
tion between D and C, and with regard to that 
portion it must again be admitted that the oppor- 
tunities for defence are very great. It is true that 
the saddle at the lowest point of the ridge, just 
opposite Krithia, at the point marked E E is low. 
It is not much more, if any more, than 10 metres, 
n* 
